An integer overflow existed in the wolfCrypt CMAC...
High severity
Unreviewed
Published
Apr 10, 2026
to the GitHub Advisory Database
•
Updated Apr 27, 2026
Description
Published by the National Vulnerability Database
Apr 10, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
Apr 10, 2026
Last updated
Apr 27, 2026
An integer overflow existed in the wolfCrypt CMAC implementation, that could be exploited to forge CMAC tags. The function wc_CmacUpdate used the guard
if (cmac->totalSz != 0)to skip XOR-chaining on the first block (where digest is all-zeros and the XOR is a no-op). However, totalSz is word32 and wraps to zero after 2^28 block flushes (4 GiB), causing the guard to erroneously discard the live CBC-MAC chain state. Any two messages sharing a common suffix beyond the 4 GiB mark then produce identical CMAC tags, enabling a zero-work prefix-substitution forgery. The fix removes the guard, making the XOR unconditional; the no-op property on the first block is preserved because digest is zero-initialized by wc_InitCmac_ex.References