Summary
A public access-control flaw allows unauthenticated users to retrieve the full user list from GET /api/allusers. This exposes user profile metadata to anyone who can reach the application and enables remote user enumeration.
Details
The vulnerable route is registered as a public endpoint:
internal/router/user.go:17
appRouterGroup.PublicRouterGroup.GET("/allusers", h.UserHandler.GetAllUsers())
However, the handler appears to have been intended as an authenticated endpoint:
internal/handler/user/user.go:177-185
- API annotations indicate an authentication requirement via
@Security ApiKeyAuth
This creates a mismatch between the documented security model and the actual routing configuration. As a result, requests to GET /api/allusers succeed without authentication and return user records, including profile metadata such as usernames, email addresses, role-related flags, avatar values, and locale information.
A negative control against another endpoint that correctly requires authentication further supports that this exposure is unintended: GET /api/user returns 401 Unauthorized when no token is supplied, while GET /api/allusers remains publicly accessible.
Impact
- Type: Access control bypass / unauthenticated data exposure
- Who is impacted: Any deployment exposing the API to untrusted networks, and all users whose profile metadata is returned by the endpoint
- Security impact: Enables remote user enumeration and disclosure of user profile metadata, which may facilitate account reconnaissance, phishing, and targeted credential attacks
- Attack preconditions: None beyond network access to the affected API endpoint
References
QiaoNPC Reporter
Summary
A public access-control flaw allows unauthenticated users to retrieve the full user list from
GET /api/allusers. This exposes user profile metadata to anyone who can reach the application and enables remote user enumeration.Details
The vulnerable route is registered as a public endpoint:
internal/router/user.go:17appRouterGroup.PublicRouterGroup.GET("/allusers", h.UserHandler.GetAllUsers())However, the handler appears to have been intended as an authenticated endpoint:
internal/handler/user/user.go:177-185@Security ApiKeyAuthThis creates a mismatch between the documented security model and the actual routing configuration. As a result, requests to
GET /api/alluserssucceed without authentication and return user records, including profile metadata such as usernames, email addresses, role-related flags, avatar values, and locale information.A negative control against another endpoint that correctly requires authentication further supports that this exposure is unintended:
GET /api/userreturns401 Unauthorizedwhen no token is supplied, whileGET /api/allusersremains publicly accessible.Impact
References