nimiq-transaction: UpdateValidator transactions allows voting key change without proof-of-knowledge
Moderate severity
GitHub Reviewed
Published
Apr 22, 2026
in
nimiq/core-rs-albatross
•
Updated Apr 27, 2026
Description
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
Apr 22, 2026
Reviewed
Apr 22, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database
Apr 22, 2026
Last updated
Apr 27, 2026
Impact
The staking contract accepts
UpdateValidatortransactions that setnew_voting_key=Some(...)while omittingnew_proof_of_knowledge. this skips the proof-of-knowledge requirement that is needed to prevent BLS rogue-key attacks when public keys are aggregated.Because tendermint macro block justification verification aggregates validator voting keys and verifies a single aggregated BLS signature against that aggregate public key, a rogue-key voting key in the validator set can allow an attacker to forge a quorum-looking justification while only producing a single signature.
While the impact is critical, the exploitability is low: The voting keys are fixed for the epoch, so the attacker would need to know the next epoch validator set (chosen through VRF), which is unlikely.
Patches
The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0.
Workarounds
No known workarounds.
References