OpenClaw's image tool bypasses tools.fs.workspaceOnly on sandbox mount paths and exfiltrates out-of-workspace images
Moderate severity
GitHub Reviewed
Published
Feb 24, 2026
in
openclaw/openclaw
•
Updated Mar 20, 2026
Description
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
Mar 4, 2026
Reviewed
Mar 4, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database
Mar 19, 2026
Last updated
Mar 20, 2026
Summary
In OpenClaw, the sandboxed
imagetool did not honortools.fs.workspaceOnly=truefor mounted paths resolved by the sandbox FS bridge. This allowed reading out-of-workspace mounted images (for example/agent/*) and forwarding those bytes to vision model providers.Impact
Sandbox boundary bypass with confidentiality impact. In affected versions,
read/write/editrespected workspace-only guardrails, butimagecould still load mounted out-of-workspace files and exfiltrate them via model requests.Affected Packages / Versions
openclaw(npm)<= 2026.2.22-2>= 2026.2.23(released)2026.2.22-2Technical Details
workspaceOnlywas enforced in sandbox file tools andapply_patch, but not propagated/enforced forimagesandbox path resolution. The fix threadsworkspaceOnlyinto image-tool construction and asserts sandbox-root containment before loading media bytes.Fix Commit(s)
dd9d9c1c609dcb4579f9e57bd7b5c879d0146b53OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
References