Summary
The Super-linter GitHub Action is vulnerable to command injection via crafted filenames. When this action is used in downstream GitHub Actions workflows, an attacker can submit a pull request that introduces a file whose name contains shell command substitution syntax, such as $(...). In affected Super-linter versions, runtime scripts may execute the embedded command during file discovery processing, enabling arbitrary command execution in the workflow runner context. This can be used to disclose the job’s GITHUB_TOKEN depending on how the workflow configures permissions.
Details
The issue appears originates in the logic that scans the repository for changed files to check.
- Use a workflow that runs Super-linter on
pull_request events.
- Open a pull request that adds a new file with a crafted filename containing command substitution and an outbound request that includes
$GITHUB_TOKEN.
- Run the workflow.
Impact
- Arbitrary command execution in the context of the workflow run that invokes Super-linter (triggered by attacker-controlled filenames in a PR).
- Credential exposure / misuse: the injected command can read environment variables available to the action, including
GITHUB_TOKEN.
The level of exposure depends on the source of the pull request.
To actively exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs have the ability to run workflows without any approval from the repository admin.
Also, the GITHUB_TOKEN needs to have unconstrained access to repository resources. Even in that case, for pull request coming from forked repositories, no secrets are passed to the forked repository when running workflows triggered by pull_request events, and the GITHUB_TOKEN drops and write permission on the source repository source.
Finally, although not specific to this vulnerability, we recommend auditing workflow_call and pull_request_target workflows because they can lead to compromise, regardless of whether you're using Super-linter, or not, as explained by this GitHub Enterprise doc.
References
izefoea Reporter
Summary
The Super-linter GitHub Action is vulnerable to command injection via crafted filenames. When this action is used in downstream GitHub Actions workflows, an attacker can submit a pull request that introduces a file whose name contains shell command substitution syntax, such as
$(...). In affected Super-linter versions, runtime scripts may execute the embedded command during file discovery processing, enabling arbitrary command execution in the workflow runner context. This can be used to disclose the job’sGITHUB_TOKENdepending on how the workflow configures permissions.Details
The issue appears originates in the logic that scans the repository for changed files to check.
pull_requestevents.$GITHUB_TOKEN.Impact
GITHUB_TOKEN.The level of exposure depends on the source of the pull request.
To actively exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs have the ability to run workflows without any approval from the repository admin.
Also, the
GITHUB_TOKENneeds to have unconstrained access to repository resources. Even in that case, for pull request coming from forked repositories, no secrets are passed to the forked repository when running workflows triggered bypull_requestevents, and theGITHUB_TOKENdrops and write permission on the source repository source.Finally, although not specific to this vulnerability, we recommend auditing
workflow_callandpull_request_targetworkflows because they can lead to compromise, regardless of whether you're using Super-linter, or not, as explained by this GitHub Enterprise doc.References