Summary
OpenClaw's exec allowlist supported optional argPattern entries to restrict the arguments accepted for an allowlisted executable. In affected releases, Linux and macOS gateways skipped argPattern checks and treated a matching executable path as sufficient to satisfy the allowlist.
This meant an operator could configure an allowlist entry that appeared to permit only a narrow argv shape, but OpenClaw would allow other argv for the same executable without an approval prompt when tools.exec.security was set to allowlist.
This issue is limited to direct enforcement of configured argPattern values. OpenClaw's exec approvals remain best-effort guardrails and do not attempt to semantically model every interpreter, loader, package script, shell feature, or transitive file a command may use.
Affected configurations
This affects OpenClaw gateway deployments that meet all of these conditions:
- the gateway runs on Linux or macOS
- exec is configured with
tools.exec.security: "allowlist"
- at least one exec allowlist entry uses
argPattern
- the allowlisted executable accepts security-relevant arguments or flags
Path-only allowlist entries are not additionally affected by this issue, because those entries intentionally allow any arguments for the matched executable. Windows was not affected by this specific bug because the affected code path already applied argPattern checks on Windows.
Impact
If an untrusted or lower-trust sender can influence a tool-enabled agent to call exec, they may be able to run disallowed arguments for an executable that the operator intended to restrict with argPattern. Depending on the executable, those arguments can cause host-side file access, network access, or command execution that should have required an approval prompt.
The practical impact depends on the operator's allowlist and channel exposure. Examples of higher-risk allowlisted executables include tools with interpreter, loader, subprocess, network, or plugin flags such as git, python, node, bash, find, tar, and ssh.
This is not a bypass of all exec approval semantics. It is a bypass of the direct argPattern predicate that the operator configured and that the exec tool description advertised as enforced at runtime.
Patched Versions
The first stable patched version is 2026.5.12.
Mitigations
Upgrade to openclaw@2026.5.12 or later. Before upgrading, operators who use exec allowlist mode should review entries that combine an executable path with argPattern, especially for interpreter-like or subprocess-capable tools.
References
amwhoi Reporter
Summary
OpenClaw's exec allowlist supported optional
argPatternentries to restrict the arguments accepted for an allowlisted executable. In affected releases, Linux and macOS gateways skippedargPatternchecks and treated a matching executable path as sufficient to satisfy the allowlist.This meant an operator could configure an allowlist entry that appeared to permit only a narrow argv shape, but OpenClaw would allow other argv for the same executable without an approval prompt when
tools.exec.securitywas set toallowlist.This issue is limited to direct enforcement of configured
argPatternvalues. OpenClaw's exec approvals remain best-effort guardrails and do not attempt to semantically model every interpreter, loader, package script, shell feature, or transitive file a command may use.Affected configurations
This affects OpenClaw gateway deployments that meet all of these conditions:
tools.exec.security: "allowlist"argPatternPath-only allowlist entries are not additionally affected by this issue, because those entries intentionally allow any arguments for the matched executable. Windows was not affected by this specific bug because the affected code path already applied
argPatternchecks on Windows.Impact
If an untrusted or lower-trust sender can influence a tool-enabled agent to call exec, they may be able to run disallowed arguments for an executable that the operator intended to restrict with
argPattern. Depending on the executable, those arguments can cause host-side file access, network access, or command execution that should have required an approval prompt.The practical impact depends on the operator's allowlist and channel exposure. Examples of higher-risk allowlisted executables include tools with interpreter, loader, subprocess, network, or plugin flags such as
git,python,node,bash,find,tar, andssh.This is not a bypass of all exec approval semantics. It is a bypass of the direct
argPatternpredicate that the operator configured and that the exec tool description advertised as enforced at runtime.Patched Versions
The first stable patched version is
2026.5.12.Mitigations
Upgrade to
openclaw@2026.5.12or later. Before upgrading, operators who use exec allowlist mode should review entries that combine an executable path withargPattern, especially for interpreter-like or subprocess-capable tools.References