Summary
An authenticated user who can create or edit ObjectAlias objects can store arbitrary HTML/JavaScript in an alias name. That payload is later rendered unescaped in DataFlow table views, causing a stored XSS when another user views the affected page.
Details
The issue is caused by unsafe HTML generation in the plugin’s custom table column renderer.
Relevant code on main (bf96eac, same commit as origin/main at the time of review):
netbox_data_flows/models/objectaliases.py
ObjectAlias.name is user-controlled (CharField)
ObjectAlias.__str__() returns self.name directly
netbox_data_flows/tables/dataflows.py
DataFlowTable.sources and DataFlowTable.destinations use ObjectAliasListColumn
netbox_data_flows/tables/columns.py
ObjectAliasListColumn.render() calls object_list_to_string(value.all(), linkify=True)
netbox_data_flows/utils/helpers.py
object_list_to_string() builds raw anchor tags with:
mark_safe(separator.join(f'<a href="{o.get_absolute_url()}">{o}</a>' for o in objects))
The alias text ({o}) is inserted into HTML without escaping, then the whole string is marked safe. Because ObjectAlias.__str__() returns the user-supplied name, HTML/JS in the alias name is executed in the victim’s browser.
This affects any page rendering DataFlowTable, including at least:
- the main Data Flow list page
- model tabs that reuse
DataFlowTable
PoC
Environment:
- NetBox with
netbox-data-flows installed
- No special plugin configuration required
Steps:
- Log in as a user with permission to create or edit
ObjectAlias and DataFlow.
- Create a new
ObjectAlias with the following name:
<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>
- Create or edit a
DataFlow so this alias is present in either sources or destinations.
- Log in as another user and open the Data Flow list page in the plugin UI.
- The JavaScript executes when the table renders the alias list.
A simple path to trigger is the Data Flow list page. Any other page that renders DataFlowTable should also be tested.
Impact
This is a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability.
Impacted users:
- any authenticated user who can view a page rendering the affected
DataFlow table
- especially higher-privileged NetBox users, because an attacker with lower privileges may target them by planting a malicious alias name
Possible impact:
- session theft
- execution of privileged actions in the victim’s session
- exfiltration of data visible to the victim in NetBox
References
Summary
An authenticated user who can create or edit
ObjectAliasobjects can store arbitrary HTML/JavaScript in an alias name. That payload is later rendered unescaped inDataFlowtable views, causing a stored XSS when another user views the affected page.Details
The issue is caused by unsafe HTML generation in the plugin’s custom table column renderer.
Relevant code on
main(bf96eac, same commit asorigin/mainat the time of review):netbox_data_flows/models/objectaliases.pyObjectAlias.nameis user-controlled (CharField)ObjectAlias.__str__()returnsself.namedirectlynetbox_data_flows/tables/dataflows.pyDataFlowTable.sourcesandDataFlowTable.destinationsuseObjectAliasListColumnnetbox_data_flows/tables/columns.pyObjectAliasListColumn.render()callsobject_list_to_string(value.all(), linkify=True)netbox_data_flows/utils/helpers.pyobject_list_to_string()builds raw anchor tags with:The alias text (
{o}) is inserted into HTML without escaping, then the whole string is marked safe. BecauseObjectAlias.__str__()returns the user-supplied name, HTML/JS in the alias name is executed in the victim’s browser.This affects any page rendering
DataFlowTable, including at least:DataFlowTablePoC
Environment:
netbox-data-flowsinstalledSteps:
ObjectAliasandDataFlow.ObjectAliaswith the following name:DataFlowso this alias is present in eithersourcesordestinations.A simple path to trigger is the Data Flow list page. Any other page that renders
DataFlowTableshould also be tested.Impact
This is a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability.
Impacted users:
DataFlowtablePossible impact:
References