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OpenClaw Improperly Neutralizes Line Breaks in systemd Unit Generation Enables Local Command Execution (Linux)

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Feb 21, 2026 in openclaw/openclaw • Updated Mar 16, 2026

Package

npm openclaw (npm)

Affected versions

<= 2026.2.19-2

Patched versions

2026.2.21

Description

Summary

A command injection vulnerability exists in OpenClaw’s Linux systemd unit generation path.
When rendering Environment= entries, attacker-controlled values are not rejected for CR/LF, and systemdEscapeArg() uses an incorrect whitespace-matching regex. This allows newline injection to break out of an Environment= line and inject standalone systemd directives (for example, ExecStartPre=). On service restart, the injected command is executed, resulting in local arbitrary command execution (local RCE) under the gateway service user.

Details

The issue is in src/daemon/systemd-unit.ts:

  • renderEnvLines(...) builds:
  • Environment=${systemdEscapeArg(${key}=${value})}
  • No CR/LF validation is enforced for environment keys/values before writing unit lines.
  • systemdEscapeArg(...) uses:
  • /[\\s"\\\\]/
  • In this regex, \\s is interpreted as a literal backslash + s, not a whitespace character class.
    As a result, whitespace detection/quoting behavior is incorrect.
    Because systemd parses unit files line-by-line, a newline inside an environment value can inject an additional directive line. Example rendered output:
Environment=INJECT=ok
ExecStartPre=/bin/touch /tmp/oc15789_rce

At restart time, systemd executes ExecStartPre, enabling command execution.

Relevant code path/components involved in exploitation chain:

  • src/daemon/systemd-unit.ts
  • src/commands/daemon-install-helpers.ts
  • src/config/env-vars.ts
  • src/config/zod-schema.ts

Trigger conditions:

  1. Attacker can influence config.env.vars (directly or indirectly).
  2. Install/reinstall path is invoked to write/update the unit.
  3. Service restart occurs (systemctl --user restart ...).

PoC

Environment: Linux host with systemd user services enabled.

  1. Configure a malicious environment value in OpenClaw config (config.env.vars), including a newline and injected directive:
  • Key: INJECT
  • Value:
ok
ExecStartPre=/bin/touch /tmp/oc15789_rce
  1. Install/reinstall the gateway service (fixed port as requested):
openclaw gateway install --port 15789 --force
  1. Inspect the generated user unit file (default path):
~/.config/systemd/user/openclaw-gateway.service

Verify that an injected standalone line exists:

ExecStartPre=/bin/touch /tmp/oc15789_rce
  1. Reload and restart user service:
systemctl --user daemon-reload
systemctl --user restart openclaw-gateway.service
  1. Confirm command execution side effect:
ls -l /tmp/oc15789_rce

Impact

This is a local command execution vulnerability in OpenClaw’s systemd unit generation during install/reinstall flows.

  • Type: Command injection via newline/directive injection in unit file generation.
  • Execution context: Runs with the same privileges as the OpenClaw gateway service user.
  • Affected users: Linux deployments using systemd user services where an attacker can control config.env.vars and trigger install/reinstall.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 61f646c41fb43cd87ed48f9125b4718a30d38e84

References

@steipete steipete published to openclaw/openclaw Feb 21, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Mar 3, 2026
Reviewed Mar 3, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Mar 11, 2026
Last updated Mar 16, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Local
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements None
Privileges Required None
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality High
Integrity High
Availability High
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(61st percentile)

Weaknesses

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')

The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-32063

GHSA ID

GHSA-vffc-f7r7-rx2w

Source code

Credits

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