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Gitea: OAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009)

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jul 13, 2026 in go-gitea/gitea

Package

gomod code.gitea.io/gitea (Go)

Affected versions

< 1.27.0

Patched versions

1.27.0

Description

Description

Gitea's OAuth2 sign-in callback reactivates a deactivated user account (IsActive=false) when the user signs in through an authentication source that does not issue refresh tokens (notably GitHub, and any OIDC/OAuth2 source configured without offline_access). PR #38009 added a gate intended to reactivate users only when the OAuth2 auto-sync cron had disabled them, using "the stored refresh token is empty" as the signal. That signal is wrong: for sources that never issue refresh tokens, an empty refresh token is the normal state of every user, so the gate cannot distinguish a cron-disabled account from one an administrator deliberately deactivated. The next time the administrator-deactivated user signs in through the provider, Gitea sets IsActive=true and grants a full session, silently undoing the administrator's action. This is the exact behavior #38009 was written to prevent. (ProhibitLogin, the hard ban, is enforced separately and is not affected.)

No special privileges are required beyond being the deactivated user and being able to sign in through the source.

Root Cause

routers/web/auth/oauth.go (the handleOAuth2SignIn reactivation gate):

if !u.IsActive {
    extLogin, hasExt, err := user_model.GetExternalLogin(ctx, authSource.ID, gothUser.UserID)
    if err != nil { ctx.ServerError("GetExternalLogin", err); return }
    isDisabledByAutoSync := hasExt && extLogin.RefreshToken == ""   // wrong signal
    if isDisabledByAutoSync {
        opts.IsActive = optional.Some(true)                          // reactivates the account
    }
}

The assumption that RefreshToken == "" is produced only by the auto-sync cron is false:

  • The cron's disable path is unreachable for sources without refresh tokens. services/auth/source/oauth2/source_sync.go returns early: if !provider.RefreshTokenAvailable() { return ... }, so it never disables (or touches the tokens of) such users.
  • The stored token is exactly what the provider returned, with no synthesizing: services/externalaccount/user.go stores RefreshToken: gothUser.RefreshToken. When the provider issues none, this is "" from the first login.
  • GitHub never issues a refresh token: goth hardcodes func (p *Provider) RefreshTokenAvailable() bool { return false } (providers/github/github.go). OIDC/OAuth2 without offline_access likewise store "".

So for a GitHub (or no-refresh-token) source, RefreshToken == "" is the state of every user, including one an administrator deactivated, and the gate reactivates them.

Proof of Concept

Setup:

  • A Gitea instance with a GitHub authentication source (Admin Panel -> Authentication Sources -> OAuth2 -> GitHub), or any OAuth2/OIDC source configured without offline_access.
  • Account V: a normal user who has signed in at least once through that source (an external_login_user row exists with empty refresh_token).

Steps:

  1. As an administrator, open Admin Panel -> Users -> V and uncheck "Activated" (is_active=false). Confirm V's requests now bounce to the activation page.
  2. As V, sign in again via "Sign in with GitHub" and complete the provider flow.
  3. V lands in the application with a working session. SELECT is_active FROM "user" WHERE lower_name='v'; now returns true.

Expected (intended by #38009): V stays is_active=false and is routed to the activation page.
Actual: V is is_active=true with a full session — the administrator's deactivation is undone.

- GitHub user, ADMIN deactivated                 refreshToken=""    -> REACTIVATED + session granted   <<< admin action undone
- OIDC user w/ refresh token, ADMIN deactivated  refreshToken="..." -> stays disabled  (control)
- OIDC user, AUTO-SYNC cron disabled             refreshToken=""    -> REACTIVATED (intended)
RESULT: BYPASS CONFIRMED.

Gitea's own regression test TestOAuth2CallbackReactivationGating ("auto-sync-disabled user is reactivated") sets RefreshToken="" and asserts reactivation after a full OIDC callback — that state is identical to a GitHub-source user an administrator deactivated.

Impact

Any Gitea instance using a GitHub authentication source (one of the most common) or an OIDC/OAuth2 source without refresh tokens, that relies on the "Activated" toggle to disable accounts, is affected. A deactivated user restores their own account to active and obtains a session, regaining whatever access the account had. Deactivation does not clear IsAdmin, so a deactivated administrator regains admin access. Bound: accounts disabled with "Prohibit Login" stay blocked; this defeats the IsActive=false deactivation only.

References

@bircni bircni published to go-gitea/gitea Jul 13, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Jul 21, 2026
Reviewed Jul 21, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(33rd percentile)

Weaknesses

Incorrect Authorization

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-55987

GHSA ID

GHSA-vrhc-jjfc-m3m3

Source code

Credits

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