Summary
An unauthenticated information disclosure vulnerability in the Installer controller allows any remote attacker to trigger phpinfo() on a fresh FacturaScripts deployment by requesting /?phpinfo=TRUE, exposing full PHP configuration, server environment variables (including any database credentials, API keys, or application secrets set as env vars), filesystem paths, and loaded extensions without being authenticated.
Details
The phpinfo() debug endpoint was intentionally added in commit 8c31c106 ("Added phpinfo option to the installer") on February 27, 2018, and has remained in the codebase for over 8 years across multiple major versions.
The feature appears to have been added as a convenience tool to help users diagnose PHP configuration during installation. However, it exposes sensitive server information to any unauthenticated attacker who knows the parameter.
Vulnerable code (Core/Controller/Installer.php ~line 115):
if ('TRUE' === $this->request->query('phpinfo', '')) {
phpinfo();
return;
}
This vulnerability is of the same class as CVE-2025-34081 (CONPROSYS HMI System unauthenticated phpinfo() exposure), which received a CVE assignment.
Introduced: commit 8c31c1060581ad6ad591c7689da3a8df8a29f486 (Feb 27 2018)
Still present: v2026-39-g262e79208 (confirmed April 2026)
PoC
Prerequisites: Fresh FacturaScripts deployment where installation has not yet been completed (config.php does not contain db_name).
Step 1 — Clone and serve the application:
git clone https://github.com/NeoRazorX/facturascripts
cd facturascripts
php -S localhost:8000
Step 2 — Send the following unauthenticated GET request:
GET /?phpinfo=TRUE HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8000
Step 3 — Observe full phpinfo() output returned (20+ pages) containing:
- Complete PHP configuration
- All server environment variables
- Filesystem paths
- Loaded extensions and versions
- HTTP request headers
No credentials, cookies, or prior interaction required.
Tested on: PHP 8.1.34, macOS, fresh clone with no configuration applied.
Proof of concept screenshot/PDF available.
Impact
Vulnerability type: Unauthenticated Information Disclosure (CWE-200)
Any unauthenticated remote attacker who can reach a freshly deployed FacturaScripts instance before installation is completed can retrieve the full PHP environment. On production deployments this includes:
- Database credentials (DB_PASSWORD, DB_USER) if set as environment variables
- Application secrets (APP_KEY, JWT secrets) if set as environment variables
- Cloud provider credentials (AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, etc.) if present
- Full server filesystem paths enabling targeted path traversal attempts
- Exact PHP version and loaded extensions enabling version-specific attacks
- All HTTP headers revealing internal infrastructure details
- Database connection configuration (mysqli default socket, PDO drivers)
- Exact PHP version enabling version-specific CVE targeting (PHP 8.1.34)
Fresh deployments are commonly left unconfigured for extended periods on shared hosting and cloud environments, making this window reliably exploitable in real-world scenarios.
Fix: Remove lines 115-118 from Core/Controller/Installer.php:
if ('TRUE' === $this->request->query('phpinfo', '')) {
phpinfo();
return;
}
References
Summary
An unauthenticated information disclosure vulnerability in the Installer controller allows any remote attacker to trigger phpinfo() on a fresh FacturaScripts deployment by requesting /?phpinfo=TRUE, exposing full PHP configuration, server environment variables (including any database credentials, API keys, or application secrets set as env vars), filesystem paths, and loaded extensions without being authenticated.
Details
The phpinfo() debug endpoint was intentionally added in commit 8c31c106 ("Added phpinfo option to the installer") on February 27, 2018, and has remained in the codebase for over 8 years across multiple major versions.
The feature appears to have been added as a convenience tool to help users diagnose PHP configuration during installation. However, it exposes sensitive server information to any unauthenticated attacker who knows the parameter.
Vulnerable code (Core/Controller/Installer.php ~line 115):
This vulnerability is of the same class as CVE-2025-34081 (CONPROSYS HMI System unauthenticated phpinfo() exposure), which received a CVE assignment.
Introduced: commit 8c31c1060581ad6ad591c7689da3a8df8a29f486 (Feb 27 2018)
Still present: v2026-39-g262e79208 (confirmed April 2026)
PoC
Prerequisites: Fresh FacturaScripts deployment where installation has not yet been completed (config.php does not contain db_name).
Step 1 — Clone and serve the application:
git clone https://github.com/NeoRazorX/facturascripts
cd facturascripts
php -S localhost:8000
Step 2 — Send the following unauthenticated GET request:
GET /?phpinfo=TRUE HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8000
Step 3 — Observe full phpinfo() output returned (20+ pages) containing:
- Complete PHP configuration
- All server environment variables
- Filesystem paths
- Loaded extensions and versions
- HTTP request headers
No credentials, cookies, or prior interaction required.
Tested on: PHP 8.1.34, macOS, fresh clone with no configuration applied.
Proof of concept screenshot/PDF available.
Impact
Vulnerability type: Unauthenticated Information Disclosure (CWE-200)
Any unauthenticated remote attacker who can reach a freshly deployed FacturaScripts instance before installation is completed can retrieve the full PHP environment. On production deployments this includes:
Fresh deployments are commonly left unconfigured for extended periods on shared hosting and cloud environments, making this window reliably exploitable in real-world scenarios.
Fix: Remove lines 115-118 from Core/Controller/Installer.php:
References