Summary
A configuration injection issue in the Docker tool sandbox could allow dangerous Docker options (bind mounts, host networking, unconfined profiles) to be applied, enabling container escape or host data access.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw (npm)
- Affected versions:
<= 2026.2.14
- Fixed version:
>= 2026.2.15 (next release)
Impact
If an attacker can influence sandbox Docker configuration (or an operator pastes untrusted config), they may be able to:
- mount sensitive host paths (e.g.
/etc, /proc, /sys, /dev, Docker socket)
- use
network=host to bypass container network isolation
- use
seccompProfile=unconfined / apparmorProfile=unconfined to weaken isolation
This can lead to host secret exfiltration or full host control (via Docker socket exposure).
Fix
OpenClaw now blocks dangerous sandbox Docker settings:
- runtime enforcement when building
docker create args
- config-schema validation for
network=host, seccompProfile=unconfined, apparmorProfile=unconfined
- security audit findings to surface dangerous sandbox docker config
Workarounds
- Do not configure
agents.*.sandbox.docker.binds to mount system directories or Docker socket paths.
- Keep
agents.*.sandbox.docker.network at none (default) or bridge.
- Do not use
unconfined for seccomp/AppArmor profiles.
Fix Commit(s)
- 887b209db47f1f9322fead241a1c0b043fd38339
- 1b6704ef5800152c777ea52b77aa2c8a46c13705 (docs)
Release Process Note
This advisory is pre-populated with the planned fixed version (>= 2026.2.15). Once openclaw@2026.2.15 is published to npm, publishing this advisory should be a single-click action.
Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
References
Summary
A configuration injection issue in the Docker tool sandbox could allow dangerous Docker options (bind mounts, host networking, unconfined profiles) to be applied, enabling container escape or host data access.
Affected Packages / Versions
openclaw(npm)<= 2026.2.14>= 2026.2.15(next release)Impact
If an attacker can influence sandbox Docker configuration (or an operator pastes untrusted config), they may be able to:
/etc,/proc,/sys,/dev, Docker socket)network=hostto bypass container network isolationseccompProfile=unconfined/apparmorProfile=unconfinedto weaken isolationThis can lead to host secret exfiltration or full host control (via Docker socket exposure).
Fix
OpenClaw now blocks dangerous sandbox Docker settings:
docker createargsnetwork=host,seccompProfile=unconfined,apparmorProfile=unconfinedWorkarounds
agents.*.sandbox.docker.bindsto mount system directories or Docker socket paths.agents.*.sandbox.docker.networkatnone(default) orbridge.unconfinedfor seccomp/AppArmor profiles.Fix Commit(s)
Release Process Note
This advisory is pre-populated with the planned fixed version (
>= 2026.2.15). Onceopenclaw@2026.2.15is published to npm, publishing this advisory should be a single-click action.Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
References