Impact
User control of the options argument of the output function allows attackers to inject arbitrary HTML (such as scripts) into the browser context the created PDF is opened in. The affected overloads and options are:
"pdfobjectnewwindow": the pdfObjectUrl option and the entire options object, which is JSON-serialized and included verbatim in the generated HTML-string."pdfjsnewwindow": the pdfJsUrl and filename options"dataurlnewwindow": the filename option
The vulnerability can be exploited in the following scenario: the attacker provides values for the output options, for example via a web interface. These values are then passed unsanitized (automatically or semi-automatically) to the attack victim. The victim creates and opens a PDF with the attack vector using one of the vulnerable method overloads inside their browser. The attacker can thus inject scripts that run in the victims browser context and can extract or modify secrets from this context.
Example attack vector:
import { jsPDF } from 'jspdf';
const doc = new jsPDF();
const payload = 'x\"></iframe><script>window.__n=1</script><iframe src="';
doc.output('pdfjsnewwindow', {
filename: payload,
pdfJsUrl: 'viewer.html'
});Patches
The vulnerability has been fixed in jspdf@4.2.1.
Workarounds
Sanitize user input before passing it to the output method.
References
sofianeelhor Reporter
peaktwilight Remediation reviewer
Impact
User control of the
optionsargument of theoutputfunction allows attackers to inject arbitrary HTML (such as scripts) into the browser context the created PDF is opened in. The affected overloads and options are:"pdfobjectnewwindow": thepdfObjectUrloption and the entire options object, which is JSON-serialized and included verbatim in the generated HTML-string."pdfjsnewwindow": thepdfJsUrlandfilenameoptions"dataurlnewwindow": thefilenameoptionThe vulnerability can be exploited in the following scenario: the attacker provides values for the output options, for example via a web interface. These values are then passed unsanitized (automatically or semi-automatically) to the attack victim. The victim creates and opens a PDF with the attack vector using one of the vulnerable method overloads inside their browser. The attacker can thus inject scripts that run in the victims browser context and can extract or modify secrets from this context.
Example attack vector:
Patches
The vulnerability has been fixed in jspdf@4.2.1.
Workarounds
Sanitize user input before passing it to the output method.
References