Summary
The OIDC token endpoint does not verify that the client exchanging an authorization code is the same client the code was issued to. A malicious OIDC client operator can exchange another client's authorization code using their own client credentials, obtaining tokens for users who never authorized their application. This violates RFC 6749 Section 4.1.3.
Details
When an authorization code is created, StoreCode at internal/service/oidc_service.go:305-322 correctly stores the ClientID alongside the code hash in the database (line 316).
During token exchange at internal/controller/oidc_controller.go:267-309, the handler retrieves the code entry at line 268 and validates the redirect_uri at line 291, but never compares entry.ClientID against the requesting client's ID (creds.ClientID). The code proceeds directly to GenerateAccessToken at line 299.
The developers clearly intended this check to exist, the refresh token flow at internal/service/oidc_service.go:508-510 has the exact guard: if entry.ClientID != reqClientId { return TokenResponse{}, ErrInvalidClient }. It was simply omitted from the authorization code grant.
The entry.ClientID field is stored in the database but never read during authorization code exchange.
PoC
Prerequisites: a tinyauth instance with two OIDC clients configured (Client A and Client B). Both clients must have at least one overlapping redirect URI, or the attacker must be able to intercept the authorization code from Client A's redirect (via referrer leak, browser history, log access, etc.).
Step 1 — Log in as a normal user:
curl -c cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/user/login \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"admin","password":"admin123"}'
Step 2 — Authorize with Client A:
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/oidc/authorize \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"client_id":"client-a-id","redirect_uri":"http://localhost:8080/callback","response_type":"code","scope":"openid","state":"test"}'
Extract the code parameter from the redirect_uri in the response.
Step 3 — Exchange Client A's code using Client B's credentials:
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/oidc/token \
-u "client-b-id:client-b-secret" \
-d "grant_type=authorization_code&code=<CODE_FROM_STEP_2>&redirect_uri=http://localhost:8080/callback"
The server returns a valid access_token, id_token, and refresh_token. Client B has obtained tokens for a user who only authorized Client A.
Impact
A malicious OIDC relying party operator who can intercept or observe an authorization code issued to a different client can exchange it for tokens under their own client identity. This enables user impersonation across OIDC clients on the same tinyauth instance. The attack requires a multi-client deployment and a way to obtain the victim client's authorization code (which is passed as a URL query parameter and can leak through referrer headers, browser history, or server logs). Single-client deployments are not affected.
References
e1024x Reporter
Summary
The OIDC token endpoint does not verify that the client exchanging an authorization code is the same client the code was issued to. A malicious OIDC client operator can exchange another client's authorization code using their own client credentials, obtaining tokens for users who never authorized their application. This violates RFC 6749 Section 4.1.3.
Details
When an authorization code is created,
StoreCodeatinternal/service/oidc_service.go:305-322correctly stores theClientIDalongside the code hash in the database (line 316).During token exchange at
internal/controller/oidc_controller.go:267-309, the handler retrieves the code entry at line 268 and validates theredirect_uriat line 291, but never comparesentry.ClientIDagainst the requesting client's ID (creds.ClientID). The code proceeds directly toGenerateAccessTokenat line 299.The developers clearly intended this check to exist, the refresh token flow at
internal/service/oidc_service.go:508-510has the exact guard:if entry.ClientID != reqClientId { return TokenResponse{}, ErrInvalidClient }. It was simply omitted from the authorization code grant.The
entry.ClientIDfield is stored in the database but never read during authorization code exchange.PoC
Prerequisites: a tinyauth instance with two OIDC clients configured (Client A and Client B). Both clients must have at least one overlapping redirect URI, or the attacker must be able to intercept the authorization code from Client A's redirect (via referrer leak, browser history, log access, etc.).
Step 1 — Log in as a normal user:
Step 2 — Authorize with Client A:
Extract the
codeparameter from theredirect_uriin the response.Step 3 — Exchange Client A's code using Client B's credentials:
The server returns a valid
access_token,id_token, andrefresh_token. Client B has obtained tokens for a user who only authorized Client A.Impact
A malicious OIDC relying party operator who can intercept or observe an authorization code issued to a different client can exchange it for tokens under their own client identity. This enables user impersonation across OIDC clients on the same tinyauth instance. The attack requires a multi-client deployment and a way to obtain the victim client's authorization code (which is passed as a URL query parameter and can leak through referrer headers, browser history, or server logs). Single-client deployments are not affected.
References