This document outlines the security features and considerations of the GOProto implementation.
- Uses 2048-bit Diffie-Hellman with a prime from RFC 3526 Group 14
- Cryptographically secure random number generation for private keys
- Protection against man-in-the-middle attacks through secure key exchange
- AES-256 IGE mode for strong encryption
- Random IV generation for each message
- Message authentication through message keys
- Proper padding of messages to prevent padding oracle attacks
- SHA-1 for message key generation (as in MTProto)
- SHA-256 for authentication key derivation
- Proper use of cryptographic hash functions
- Sequence numbers to prevent message replay
- Session-based message ordering
- Timestamp-based session expiration
- Unique session IDs for each connection
- Server salt for additional entropy
- Automatic cleanup of expired sessions
- Thread-safe session management
- TCP-based communication with proper error handling
- Connection timeouts to prevent resource exhaustion
- Message length validation to prevent buffer overflows
- Uses crypto/rand for cryptographically secure random numbers
- Proper seeding of random number generators
- Secure generation of keys, IVs, and salts
- Secure handling of sensitive data in memory
- Proper cleanup of cryptographic material
- Minimization of sensitive data exposure
- Graceful error handling without information leakage
- Proper validation of all inputs
- Safe error messages that don't reveal implementation details
This implementation simplifies some aspects of the full MTProto specification:
- Authentication: Does not implement full client authentication
- Key Derivation: Simplified auth key derivation process
- Message Acknowledgments: Basic acknowledgment handling
- Container Messages: Limited support for message containers
Potential security gaps in this implementation:
- No certificate validation: Does not implement TLS certificate validation
- Limited attack surface testing: Not tested against common cryptographic attacks
- Timing attacks: May be vulnerable to timing attacks in some operations
- Side-channel attacks: Not hardened against side-channel attacks
If you choose to use this implementation in production, consider:
- Security Audit: Have the code audited by a qualified security professional
- TLS Layer: Add a TLS layer for additional encryption and authentication
- Input Validation: Implement comprehensive input validation
- Rate Limiting: Add rate limiting to prevent DoS attacks
- Monitoring: Implement security monitoring and alerting
- Regular Updates: Keep dependencies up to date with security patches
If you discover a security vulnerability, please report it privately to the maintainers. Do not disclose security issues publicly until they have been addressed.
This implementation is not guaranteed to comply with any specific security standards or regulations. Organizations with compliance requirements should conduct their own evaluation.