fix(hooks): trim PowerShell trailing blank lines;Fix/powershell trailing newlines

[aprashnasuraj-dev]

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[aprashnasuraj-dev]

This looks like more than simply “GitHub being down.” There are now reproducible cases showing transient runner→STS network stalls being amplified by the action’s timeout behavior. In #1915, an STS request can remain pending indefinitely because the retry wrapper only runs after a promise rejects; a stalled request never reaches that retry path. #1848 also shows v6 ETIMEDOUT retries lasting long enough for the OIDC JWT itself to expire.

So I’d describe this as intermittent network/routing trouble combined with an action-side resilience gap, rather than a global STS outage. Until the per-request behavior is fixed, I would bound both the workflow/job timeout and action-timeout-s, keep retries finite, and preserve the failed runner/IP/STS endpoint information when it happens.

In other words: the initial stall may be infrastructure/network-related, but an hours-long hang does not have to be.