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[PM-20578] Encrypt Risk Insights report and send it to server #14659
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ | ||
| import { mock } from "jest-mock-extended"; | ||
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| import { ApiService } from "@bitwarden/common/abstractions/api.service"; | ||
| import { OrganizationId } from "@bitwarden/common/types/guid"; | ||
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| import { RiskInsightsApiService } from "./risk-insights-api.service"; | ||
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| describe("RiskInsightsApiService", () => { | ||
| let service: RiskInsightsApiService; | ||
| const apiService = mock<ApiService>(); | ||
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| beforeEach(() => { | ||
| service = new RiskInsightsApiService(apiService); | ||
| }); | ||
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| it("should be created", () => { | ||
| expect(service).toBeTruthy(); | ||
| }); | ||
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| it("should call apiService.send with correct parameters for saveRiskInsightsReport", (done) => { | ||
| const orgId = "org1" as OrganizationId; | ||
| const request = { | ||
| data: { | ||
| organizationId: orgId, | ||
| date: new Date().toISOString(), | ||
| reportData: "test data", | ||
| totalMembers: 10, | ||
| totalAtRiskMembers: 5, | ||
| totalApplications: 100, | ||
| totalAtRiskApplications: 50, | ||
| totalCriticalApplications: 22, | ||
| }, | ||
| }; | ||
| const response = { | ||
| ...request.data, | ||
| }; | ||
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| apiService.send.mockReturnValue(Promise.resolve(response)); | ||
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| service.saveRiskInsightsReport(orgId, request).subscribe((result) => { | ||
| expect(result).toEqual(response); | ||
| expect(apiService.send).toHaveBeenCalledWith( | ||
| "PUT", | ||
| `/reports/risk-insights-report/${orgId.toString()}`, | ||
| request.data, | ||
| true, | ||
| true, | ||
| ); | ||
| done(); | ||
| }); | ||
| }); | ||
| }); |
| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ | ||
| import { from, Observable } from "rxjs"; | ||
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| import { ApiService } from "@bitwarden/common/abstractions/api.service"; | ||
| import { OrganizationId } from "@bitwarden/common/types/guid"; | ||
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| import { | ||
| SaveRiskInsightsReportRequest, | ||
| SaveRiskInsightsReportResponse, | ||
| } from "../models/password-health"; | ||
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| export class RiskInsightsApiService { | ||
| constructor(private apiService: ApiService) {} | ||
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| saveRiskInsightsReport( | ||
| orgId: OrganizationId, | ||
| request: SaveRiskInsightsReportRequest, | ||
| ): Observable<SaveRiskInsightsReportResponse> { | ||
| const dbResponse = this.apiService.send( | ||
| "PUT", | ||
| `/reports/risk-insights-report/${orgId.toString()}`, | ||
| request.data, | ||
| true, | ||
| true, | ||
| ); | ||
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| return from(dbResponse as Promise<SaveRiskInsightsReportResponse>); | ||
| } | ||
| } |
|
Contributor
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. โ๏ธ I think we should take the encryption/decryption logic and move it to a new service The report service logic should just contain the logic for calculating the risk insights report. I think adding the encryption decryption adds too much to this service.
Collaborator
Author
There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. As advised - I moved the encryption/decryption to its own service |
| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -1,13 +1,16 @@ | ||
| // FIXME: Update this file to be type safe | ||
| // @ts-strict-ignore | ||
| import { concatMap, first, from, map, Observable, zip } from "rxjs"; | ||
| import { concatMap, first, firstValueFrom, from, map, Observable, takeWhile, zip } from "rxjs"; | ||
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| import { AuditService } from "@bitwarden/common/abstractions/audit.service"; | ||
| import { EncryptService } from "@bitwarden/common/key-management/crypto/abstractions/encrypt.service"; | ||
| import { Utils } from "@bitwarden/common/platform/misc/utils"; | ||
| import { PasswordStrengthServiceAbstraction } from "@bitwarden/common/tools/password-strength"; | ||
| import { OrganizationId } from "@bitwarden/common/types/guid"; | ||
| import { CipherService } from "@bitwarden/common/vault/abstractions/cipher.service"; | ||
| import { CipherType } from "@bitwarden/common/vault/enums"; | ||
| import { CipherView } from "@bitwarden/common/vault/models/view/cipher.view"; | ||
| import { KeyService } from "@bitwarden/key-management"; | ||
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| import { | ||
| ApplicationHealthReportDetail, | ||
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@@ -20,8 +23,10 @@ import { | |
| MemberDetailsFlat, | ||
| WeakPasswordDetail, | ||
| WeakPasswordScore, | ||
| RiskInsightsReport, | ||
| } from "../models/password-health"; | ||
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| import { CriticalAppsService } from "./critical-apps.service"; | ||
| import { MemberCipherDetailsApiService } from "./member-cipher-details-api.service"; | ||
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| export class RiskInsightsReportService { | ||
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@@ -30,6 +35,9 @@ export class RiskInsightsReportService { | |
| private auditService: AuditService, | ||
| private cipherService: CipherService, | ||
| private memberCipherDetailsApiService: MemberCipherDetailsApiService, | ||
| private keyService: KeyService, | ||
| private encryptService: EncryptService, | ||
| private criticalAppsService: CriticalAppsService, | ||
| ) {} | ||
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| /** | ||
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@@ -162,6 +170,38 @@ export class RiskInsightsReportService { | |
| }; | ||
| } | ||
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| async generateRiskInsightsReport( | ||
| organizationId: OrganizationId, | ||
| details: ApplicationHealthReportDetail[], | ||
| summary: ApplicationHealthReportSummary, | ||
| ): Promise<RiskInsightsReport> { | ||
| const key = await this.keyService.getOrgKey(organizationId as string); | ||
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| if (key === null) { | ||
| throw new Error("Organization key not found"); | ||
| } | ||
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| const reportData = await this.encryptService.encryptString(JSON.stringify(details), key); | ||
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| // const atRiskMembers = this.generateAtRiskMemberList(details); | ||
| // const atRiskApplications = this.generateAtRiskApplicationList(details); | ||
| const criticalApps = await firstValueFrom( | ||
| this.criticalAppsService | ||
| .getAppsListForOrg(organizationId) | ||
| .pipe(takeWhile((apps) => apps !== null && apps.length > 0)), | ||
| ); | ||
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| return { | ||
| organizationId: organizationId, | ||
| date: new Date().toISOString(), | ||
| reportData: reportData?.encryptedString?.toString() ?? "", | ||
| totalMembers: summary.totalMemberCount, | ||
| totalAtRiskMembers: summary.totalAtRiskMemberCount, | ||
| totalApplications: summary.totalApplicationCount, | ||
| totalAtRiskApplications: summary.totalAtRiskApplicationCount, | ||
| totalCriticalApplications: criticalApps.length, | ||
| }; | ||
| } | ||
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| /** | ||
| * Associates the members with the ciphers they have access to. Calculates the password health. | ||
| * Finds the trimmed uris. | ||
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Question โ Will this report be automatically generated and submitted on a schedule, or manually created only? If the former, are we OK with this unencrypted metadata?
Unless not possible, I would recommend encrypting all metadata here. Specifically, reportData should be one blob including both the summary data and detail data. Below, I show a theoretical attack that may abuse the summary data to decrypt all org vault data remotely.
Specifically, the following attacks (non exhaustive, and non validated) may be made possible. I have not implemented or validated them, and they are purely on the basis of reading the code.
Leak individiual item/application weakness status
Before every report generation, the server forces a sync to the client that will create the report, and present a false view of the ciphers, specifically, just show 1 cipher. The total will then reflect just that cipher, and thus the safety presumed by the use of summarized data is broken. This attack can be optimized to be much faster than a linear amount of queries.
Remote predicate evaluation on arbitrary org encrypted strings
Further, it allows the server to remotely run certain predicates such as
findWeakPasswordon any arbitrary org-key encrypted data (not just passwords) and obtain the result, by swapping encrypted strings within the cipher.this.passwordStrengthService.getPasswordStrength(is called, which uses zxcvbn to compare a security score, of the password compared to, including the encrypted "username" field. If the server has access to known plaintext ciphertext pairs here, they may be able to create a decryption oracle capable of remotely decrypting all org vault data with this. NOTE: This is theoretical, I have not validated this thoroughly. Roughly, the attacker would remotely, via the previous attack make the client evaluate password strength. As the password, the server sets the target encstring. As the username, they set one of the known plaintext / ciphertext pairs. zxcvbn will return a different score based on the similarity of the two, and depending on if it reaches a threshold, it will be a cipher at risk. This can be used, given enough plaintext ciphertext pairs to fully recovery the target plaintext, thus making full decryption of all vault data possible. One would find a plaintext-ciphertext pair close to the threshold, then flip each character to figure out which character is the correct character for that position. However, this requires a lot of plaintext ciphertext pairs, or an encryption oracle.Remote predicate evaluation - equality check
Using the same attack as above, the server can perform an equality check on any two arbitrary org-key encrypted org strings, by presenting 2 items, with the target encstrings set as the password.
Remote clustering of encrypted vault items by app
Further, it allows the server to cluster any ciphers and confirm if the are for the same domain. Example: Server provides cipher A, cipher B. If only one app is reported, then both are the same app and get clustered. This can be improved to be much faster than linear time.
(Out of scope note) Clusters / individual weak items can be tied to real domains
Combining this with a compromised icon server (out of scope) would allow tying encrypted ciphers to domains, and thus leak which accounts are weak.
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I will cc @mandreko-bitwarden, @jlf0dev on this, because these (presumed) attacks are security relevant, possibly threatening all of organization vault encryption confidentiality. I'm keeping these comments public because this is not released code, but just draft.
@jlf0dev I have not implemented these attacks because I looked at this as an early code review for the unrelated issue bellow, but it felt unethical not to look closer here. I don't know if it's worth to spend the time to confirm the validity of the attacks above. If we just encrypt the metadata, then all of them are invalid etiher way.