Please do not open a public issue for security-sensitive reports. Email the maintainers directly with details and a reproduction. We aim to acknowledge within 72 hours.
In scope for security reports:
- Code execution from a malicious model file or manifest (path traversal, archive extraction, deserialization, allocator abuse).
- Authentication / authorization bypasses in
npurun serve. - Memory unsafety in
qnn/qnn-sys(FFI boundary). - TOCTOU / atomicity bugs in
npurun-registrycache writes. - HTTP request smuggling, header injection, SSE injection in the server.
- Insecure defaults (e.g.
npurun servebinding to0.0.0.0without authentication when documentation implies otherwise).
Out of scope:
- Issues only reproducible against the proprietary QNN SDK runtime itself — report those to Qualcomm.
- DoS via legitimate but expensive inputs (e.g. huge model files); we'll treat those as resource-management bugs, not security issues.
npurun servedefaults to127.0.0.1. Binding to a non-loopback interface without an auth token is intentionally allowed but documented as user-managed risk.- Model files are downloaded from the configured registry over HTTPS and sha256-verified against the manifest. The integrity boundary is the manifest signature (Phase 6 — manifest signing planned).