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Add model for impact of penalty cap on surplus and success rates#8

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fhenneke wants to merge 6 commits into
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cap_model
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Add model for impact of penalty cap on surplus and success rates#8
fhenneke wants to merge 6 commits into
mainfrom
cap_model

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This PR adds a notebook with a simple model for solver behavior given caps. The effect of the cap on optimal bids and success rates is visualized.

Example figure:
image

Next step

  • convert success rates into time delays
  • convert time delays into value lost
  • find the cap which maximizes value of optimal bidding
  • fit to estimated values for volatility, time of exclusivity, ...

fhenneke and others added 3 commits June 25, 2026 14:57
translation of a julia notebook from the discussion around hiding information on the auction endpoint
- surplus draw can be negative; split unsets into a base (forced p_fail)
  rate and a volatility-driven strategic rate
- make the competing solvers' bids explicit as uniform[0, 200]
- success-rate / unset terminology; fixed 0-1 success axis, auto c_l range,
  higher default volatility

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Review the following changes in direct dependencies. Learn more about Socket for GitHub.

Diff Package Supply Chain
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Vulnerability Quality Maintenance License
Addedipympl@​0.10.09710010010080
Addedipywidgets@​8.1.899100100100100

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fhenneke and others added 3 commits June 25, 2026 21:28
Dashed lines on the optimal-bid panel for the expected routing surplus
(1-p_fail)*mu and its value conditional on the routing not failing (mu).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Combine the bid and success-rate plots into a third panel showing the
expected value per won auction, V = success*s* - L*(1-success), where the
bid s is the surplus delivered to the user and L is the cost of one unset.
The optimal cap c_l* is marked on all three panels.

- model competing solvers' bid via a configurable density (uniform /
  triangle / gaussian / rising); keep the reference grid finer than the bid
  grid so argmax(s*) does not jitter on a flat payoff ridge
- normalize the mean surplus to mu = 1 (the model is scale-invariant); the
  controls are now dimensionless ratios sigma/mu, c_u/mu, L/mu

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- surplus dropdown switches the routing surplus between the default
  gaussian and the hardcoded CUSTOM_SURPLUS (value, probability) atoms;
  mu and sigma are computed from the atoms so the reference lines, the
  L coupling and the f*sigma cap read the same in both modes
- couple the unset cost to volatility, L = (L/sigma) * sigma, and draw
  a candidate cap c_l = f*sigma (slider f) next to c_l* on every panel

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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