[Aikido] AI Fix for Using unsafe GitHub Actions trigger may allow privilege escalation via CI/CD

[aikido-autofix]

Notice something off? Reach out to @securitymirco

This patch mitigates privilege escalation via CI/CD in the 'CLA Assistant' workflow by replacing the 'pull_request_target' trigger with 'pull_request' to prevent untrusted code execution with elevated permissions.

Aikido used AI to generate this PR.

Medium confidence: Aikido has validated similar fixes and observed positive outcomes. Validation is required.

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[securitymirco]

Closing as a false positive.

pull_request_target is only exploitable when the workflow checks out and executes
PR head code, or interpolates untrusted input into a shell step. This workflow does
neither — it has no actions/checkout, and just delegates to
dash0hq/.github/.github/workflows/cla.yaml@main, which runs a single SHA-pinned
action (contributor-assistant/github-action@ca4a40a7, v2.6.1). The only untrusted
input is github.event.comment.body, used in an == comparison inside an if:.
There is no untrusted-code execution path to escalate through.

The proposed change would also break CLA enforcement in two ways:

1. The reusable workflow gates its only step on
   ... || github.event_name == 'pull_request_target'. Switching to pull_request
   means that condition no longer matches, so the CLA step is silently skipped on
   opened/closed/synchronize — no failure, just no enforcement.

2. pull_request from a fork gets a read-only GITHUB_TOKEN and