fix: prevent glob injection and cross-server secret leakage in MCP gateway

cmd/docker-mcp/secret-management/secret/credstore.go

@@ -24,6 +24,16 @@ func cmd(ctx context.Context, args ...string) *exec.Cmd {
 	return exec.CommandContext(ctx, "docker", append([]string{"pass"}, args...)...)
 }
 
+// ValidateSecretName returns an error if the name contains glob metacharacters
+// or path traversal sequences that could be injected into the pattern sent to
+// the Desktop secrets resolver (which treats the pattern field as a glob).
+func ValidateSecretName(name string) error {
+	if strings.ContainsAny(name, "*?[]{") {
+		return fmt.Errorf("secret name %q contains illegal glob metacharacter", name)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 // GetDefaultSecretKey constructs the full namespaced ID for an MCP secret
 // using the default namespace (docker/mcp/).
 //

cmd/docker-mcp/secret-management/secret/secret_test.go

@@ -12,6 +12,18 @@ func TestGetDefaultSecretKey(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, "docker/mcp/mykey", result)
 }
 
+func TestValidateSecretName(t *testing.T) {
+	valid := []string{"mykey", "postgres_password", "GITHUB_TOKEN", "some-key", "key.with.dots"}
+	for _, name := range valid {
+		require.NoError(t, ValidateSecretName(name), "expected %q to be valid", name)
+	}
+
+	invalid := []string{"**", "*", "docker/mcp/**", "key*", "key?", "key[0]", "key{a}"}
+	for _, name := range invalid {
+		assert.Error(t, ValidateSecretName(name), "expected %q to be invalid", name)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestParseArg(t *testing.T) {
 	// Test key=value parsing
 	secret, err := ParseArg("key=value", SetOpts{})

pkg/gateway/configuration.go

@@ -92,13 +92,21 @@ func (c *Configuration) Find(serverName string) (*catalog.ServerConfig, *map[str
 
 	// Is it an MCP Server?
 	if server.Image != "" || server.SSEEndpoint != "" || server.Remote.URL != "" {
+		// Scope secrets to only the keys declared by this server so that a
+		// compromised or malicious server cannot access another server's secrets.
+		scopedSecrets := make(map[string]string, len(server.Secrets))
+		for _, s := range server.Secrets {
+			if v, ok := c.secrets[s.Name]; ok {
+				scopedSecrets[s.Name] = v
+			}
+		}
 		return &catalog.ServerConfig{
 			Name: serverName,
 			Spec: server,
 			Config: map[string]any{
 				oci.CanonicalizeServerName(serverName): c.config[oci.CanonicalizeServerName(serverName)],
 			},
-			Secrets: c.secrets, // TODO: we could keep just the secrets for this server
+			Secrets: scopedSecrets,
 		}, nil, true
 	}
 

pkg/gateway/secrets_uri.go

@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ func buildFallbackURIs(configs []ServerSecretConfig) map[string]string {
 		secretToOAuthID := oauthMapping(cfg)
 
 		for _, s := range cfg.Secrets {
+			if err := secret.ValidateSecretName(s.Name); err != nil {
+				log.Logf("Warning: skipping secret with invalid name %q: %v", s.Name, err)
+				continue
+			}
 			secretName := cfg.Namespace + s.Name
 			if oauthSecretID, ok := secretToOAuthID[s.Name]; ok {
 				secretNameToURI[secretName] = "se://" + oauthSecretID
@@ -68,6 +72,10 @@ func buildVerifiedURIs(configs []ServerSecretConfig, availableSecrets map[string
 		secretToOAuthID := oauthMapping(cfg)
 
 		for _, s := range cfg.Secrets {
+			if err := secret.ValidateSecretName(s.Name); err != nil {
+				log.Logf("Warning: skipping secret with invalid name %q: %v", s.Name, err)
+				continue
+			}
 			secretName := cfg.Namespace + s.Name
 
 			// Try OAuth token first

pkg/mcp/remote.go

@@ -169,6 +169,10 @@ func (c *remoteMCPClient) AddRoots(roots []*mcp.Root) {
 }
 
 func getSecretValue(ctx context.Context, secretName string) string {
+	if err := secret.ValidateSecretName(secretName); err != nil {
+		log.Logf("Warning: skipping secret with invalid name %q: %v", secretName, err)
+		return ""
+	}
 	fullID := secret.GetDefaultSecretKey(secretName)
 	env, err := secret.GetSecret(ctx, fullID)
 	if err != nil {