feat: optional zeroize feature for secret types (#7)#14
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Adds a `zeroize` cargo feature that derives `zeroize::Zeroize` on the secret-bearing structs across every scheme: - `kem::cgw_kv::SecretKey` / `UserSecretKey` - `kem::cgw_fo::UserSecretKey` - `kem::kiltz_vahlis_one::SecretKey` / `UserSecretKey` - `ibe::cgw::SecretKey` / `UserSecretKey` - `ibe::waters::SecretKey` / `UserSecretKey` - `ibe::waters_naccache::SecretKey` / `UserSecretKey` - `ibe::boyen_waters::SecretKey` / `UserSecretKey` - `kem::SharedSecret` - `util::Identity` (used as `Id` in cgw_fo) The feature chains through to `pg-curve/zeroize` so the leaf `Scalar`, `G1Affine`, `G2Affine` and `Gt` types get their zeroize impls from the upstream crate. As noted in issue #7, these types are all `Copy` so `ZeroizeOnDrop` is not possible; users must call `.zeroize()` explicitly. The feature gives them the machinery to do so. Added a round-trip test under `cgwkv` (the scheme PostGuard uses): derives an MSK/USK/SharedSecret, zeroizes each, asserts the bytes change and that the shared-secret bytes are fully zero. Does NOT add `Zeroize` as a bound on the `IBKEM` / `IBE` traits themselves — that's a larger API decision and would retroactively require every external impl to opt in. Deferring.
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Self-review (this agent authored the PR, GitHub blocks --approve on own PRs). Posting as --comment so the verdict is on record for the human reviewer.
Verdict: would approve.
Reviewed the diff, ran cargo test --features cgwkv,zeroize locally — new secret_types_zeroize test passes, existing tests untouched. All 6 CI checks green.
The approach is well-contained:
- Feature is fully opt-in via
cfg_attr, no cost for consumers that don't enable it. pg-curve/zeroizechain pullsZeroizeimpls forScalar/G1Affine/G2Affine/Gt, so the derive composes correctly.Identityderive is needed becausecgw_fo::UserSecretKeycarries one — correct call.- Test snapshots
to_bytes()and asserts inequality post-zeroize, plus assertsSharedSecret.0is all-zero. Catches the failure mode where a derive silently no-ops.
Scope decisions worth flagging as intentional:
- Deferring
IBKEM::Sk: Zeroize/IBKEM::Usk: Zeroizetrait bounds — breaking change for downstream impls, left for maintainer call. ZeroizeoverZeroizeOnDrop— every secret struct isCopy, soDropisn't usable (leonbotros noted this on the issue in 2022).
Minor / non-blocking: tests only exercise CGWKV. The PR offers to extend to KV1/Waters/Boyen-Waters; for the active PostGuard stack the CGWKV coverage is sufficient.
Closes #7 cleanly.
The zeroize feature (#14) derives Zeroize but not ZeroizeOnDrop, because the secret types are Copy. Secret material is therefore not wiped on drop and callers MUST call .zeroize() explicitly. Document this contract in the crate-level docs and add a MUST-call annotation to every SharedSecret, SecretKey and UserSecretKey across all KEM and IBE schemes. Co-authored-by: dobby-yivi-agent[bot] <275734547+dobby-yivi-agent[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Rules + review gate (Rules Dobby 2) — 1 finding, changes requested.
Ran per-rule Haiku checks (conventional-commit title, cargo fmt, tests-on-changes, ai-slop, docs-drift, promised-vs-delivered, plus ibe repo notes: deep-dive / release-plz / rand-getrandom) and merged with Review Dobby 2's review. cargo fmt --all -- --check is clean, the PR title is conventional, and the added # Zeroization docs are accurate and well-scoped.
Two automated verdicts were reviewed and dismissed as false positives: (1) the "no justification paragraphs" flag on the new doc-comments — those # Zeroization sections are the requested MUST-call deliverable, i.e. legitimate public-API rustdoc, not narration of a trivial change; (2) a "promised-vs-delivered" flag on Identity deriving Zeroize — that derive is a mechanical requirement of cgw_fo::UserSecretKey's own derive, not a scope breach.
One genuine, verified finding remains (inline) — a zeroize coverage gap on boyen_waters::SharedSecret. Sending back to PR Dobby to close it.
The PKE SharedSecret(Gt) was the one public secret-bearing type left without the zeroize derive or the MUST-call note. Its inner Gt field is private, so callers could neither .zeroize() it nor reach .0 to wipe it manually, leaving the crate's zeroization contract unachievable for this type. Add the same derive + # Zeroization note used on every other secret type, plus a shared_secret_zeroize test. Also correct the decrypt doc comment (returns Msg, not SharedSecret). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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/dobby fix conflicts |
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On it, @rubenhensen! I'll resolve the merge conflicts and get a draft PR opened for you. |
…ypes # Conflicts: # Cargo.toml # src/ibe/boyen_waters.rs # src/ibe/waters.rs # src/ibe/waters_naccache.rs # src/kem/mod.rs
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Merged latest The conflicts were all the same shape:
Verified: |
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Rules + review gate (Rules Dobby 2) — clean, approving. ✅
(Submitted as --comment: GitHub blocks --approve on a bot's own PR — this is the effective APPROVE.)
Ran per-rule Haiku checks and merged with Review Dobby 2's review (which returned 0 findings this round):
- conventional-commit title — ✅
feat: … - cargo fmt — ✅ diff is rustfmt-clean
- AI-slop / justification-paragraph — ✅ the
# Zeroizationsections are legitimate public-API rustdoc (a MUST-call contract), not narration - docs-drift — ✅ crate-level + per-type docs added and accurate
- promised-vs-delivered — ✅ scope matches;
IdentityderivingZeroizeis a mechanical requirement ofcgw_fo::UserSecretKey, not scope creep - check-dep-is-used — ✅ new optional
zeroizedep is feature-gated and used - ibe deep-dive / release-plz — ✅
no_stdpreserved (default-features=false), no manual version/changelog edits
Cycle-1 finding resolved: the boyen_waters::SharedSecret zeroize coverage gap is now closed (derive + dedicated shared_secret_zeroize test present).
One Haiku verdict (tests-required-on-fixes: "add a test per type") was reviewed and dismissed as a false positive — derive(Zeroize) is a uniform macro expansion; the two added tests already exercise every underlying field type (Gt, Scalar, G1Affine, G2Affine, byte-array), it would not compile if a field lacked Zeroize, and all 16 secret types were manually verified to blank. Per-type duplication adds no coverage.
Approving. Flipping to ready-for-review.
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Cycle 2 gate is clean — all 10 per-rule checks passed and Review Dobby found 0 findings. The coverage gap from cycle 1 is resolved (derive + test added). One "tests-per-type" flag was dismissed as a false positive: is a uniform macro expansion and the two new tests already exercise every field type across all 16 secret types. GitHub blocked a bot APPROVE on a bot-authored PR, so the gate result was posted as a comment with the marker instead — the PR is ready-for-review and mergeable. 🟢 |
Summary
Addresses #7 (open since 2022). Adds an opt-in
zeroizecargo feature that deriveszeroize::Zeroizeon every secret-bearing struct across all the IBKEM / IBE schemes in this crate, plusSharedSecretand the identity hash.Scope
#[cfg_attr(feature = "zeroize", derive(zeroize::Zeroize))]on:kem::cgw_kv::{SecretKey, UserSecretKey}kem::cgw_fo::UserSecretKeykem::kiltz_vahlis_one::{SecretKey, UserSecretKey}kem::SharedSecretibe::cgw::{SecretKey, UserSecretKey}ibe::waters::{SecretKey, UserSecretKey}ibe::waters_naccache::{SecretKey, UserSecretKey}ibe::boyen_waters::{SecretKey, UserSecretKey}util::Identity(needed becausecgw_fo::UserSecretKeycarries one)The new feature chains through to
pg-curve/zeroize, soScalar,G1Affine,G2AffineandGtpick up their upstream zeroize impls.Why
Zeroizeand notZeroizeOnDropAs leonbotros flagged on the issue in 2022: every secret struct in this crate is
Copy, which is incompatible withZeroizeOnDrop. This PR intentionally matches the original scope — "implement/derive Zeroize", not "on drop" — so users who care about best-effort clearing can call.zeroize()explicitly.What this PR does NOT do
The issue also mentions "add the trait bounds to the KEM/IBE traits". Skipped deliberately: adding
Zeroizeto theIBKEM::Sk/IBKEM::Uskassociated-type bounds would retroactively require every external impl to opt in, which is a breaking-change decision I'd rather leave to a maintainer call. The#[cfg_attr]gating here is additive and carries no cost for consumers that don't enable the feature.Verification
cargo test(no features)cargo test --features cgwkvcargo test --features cgwkv,zeroizesecret_types_zeroize)cargo test --all-featurescargo build --all-featuresThe new test (
kem::cgw_kv::tests::secret_types_zeroize) runs the full setup→extract→encaps flow, snapshots the serialized secrets, calls.zeroize(), and asserts:SecretKey.to_bytes()changes after zeroizeUserSecretKey.to_bytes()changes after zeroizeSharedSecret.0is all zero after zeroizeOnly wrote this for CGWKV since that's the active PostGuard scheme; happy to replicate for KV1 / Waters / Boyen-Waters if the maintainers would prefer exhaustive coverage.
Reviewer quickstart
```
git fetch origin && git checkout feat/zeroize-secret-types && cargo test --all-features
```
Closes #7.