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OCSP designated-responder authorization bypass — missing signature verification (RFC 6960 §4.2.2.2)

High
u3s published GHSA-gxrm-pf64-99xm Apr 7, 2026

Package

OTP

Affected versions

>= 27.0

Patched versions

27.3.4.10, 28.4.2
public_key (OTP)
>= 1.16
1.17.1.2, 1.20.3
ssl (OTP)
>= 11.2
11.2.12.7, 11.5.4

Description

Impact

For Erlang/OTP's internal usage (TLS client with OCSP stapling)

  • Clients running TLS (SSL) may accept connections to servers with revoked certificates
  • Clients may transmit sensitive data to compromised servers
  • Requires attacker to control or MITM the server being validated
  • Note: Erlang/OTP TLS (SSL) server does not support OCSP stapling
  • Note: For legacy reasons the client was actually implemented and documented to
    do a best effort validation, which by default makes it unreliable. This is now addressed
    and a must staple behavior is enforced unless user implements its own fallback validation
    if the staple is missing.

For applications using public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 API

  • Impact depends on usage context
  • Server-side client certificate validation: authentication bypass
  • Other scenarios: variable impact

Workarounds

For TLS (SSL) users

  1. Do not enable OCSP validation setting (current default is {stapling, no_staple})
  2. Use CRL-based revocation checking by setting the {crl_check, true} SSL option instead

For applications using public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 directly

  1. Pass {is_trusted_responder_fun, Fun} option with a function that validates trusted responder certificates
  2. Restrict OCSP responder access to trusted endpoints via network controls (only applicable if you control the OCSP infrastructure)

Affected/Unaffected Versions

A version larger than or equal to one of the listed patched versions is unaffected; otherwise, a version that satisfies an expression listed under affected versions is affected, and if it does not, it is unaffected.

The documentation of the new OTP version scheme describes how versions should be compared. Note that versions used prior to OTP 17.0, when the new OTP version scheme was introduced, are never listed since it is not well defined how to compare those versions.

In the case of this vulnerability, versions prior to OTP 27.0 are unaffected.

Credits

Thanks to Igor Morgenstern at Aisle Research for finding and responsibly disclosing this vulnerability to the Erlang/OTP project.

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements Present
Privileges Required None
User interaction Passive
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality High
Integrity High
Availability None
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality Low
Integrity Low
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

CVE ID

CVE-2026-32144

Weaknesses

Improper Certificate Validation

The product does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate. Learn more on MITRE.

Credits