Fix errors in documentation

content/2020-11-23-frontrunning-mev-crisis.mdx

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ We believe it is essential for Flashbots and the community working alongside us
 
 ## Our Public Commitments
 Flashbots arose from the MEV Pi-Rate Ship, a neutral, chain-agnostic, interdisciplinary research collective that supports MEV-related theoretical and empirical research. As an open research organization, we commit today and in the future, to:
-* Preserving the core values of Ethereum in what we create, i.e. openness, permisionlessness, decentralization, against the coming MEV crisis.
+* Preserving the core values of Ethereum in what we create, i.e. openness, permissionlessness, decentralization, against the coming MEV crisis.
 
 * Making our research and core Flashbots infrastructure code open source for any community member to contribute to and benefit from.
 

content/2021-02-22-quantifying-mev-explore.mdx

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ MEV transactions are fascinating, sometimes by their complexity, sometimes by th
 ### Network Overhead from MEV Extraction
 DeFi trading bot operators compete for MEV opportunities by engaging in frontrunning/priority gas auctions like in example 1 and engaging in [backrunning](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/issues/21350) (ie. aiming to be, in the same block, as close as possible behind a specific transaction such as an oracle update by spamming the network with many transactions with a gas price slightly below or equal to the target and hoping one gets included).
 
-Both of these practices are nefarious to Ethereum by bloating the chain and exercising an upwards pressure on gas prices, as we can see from the gas price of example 2 above. This problem is particularly relevant at the moment given the high gas prices we’re seeing. Such prices contribute to eroding Ethereum’s permisionlessness by pushing out small users from the network as it becomes too costly for them.
+Both of these practices are nefarious to Ethereum by bloating the chain and exercising an upwards pressure on gas prices, as we can see from the gas price of example 2 above. This problem is particularly relevant at the moment given the high gas prices we’re seeing. Such prices contribute to eroding Ethereum’s permissionlessness by pushing out small users from the network as it becomes too costly for them.
 
 In addition, since a single transaction will win an MEV opportunity, we find that the Ethereum blockchain is littered with Reverted and Checked transactions which we’ve classified as Failed MEV transactions. We believe none of these failed MEV transactions needed to be recorded on chain and take up valuable block space.
 

content/2021-03-18-transparency-february.mdx

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ Another metric we are watching closely is the number of unique searchers who’v
 
 * **Multigrain Toast** — Toast, with 4-hop ETH->HYPE->METRIC->BUILD->ETH route, turned 1.75 ETH into 10.37. Miner got 2.5ETH, searcher got 7 ETH — https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe7692082844eb95d5e0946cd6f17031f435e1bf8ef5e14a2d14e7bd423f4e75e
 
-* **Paint Rescue** — CheckAndSend, withdrawing $800 of “PAINT” tokens from a well-known private key. Otherwise tokens would be “stuck” with less knowledgable users trying to pull tokens out by first sending ETH (that gets swept). — https://etherscan.io/txs?block=12035866&p=4
+* **Paint Rescue** — CheckAndSend, withdrawing $800 of “PAINT” tokens from a well-known private key. Otherwise tokens would be “stuck” with less knowledgeable users trying to pull tokens out by first sending ETH (that gets swept). — https://etherscan.io/txs?block=12035866&p=4
 
 * **Risk Free Breeding** — CryptoKitties runs a “privileges birther”, giving themselves exclusive right to first 5 blocks of birth-eligibility. It would be rough competing against that privileged birther PLUS other regular birthers for the scraps without using Flashbots. Miner took 0.062, searcher took 0.038. — https://etherscan.io/txs?block=11930608&p=3
 

content/2021-12-04-on-the-formalization-of-mev.mdx

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ $$
 \mathsf{EV}(p, s)=\max_{\left\{s'\in S|s\xrightarrow{a_p} s'\right\}} \left\{ b(p, s')-b(p,s)\right\}. \tag{6}
 $$
 
-Here, $S$ is the set of all states, and the notation $s\xrightarrow{a_p} s'$ means that state $s'$ is *reachable* from state $s$ by some action or sequence of actions $a_p$ by player $p$. Together with equation (5) above, we achieved defintions that will allow us to easily generalize to the cross-domain case (see below), and solves most of the issues we encountered with definitions (1) and (2).
+Here, $S$ is the set of all states, and the notation $s\xrightarrow{a_p} s'$ means that state $s'$ is *reachable* from state $s$ by some action or sequence of actions $a_p$ by player $p$. Together with equation (5) above, we achieved definitions that will allow us to easily generalize to the cross-domain case (see below), and solves most of the issues we encountered with definitions (1) and (2).
 
 
 ## Outstanding issues and extensions

content/2024-03-29-preparing-for-dencun.mdx

@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ The Dencun fork was a great opportunity to review internal processes for upgradi
 
 - Importance of better tooling such as Kurtosis for local testing
 - Early integration with Ethereum clients is key in resolving client bugs. As mev-boost testing occurred later during the testnet forks for Shapella, a client bug wasn’t discovered until mainnet, resulting in missed slots.
-- Improved maturity of the mev-boost ecosystem. Client teams are more aware of mev-boost resulting in fewer last minute changes to accomodate external block building.
+- Improved maturity of the mev-boost ecosystem. Client teams are more aware of mev-boost resulting in fewer last minute changes to accommodate external block building.
 
 For things to improve on for future hard forks: