🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Prevent SSRF in path routes validation - #71
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🚨 Severity: HIGH 💡 Vulnerability: The application did not validate the protocol for the user-supplied `destiny` and `callback` URLs in `src/front/.server/panel/paths.ts`. 🎯 Impact: This allowed malicious internal URLs (e.g., `file://`, `gopher://`, `localhost`) to be accepted, leading to potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and internal network probing. 🔧 Fix: Validated that `new URL(destiny)` and `new URL(callback)` strict protocols are either `http:` or `https:`. ✅ Verification: Ran `pnpm test` and ensured `paths.spec.ts` and all other tests pass successfully. Documented learnings in `.jules/sentinel.md`. Co-authored-by: frkr <185359+frkr@users.noreply.github.com>
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🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Prevent SSRF in path routes validation
🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: The application did not validate the protocol for the user-supplied
destinyandcallbackURLs insrc/front/.server/panel/paths.ts.🎯 Impact: This allowed malicious internal URLs (e.g.,
file://,gopher://,localhost) to be accepted, leading to potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and internal network probing.🔧 Fix: Validated that
new URL(destiny)andnew URL(callback)strict protocols are eitherhttp:orhttps:.✅ Verification: Ran
pnpm testand ensuredpaths.spec.tsand all other tests pass successfully. Documented learnings in.jules/sentinel.md.PR created automatically by Jules for task 5416366887217802651 started by @frkr