fix(security/high/): update security protobufjs to v7.6.3 [security] - abandoned - #783
fix(security/high/): update security protobufjs to v7.6.3 [security] - abandoned#783renovate-sh-app[bot] wants to merge 3 commits into
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| datasource | package | from | to | | ---------- | ---------- | ----- | ----- | | npm | protobufjs | 7.5.8 | 7.6.3 | Signed-off-by: renovate-sh-app[bot] <219655108+renovate-sh-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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This PR contains the following updates:
7.5.8→7.6.3protobufjs: Denial of service through unbounded Any expansion during JSON conversion
CVE-2026-48712 / GHSA-wcpc-wj8m-hjx6
More information
Details
Summary
protobufjs could recurse without a depth limit while converting decoded messages to plain objects or JSON. This affected generated
toObject()conversion and the customgoogle.protobuf.AnyJSON conversion path.A crafted protobuf binary payload containing deeply nested
Anyvalues could cause the JavaScript call stack to be exhausted during conversion to JSON.Impact
An attacker who can provide protobuf binary data decoded by an application may be able to crash the process or otherwise cause message conversion to fail with a stack overflow.
This affects applications that decode untrusted protobuf input containing
google.protobuf.Anyvalues and then convert decoded messages to JSON or plain objects with JSON conversion enabled, for example throughJSON.stringify(message),Message#toJSON(), orType.toObject(message, { json: true }).Applications that only decode and re-encode protobuf binary data without converting decoded messages to JSON are not directly affected by this issue.
Preconditions
google.protobuf.Any, and the referencedtype_urlmust resolve to a message type in the loaded protobuf root.Anyvalues that are expanded during conversion.Workarounds
Avoid converting untrusted protobuf messages containing
google.protobuf.Anyvalues to JSON with affected versions. If immediate upgrade is not possible, reject or limit messages with deeply nestedAnypayloads at an outer protocol boundary where feasible, avoid JSON conversion of untrustedAnyvalues, or isolate message conversion in a process that can be safely restarted.Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
protobufjs : Schema-derived names can shadow runtime-significant properties
CVE-2026-54269 / GHSA-f38q-mgvj-vph7
More information
Details
Summary
protobufjs accepted certain schema-derived names that could collide with properties used by protobufjs runtime helpers. The known affected names are fields named
hasOwnProperty, field or oneof names such as$typewhen loaded through protobufjs JSON/reflection descriptors, and service methods whose generated helper name isrpcCall.When affected message or service types were used, protobufjs could read schema-controlled data where it expected an own-property helper, reflected type metadata, or the base RPC helper. This could cause deterministic exceptions or recursive calls in affected decode post-checks, verification, object conversion, reflected JSON serialization, or protobufjs RPC helper invocation.
Impact
An attacker who can provide or influence protobuf schemas or protobufjs JSON descriptors may be able to make affected message or service types unusable, resulting in denial of service for the affected processing path.
Applications using only trusted schemas are affected only if those schemas contain one of the problematic names and the application reaches the affected API path.
The issue is not known to allow code execution by itself.
Preconditions
hasOwnProperty,$typethrough protobufjs JSON/reflection descriptor input,rpcCall.verify, ortoObjectforhasOwnProperty; reflected message JSON serialization for$type; or protobufjs RPC service invocation forrpcCall.Workarounds
Do not load protobuf schemas or protobufjs JSON descriptors from untrusted sources with affected versions. If untrusted schemas or descriptors must be accepted, validate schema-derived field, oneof, and service method names before loading and reject the problematic names described above.
Applications using trusted schemas can avoid the issue by renaming affected fields or service methods, or by avoiding the affected API path.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:LReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
protobufjs/protobuf.js (protobufjs)
v7.6.3: protobufjs: v7.6.3Compare Source
Bug Fixes
v7.6.2: protobufjs: v7.6.2Compare Source
Bug Fixes
v7.6.1: protobufjs: v7.6.1Compare Source
Bug Fixes
v7.6.0: protobufjs: v7.6.0Compare Source
Features
v7.5.9: protobufjs: v7.5.9Compare Source
Bug Fixes
Configuration
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