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117 changes: 117 additions & 0 deletions A98-SNI-setting-and-SNI-SAN-validation.md
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A98: xDS-Based setting SNI and server certificate SAN validation
----
* Author: [Kannan Jayaprakasam](https://github.com/kannanjgithub)
* Approver: [Eric Anderson](https://github.com/ejona86)
* Status: Draft
* Implemented in:
* Last updated: 2025-07-28

## Abstract

gRPC will add support for setting Server Name Indication (SNI) and validation of server certificate's
Subject Alternative Names (SANs) aginst the SNI that was used.

### Background

During Tls handshake, the server presents its certificate to the client for authentication. For servers
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FYI, this is actually required by the http2 standard (paragraph 9.2 of the http2 spec):

HTTP/2 clients MUST indicate the target domain name when negotiating TLS.

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It's fair to point out, but actually not relevant. It's really be "required" well before HTTP/2. But SNI and the HTTP/2 spec only considers WWW.

When you have SPIFFE certs, or just doing xds, the "target domain name" may not be a valid domain name. SNI prohibits using invalid domain names, so you may have to drop SNI. That's what happened in Java; C++ instead was choosing to send invalid SNI.

So while we could mention HTTP/2 requires it, I don't think it actually adds any weight.

serving multiple domains, the client needs to indicate which domain it is requesting, so that the server
can present the certificate is has for that domain. The client does this at the time of Tls handshaking
via Server Name Indication (SNI). When using `XdsChannelCredentials` for a channel, the gRPC client needs
to be configured by the xDS server with what value to send for SNI and the gRPC client should use it for
the Tls handshake.

In [A29][A29] for TLS security in xDS-managed connections, the `sni` field from [UpstreamTlsContext.sni][UTC_SNI]
was ignored.

When using `XdsChannelCredentials` for the channel, hostname validation
is turned off and instead SAN matching is performed against [UpstreamTlsContext.match_subject_alt_names][match_subject_alt_names]
instead of a typical hostname. This proposal adds SAN matching for the same name as the client used for SNI.

For an overview of securing connections in the envoy proxy using SNI
and SAN validation, see [envoy-SNI].

[UTC_SNI]: https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/blob/ee2bab9e40e7d7649cc88c5e1098c74e0c79501d/api/envoy/extensions/transport_sockets/tls/v3/tls.proto#L42
[A29]: A29-xds-tls-security.md
[envoy-SNI]: https://www.envoyproxy.io/docs/envoy/latest/start/quick-start/securing
[match_subject_alt_names]: https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/blob/b29d6543e7568a8a3e772c7909a1daa182acc670/api/envoy/extensions/transport_sockets/tls/v3/common.proto#L407

## Proposal
This proposal has two parts:
1. Setting SNI: When using `XdsChannelCredentials` for the channel, gRPC clients will set SNI for the Tls handshake for
Tls connections using the fields from [UpstreamTlsContext][UTC] in the CDS update.

i. If `UpstreamTlsContext.sni` specifies the SNI to use, then
it will be used.

ii. If [UpstreamTlsContext][UTC] specifies `auto_sni_host`, then
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Done.

SNI will be set to the hostname, which is either the logical
DNS name for DNS clusters or the endpoint hostname for EDS
clusters, as in the case of the hostname used for [authority
rewriting][A81-hostname].
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Shouldn't it be in the opposite order?

Quoting https://www.envoyproxy.io/docs/envoy/latest/start/quick-start/securing#connect-to-an-endpoint-with-sni:

When multiple options are configured, auto_sni has the highest priority, followed by auto_host_sni, followed by the fixed sni.

The behavior for gRPC needs to be consistent with Envoy.

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Yes, changed it now, thanks.

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However note that we are not implementing auto_sni in this proposal.


[UTC]: https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/blob/ee2bab9e40e7d7649cc88c5e1098c74e0c79501d/api/envoy/extensions/transport_sockets/tls/v3/tls.proto#L29
[A81-hostname]: https://github.com/grpc/proposal/blob/4f833c5774e71e94534f72b94ee1b9763ec58516/A81-xds-authority-rewriting.md?plain=1#L85

2. Server SAN validation against SNI used: If `auto_sni_san_validation` is true in the [UpstreamTlsContext][UTC]
gRPC client will perform validation for a DNS SAN matching the SNI value
sent. The normal matching when using `TlsCredentials' for the channel
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This is the XdsChannelCredentials matching

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But looking at XdsX509ExtendedTrustManager it is only matching DNS names against the SANs so I thought we are doing the same but just matching them against the SNI passed by the client.

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I misunderstood that doing matching for only 3 types was more restrictive than what TlsCredentials does. Modified it now.

allows other SAN types, but only the DNS type will be checked here.

### Related Proposals:
* [gRFC A29: xDS-Based Security for gRPC Clients and Servers][A29]
* [gRFC A81: xDS Authority Rewriting][A81]

[A29]: A29-xds-tls-security.md
[A81]: A81-xds-authority-rewriting.md

### Setting SNI
#### Tls handshake time changes
As mentioned in [A29 implementation details][A29_impl-details] the
`UpstreamTlsContext` is either passed down to child policies via
channel arguments or is put in sub-channel attribute wrapped in a
`SslContextProviderSupplier`, depending on the language. The `UpstreamTlsContext.SNI`
would already be available to this provider supplier from the parsed Cluster resource.
At the time of Tls protocol negotiation, when this provider supplier is
used to invoked to set the SslContext, the hostname from the channel attributes
also will be passed now, to determine the SNI to be set for the Tls handshake.
For example, in Java, at protocol negotiation time the `SslContextProviderSupplier` is given
a callback to be invoked with the `SslContext` when the client Ssl Provider instantiated by
this supplier has the `SslContext` ready. This callback will now also be passed the SNI
taken from the subchannel attributes. This value along with the `UpstreamTlsContext` available
in the `SslContextProviderSupplier` will be used to decide the SNI to be used for the handshake.

[A29_impl-details]: https://github.com/grpc/proposal/blob/master/A29-xds-tls-security.md#implementation-details
[UTC_SNI]: https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/blob/ee2bab9e40e7d7649cc88c5e1098c74e0c79501d/api/envoy/extensions/transport_sockets/tls/v3/tls.proto#L42

### SAN SNI validation
The server certificate validation described in [A29 SAN matching][A29_SAN-matching]
matches the Subject Alternative Names specified in the server certificate against
[`match_subject_alt_names`][match_subject_alt_names] in `CertificateValidationContext`.
If `auto_sni_san_validation` is set in the [UpstreamTlsContext][UTC], matching will be
performed against the SNI that was used by the client, and this validation will replace
the [`match_subject_alt_names`][match_subject_alt_names] if set. This verification occurs
in the TrustManager of the SslContext which is created using the cert store indicated by
`CertificateValidationContext` in `UpstreamTlsContext` which is either a managed cert store
or the system root cert store.

#### Caching for the SslContext
The `SslContextProviderSupplier` (named so because it supplies both client and server
SslContext providers) creates a provider for the client `SslContext` and today
maintains a cache of `UpstreamTlsContext` to the client `SslContext` provider instances.
For the SNI requirement, the `TrustManager` in the `SslContext` needs to
be aware of the SNI to validate the SAN against, so a different `TrustManager` instance needs
to be created for each SNI to use for the same `UpstreamTlsContext`, so this cache's key will
need to be enhanced to be <UpstreamTlsContext, String> to hold the SNI as well, and the client
`SslContext` provider for a particular key will create a `TrustManager` instance that takes the
SNI to validate the SANs against and set it in the `SslContext` it provides.

[A29_SAN-matching]: https://github.com/grpc/proposal/blob/master/A29-xds-tls-security.md#server-authorization-aka-subject-alt-name-checks
[match_subject_alt_names]: https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/blob/b29d6543e7568a8a3e772c7909a1daa182acc670/api/envoy/extensions/transport_sockets/tls/v3/common.proto#L407
[UTC]: https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/blob/ee2bab9e40e7d7649cc88c5e1098c74e0c79501d/api/envoy/extensions/transport_sockets/tls/v3/tls.proto#L29

#### Behavior when SNI is not indicated in UpstreamTlsContext
When `UpstreamTlsContext` has neither of `SNI` and `auto_sni_host` values set, the current behavior will continue, i.e. SNI will be set to the xds hostname from `GrpcRoute`.

### Temporary environment variable protection
Setting SNI and performing the SAN validation against SNI will be guarded by the `GRPC_EXPERIMENTAL_XDS_SNI`
env var. The env var guard will be removed once the feature passes interop tests.