feat: bot-platform login + validate (botplatform-service) — v1

auth-service/bpvalidator.go

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+
+	"github.com/go-resty/resty/v2"
+
+	"github.com/hmchangw/chat/pkg/errcode"
+	"github.com/hmchangw/chat/pkg/natsutil"
+	"github.com/hmchangw/chat/pkg/principal"
+)
+
+// httpBotplatformValidator is the production BotplatformValidator: it POSTs
+// the supplied authToken to {baseURL}/v1/auth/validate and unmarshals the
+// {valid, principal} response. Resty handles timeout, TLS, and redirects;
+// the Resty client is supplied externally (so main wires the shared
+// restyutil instance).
+type httpBotplatformValidator struct {
+	client  *resty.Client
+	baseURL string
+}
+
+// newHTTPBotplatformValidator returns a validator that talks to the
+// botplatform-service at baseURL. baseURL should be the public botplatform
+// URL of the LOCAL site (validation is local-DB only — cross-site routing is
+// the gateway's job).
+func newHTTPBotplatformValidator(client *resty.Client, baseURL string) *httpBotplatformValidator {
+	return &httpBotplatformValidator{client: client, baseURL: baseURL}
+}
+
+// Validate POSTs to botplatform /v1/auth/validate. Returns:
+//   - a typed errcode.Unauthenticated on a 401 from upstream (caller will
+//     surface it to the client as 401 invalid_token).
+//   - a raw wrapped error on network failures or non-2xx/401 statuses
+//     (caller will surface it as 503 upstream_unavailable).
+func (v *httpBotplatformValidator) Validate(ctx context.Context, authToken string) (principal.Principal, error) {
+	var body struct {
+		Valid     bool                `json:"valid"`
+		Principal principal.Principal `json:"principal"`
+	}
+	req := v.client.R().
+		SetContext(ctx).
+		SetBody(map[string]string{"authToken": authToken}).
+		SetResult(&body)
+	if id := natsutil.RequestIDFromContext(ctx); id != "" {
+		req = req.SetHeader(natsutil.RequestIDHeader, id)
+	}
+	resp, err := req.Post(v.baseURL + "/v1/auth/validate")
+	if err != nil {
+		return principal.Principal{}, fmt.Errorf("validate authToken: %w", err)
+	}
+	switch resp.StatusCode() {
+	case http.StatusOK:
+		if !body.Valid {
+			return principal.Principal{}, errcode.Unauthenticated("session token invalid",
+				errcode.WithReason(errcode.BotplatformInvalidToken))
+		}
+		return body.Principal, nil
+	case http.StatusUnauthorized:
+		return principal.Principal{}, errcode.Unauthenticated("session token invalid",
+			errcode.WithReason(errcode.BotplatformInvalidToken))
+	default:
+		return principal.Principal{}, fmt.Errorf("botplatform validate: HTTP %d: %s",
+			resp.StatusCode(), string(resp.Body()))
+	}
+}

auth-service/handler.go

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/hmchangw/chat/pkg/errcode"
 	"github.com/hmchangw/chat/pkg/errcode/errhttp"
 	pkgoidc "github.com/hmchangw/chat/pkg/oidc"
+	"github.com/hmchangw/chat/pkg/principal"
 	"github.com/hmchangw/chat/pkg/subject"
 )
 
@@ -27,7 +28,13 @@ type TokenValidator interface {
 }
 
 type authRequest struct {
-	SSOToken      string `json:"ssoToken" binding:"required"`
+	// Exactly one of SSOToken / AuthToken must be set. The server routes on
+	// which field is present:
+	//   - SSOToken populated -> existing OIDC path (unchanged behavior).
+	//   - AuthToken populated -> new botplatform-validate path
+	//     (bots/admins exchange their session for a NATS JWT).
+	SSOToken      string `json:"ssoToken"`
+	AuthToken     string `json:"authToken"`
 	NATSPublicKey string `json:"natsPublicKey" binding:"required"`
 }
 
@@ -51,15 +58,26 @@ type userInfoResp struct {
 	DeptID      string `json:"deptId"`
 }
 
-// AuthHandler processes auth requests, validates SSO tokens via OIDC,
-// and returns signed NATS user JWTs with scoped permissions.
+// BotplatformValidator validates a session authToken against botplatform-
+// service. Returned err is errcode.Unauthenticated for invalid tokens and a
+// raw wrapped error for upstream failures (the handler surfaces those as
+// 503 upstream_unavailable). The Principal type is the shared wire shape
+// from pkg/principal, also produced by botplatform-service.
+type BotplatformValidator interface {
+	Validate(ctx context.Context, authToken string) (principal.Principal, error)
+}
+
+// AuthHandler processes auth requests, validates SSO tokens via OIDC or
+// session tokens via botplatform, and returns signed NATS user JWTs with
+// role-scoped permissions.
 type AuthHandler struct {
-	validator  TokenValidator
-	signingKey nkeys.KeyPair
-	jwtExpiry  time.Duration
-	jwtJitter  float64        // fraction of jwtExpiry; 0 = fixed lifetime
-	randFloat  func() float64 // injectable [0,1) source; defaults to crypto rand
-	devMode    bool
+	validator   TokenValidator
+	bpValidator BotplatformValidator // optional; nil disables the session-token branch
+	signingKey  nkeys.KeyPair
+	jwtExpiry   time.Duration
+	jwtJitter   float64        // fraction of jwtExpiry; 0 = fixed lifetime
+	randFloat   func() float64 // injectable [0,1) source; defaults to crypto rand
+	devMode     bool
 }
 
 // Option configures optional AuthHandler behavior.
@@ -84,6 +102,13 @@ func WithRandFloat(fn func() float64) Option {
 	return func(h *AuthHandler) { h.randFloat = fn }
 }
 
+// WithBotplatformValidator enables the session-token branch of POST /auth.
+// Without it, a request carrying an authToken is rejected as if the field
+// were unsupported.
+func WithBotplatformValidator(v BotplatformValidator) Option {
+	return func(h *AuthHandler) { h.bpValidator = v }
+}
+
 // NewAuthHandler creates an AuthHandler with the given token validator,
 // NATS account signing key, and JWT expiry duration.
 func NewAuthHandler(validator TokenValidator, signingKey nkeys.KeyPair, jwtExpiry time.Duration, devMode bool, opts ...Option) *AuthHandler {
@@ -112,8 +137,13 @@ func cryptoRandFloat() float64 {
 	return float64(n.Int64()) / float64(denom)
 }
 
-// HandleAuth validates the SSO token, resolves permissions based on
-// the user account, and returns a signed NATS JWT.
+// HandleAuth routes by which token is present:
+//   - ssoToken set, authToken empty → existing OIDC path (unchanged).
+//   - authToken set, ssoToken empty → new session-validate path via
+//     botplatform. NATS JWT scope is derived from the principal's roles
+//     (admin > bot > user) by pkg/principal.NATSSubjectScope.
+//   - both set → 400 ambiguous_token (the client must pick one auth method).
+//   - neither set → 400 missing_token.
 func (h *AuthHandler) HandleAuth(c *gin.Context) {
 	if h.devMode {
 		h.handleDevAuth(c)
@@ -124,7 +154,7 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) HandleAuth(c *gin.Context) {
 
 	var req authRequest
 	if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
-		errhttp.Write(ctx, c, errcode.BadRequest("ssoToken and natsPublicKey are required",
+		errhttp.Write(ctx, c, errcode.BadRequest("natsPublicKey is required",
 			errcode.WithReason(errcode.AuthMissingFields)))
 		return
 	}
@@ -135,15 +165,33 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) HandleAuth(c *gin.Context) {
 		return
 	}
 
+	switch {
+	case req.SSOToken != "" && req.AuthToken != "":
+		errhttp.Write(ctx, c, errcode.BadRequest("set exactly one of ssoToken / authToken",
+			errcode.WithReason(errcode.BotplatformAmbiguousToken)))
+		return
+	case req.SSOToken == "" && req.AuthToken == "":
+		errhttp.Write(ctx, c, errcode.BadRequest("set exactly one of ssoToken / authToken",
+			errcode.WithReason(errcode.BotplatformMissingToken)))
+		return
+	case req.AuthToken != "":
+		h.handleSession(ctx, c, req)
+		return
+	}
+
+	h.handleSSO(ctx, c, req)
+}
+
+// handleSSO runs the existing OIDC validation + JWT mint. Behavior unchanged
+// from the pre-extension code path.
+func (h *AuthHandler) handleSSO(ctx context.Context, c *gin.Context, req authRequest) {
 	claims, err := h.validator.Validate(ctx, req.SSOToken)
 	if err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, pkgoidc.ErrTokenExpired) {
 			errhttp.Write(ctx, c, errcode.Unauthenticated("SSO token has expired, please re-login",
 				errcode.WithReason(errcode.AuthTokenExpired)))
 			return
 		}
-		// Non-expiry failures surface as "invalid SSO token"; attach the raw
-		// cause so the server log carries the actual reason.
 		errhttp.Write(ctx, c, errcode.Unauthenticated("invalid SSO token",
 			errcode.WithReason(errcode.AuthInvalidToken),
 			errcode.WithCause(err)))
@@ -152,7 +200,6 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) HandleAuth(c *gin.Context) {
 
 	account := claims.Account()
 	if account == "" {
-		// Blank account would mint a JWT with chat.user..> permissions — refuse.
 		errhttp.Write(ctx, c, errcode.Unauthenticated("token missing account claim",
 			errcode.WithReason(errcode.AuthInvalidToken)))
 		return
@@ -163,17 +210,15 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) HandleAuth(c *gin.Context) {
 	}
 	ctx = errcode.WithLogValues(ctx, "account", account)
 
-	natsJWT, err := h.signNATSJWT(req.NATSPublicKey, account)
+	scope := principal.NATSSubjectScope(account, nil) // SSO users have no roles -> user scope
+	natsJWT, err := h.signNATSJWT(req.NATSPublicKey, scope)
 	if err != nil {
 		errhttp.Write(ctx, c, fmt.Errorf("generating NATS token: %w", err))
 		return
 	}
 
 	slog.Debug("auth success", "account", account, "subject", claims.Subject)
-
-	// Parse description field: "employeeId, engName, chineseName"
 	employeeID, engName, chineseName := parseDescription(claims.Description)
-
 	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, authResponse{
 		NATSJWT: natsJWT,
 		UserInfo: userInfoResp{
@@ -188,6 +233,54 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) HandleAuth(c *gin.Context) {
 	})
 }
 
+// handleSession exchanges a botplatform session authToken for a NATS JWT. The
+// scope is derived from the principal's roles (admin > bot > user) so a bot
+// gets chat.bot.{stripped}.>, an admin gets chat.>, and the rare role-less
+// session falls back to chat.user.{account}.>.
+func (h *AuthHandler) handleSession(ctx context.Context, c *gin.Context, req authRequest) {
+	if h.bpValidator == nil {
+		errhttp.Write(ctx, c, errcode.Unavailable("session-token auth not configured",
+			errcode.WithReason(errcode.BotplatformUpstreamUnavailable)))
+		return
+	}
+
+	p, err := h.bpValidator.Validate(ctx, req.AuthToken)
+	if err != nil {
+		var ec *errcode.Error
+		if errors.As(err, &ec) {
+			errhttp.Write(ctx, c, ec)
+			return
+		}
+		errhttp.Write(ctx, c, errcode.Unavailable("botplatform unavailable",
+			errcode.WithReason(errcode.BotplatformUpstreamUnavailable),
+			errcode.WithCause(err)))
+		return
+	}
+	if p.Account == "" {
+		errhttp.Write(ctx, c, errcode.Unauthenticated("principal missing account",
+			errcode.WithReason(errcode.AuthInvalidToken)))
+		return
+	}
+	ctx = errcode.WithLogValues(ctx, "account", p.Account)
+
+	scope := principal.NATSSubjectScope(p.Account, p.Roles)
+	natsJWT, err := h.signNATSJWT(req.NATSPublicKey, scope)
+	if err != nil {
+		errhttp.Write(ctx, c, fmt.Errorf("generating NATS token: %w", err))
+		return
+	}
+
+	slog.Debug("session auth success", "account", p.Account, "roles", p.Roles)
+	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, authResponse{
+		NATSJWT: natsJWT,
+		UserInfo: userInfoResp{
+			Account: p.Account,
+			// No employee fields for bot/admin sessions — botplatform's
+			// principal carries identity, not directory metadata.
+		},
+	})
+}
+
 // handleDevAuth handles auth in dev mode: accepts account name directly
 // without OIDC validation, for use during local development only.
 func (h *AuthHandler) handleDevAuth(c *gin.Context) {
@@ -212,7 +305,8 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) handleDevAuth(c *gin.Context) {
 	}
 	ctx = errcode.WithLogValues(ctx, "account", req.Account)
 
-	natsJWT, err := h.signNATSJWT(req.NATSPublicKey, req.Account)
+	scope := principal.NATSSubjectScope(req.Account, nil)
+	natsJWT, err := h.signNATSJWT(req.NATSPublicKey, scope)
 	if err != nil {
 		errhttp.Write(ctx, c, fmt.Errorf("generating NATS token: %w", err))
 		return
@@ -230,30 +324,19 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) handleDevAuth(c *gin.Context) {
 	})
 }
 
-// signNATSJWT creates a signed NATS user JWT with permissions scoped
-// to the user's namespace and standard chat subjects.
-func (h *AuthHandler) signNATSJWT(userPubKey, account string) (string, error) {
+// signNATSJWT creates a signed NATS user JWT with the supplied pub/sub
+// allowlist. The scope is computed upstream by pkg/principal.NATSSubjectScope
+// so the role-to-subject mapping has a single source of truth across
+// auth-service and future consumers.
+func (h *AuthHandler) signNATSJWT(userPubKey string, scope principal.Scope) (string, error) {
 	uc := jwt.NewUserClaims(userPubKey)
 	uc.Expires = h.jwtExpiryAt().Unix()
-
-	// Publish permissions: user's own namespace + inbox for request-reply.
-	uc.Pub.Allow.Add(fmt.Sprintf("chat.user.%s.>", account))
-	uc.Pub.Allow.Add("_INBOX.>")
-
-	// Subscribe permissions: user's own namespace, all rooms, and inbox.
-	uc.Sub.Allow.Add(fmt.Sprintf("chat.user.%s.>", account))
-	uc.Sub.Allow.Add("chat.room.>")
-	uc.Sub.Allow.Add("_INBOX.>")
-
-	// Presence: read anyone's live state and publish batch queries. The state
-	// broadcast carries only the account (no siteID), so a single-token wildcard
-	// covers it. Writes (hello/ping/activity/bye/manual) live under the user's
-	// own chat.user.{account}.> namespace already granted above. Clients can read
-	// state but never publish it — the "state" vs "query" token keeps the query
-	// pub-rule from matching the state subject, so presence can't be forged.
-	uc.Sub.Allow.Add("chat.user.presence.state.*")
-	uc.Pub.Allow.Add("chat.user.presence.*.query.batch")
-
+	for _, s := range scope.PubAllow {
+		uc.Pub.Allow.Add(s)
+	}
+	for _, s := range scope.SubAllow {
+		uc.Sub.Allow.Add(s)
+	}
 	return uc.Encode(h.signingKey)
 }