fix(engine): pass credentials by name, not value, on docker run by eFAILution · Pull Request #144 · huntridge-labs/argus

eFAILution · 2026-05-12T02:26:39Z

Description

Closes hardening item (1) from "Secret Handling & Credential Surface Hardening" in docs/developer/SDK-ROADMAP.md. Switches the engine's container-path env passthrough from -e NAME=VALUE (value on argv) to -e NAME (name only, value in the subprocess's private env). Closes the ps / docker inspect / docker-daemon-audit leak vector identified in the post-#142 security audit.

Changes Made

Details

Before:

docker_cmd.extend(["-e", f"{env_name}={env_value}"])
# docker run -e ZAP_AUTH_PASSWORD=hunter2 ...

After:

subprocess_env[env_name] = env_value           # private to argus's subprocess
docker_cmd.extend(["-e", env_name])            # docker inherits by name
# docker run -e ZAP_AUTH_PASSWORD ...
# subprocess.run(..., env=subprocess_env)

Docker inherits the named env var from the parent process (the python subprocess argus spawns). The value lives only in that subprocess's private environment — never on argv. Three concrete leak vectors close:

Vector	Before	After
`ps -ef \| grep "docker run"`	Shows credential to any local user	Shows only the NAME
`docker inspect <container>`	Shows credential to anyone with docker socket access	Shows only the NAME
Docker daemon audit logs	Capture full `NAME=VALUE`	Capture only NAME

The subprocess env is private to argus's docker-run child and its own children. Visible only to processes that can already read /proc/<pid>/environ for that specific pid — strictly tighter access than the ps-visible argv list.

Behavior preservation:

Scanners without container_env: unchanged (subprocess.run receives env=None, inherits parent unmodified).
container_env entries with None values: still filtered before the dict is built. Unset env-var-name references don't materialize at all (closes the "and don't accidentally inherit the host's value for that name" gap explicitly).
container_env that resolves to an all-None dict: drops the env=... override entirely (matches the no-container_env path; subprocess.run sees env=None).

Testing

Unit tests added/updated
Integration tests added/updated
Manual testing performed
Tested with different scanner combinations

Test Results

Updated 3 existing engine-hook tests + added 1 new one in argus/tests/test_engine.py::TestContainerEnvHook:

test_env_vars_passed_by_name_not_value (renamed from test_env_vars_passed_via_dash_e) — explicit assertion that VALUE never appears on argv, and that it lands in subprocess.run's env= dict; PATH preserved from parent env.
test_none_value_skipped — verifies None values don't reach argv OR subprocess env.
test_no_container_env_method_no_extra_flags — verifies env=None is passed for back-compat scanners.
test_all_none_values_no_subprocess_env_override (new) — guards the "drop override on empty dict" path.

Full suite: 3066 passed, 2 skipped, 7 deselected.

Security Considerations

No security impact
Security enhancement
Potential security implications (explain below)

Security Details

Closes the highest-payoff item from the secret-handling audit. Severity classification per the audit: medium — exploitable only by an attacker who already has local user access to the scan host, but trivial once they do. After this PR, even an attacker with local user access can no longer scrape credentials from ps -ef; they'd need to read /proc/<pid>/environ for the specific docker-spawning subprocess, which requires the same uid (or root).

AI Context Updates (.ai/)

.ai/architecture.yaml updated — both core/engine.py description copies updated to describe the new passthrough strategy (NAME-only argv + private subprocess env).
.ai/workflows.yaml updated
.ai/decisions.yaml updated
.ai/errors.yaml updated
N/A

Checklist

Code follows project style guidelines
Documentation updated
Changelog updated (if applicable)
All tests pass
Reviewed by at least one maintainer
Reviewed CONTRIBUTING.md guidelines

Related Issues

Implements hardening item (1) from docs/developer/SDK-ROADMAP.md → "Secret Handling & Credential Surface Hardening" (added in PR docs(roadmap): capture secret-handling audit + hardening PR queue #143).
Builds on the container_env engine hook landed in PR feat(secrets): credential resolver + zap config-passthrough wiring #142.

Screenshots/Logs (if applicable)

Diff: 4 files, +96 / -21.

Closes hardening item #1 from "Secret Handling & Credential Surface Hardening" in docs/developer/SDK-ROADMAP.md. Before: docker run -e NAME=VALUE ... image ... After: docker run -e NAME ... image ... subprocess.run(..., env={**os.environ, NAME: VALUE}) Docker inherits the named env var from the parent process (the python subprocess argus spawns). The value lives only in that subprocess's private environment — not in argv. Closes three specific leak vectors: - `ps -ef | grep "docker run"` no longer shows credentials to other local users on the scan host. - `docker inspect <container>` no longer shows credentials to anyone with docker socket access. - Docker daemon audit logs (if configured) capture only NAME, not VALUE. The subprocess env is private to argus's docker-run child and its own children (the docker daemon's container). Visible only to processes that can already read /proc/<pid>/environ for that specific pid — a strictly tighter access set than the ps-visible argv list. Behavior preservation: - Scanners without container_env: unchanged (subprocess env=None, inherits parent unmodified). - container_env entries with None values: still filtered before the dict is built, so unset env-var-name references don't materialize at all. - container_env that resolves to an all-None dict: drops the env=... override entirely (matches no-container_env behavior). Updated 4 engine hook tests: - test_env_vars_passed_by_name_not_value (renamed from test_env_vars_passed_via_dash_e) — explicit assertion that VALUE never appears on argv, and that it lands in the subprocess env. - test_none_value_skipped — verifies None values don't reach either argv OR subprocess env. - test_no_container_env_method_no_extra_flags — verifies env=None is passed for back-compat scanners. - test_all_none_values_no_subprocess_env_override (new) — guards the "drop override on empty dict" path. .ai/architecture.yaml engine-hook description updated in both copies to reflect the new passthrough strategy. Full suite: 3066 passed, 2 skipped.

codecov · 2026-05-12T02:28:57Z

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.

📢 Thoughts on this report? Let us know!

github-actions · 2026-05-12T02:29:53Z

🔒 Argus Container Security Scan

Branch: fix/engine-env-passthrough-no-value
Commit: 4efd24f

📊 Combined Findings Summary

🚨 Critical	⚠️ High	🟡 Medium	🔵 Low	📦 Total	🔢 Unique
1	55	86	64	206	206

Scanned: 4 containers | Build Failures: 0

📦 Container Breakdown

Container	Image	🚨 Crit	⚠️ High	🟡 Med	🔵 Low	Total	Unique	Status
cli	`ghcr.io/huntridge-labs/argus/cli:4efd24ff3b6671770b1a3085c48f1a7722c44e39`	1	39	32	1	73	73	✅
scanner-bandit	`ghcr.io/huntridge-labs/argus/scanner-bandit:4efd24ff3b6671770b1a3085c48f1a7722c44e39`	0	0	2	0	2	2	✅
scanner-opengrep	`ghcr.io/huntridge-labs/argus/scanner-opengrep:4efd24ff3b6671770b1a3085c48f1a7722c44e39`	0	7	44	63	114	114	✅
scanner-supply-chain	`ghcr.io/huntridge-labs/argus/scanner-supply-chain:4efd24ff3b6671770b1a3085c48f1a7722c44e39`	0	9	8	0	17	17	✅

🔍 Detailed Findings by Container

🚨 cli - 73 vulnerabilities (33 unique)

Image: ghcr.io/huntridge-labs/argus/cli:4efd24ff3b6671770b1a3085c48f1a7722c44e39

Combined (Deduplicated)

🚨 Critical	⚠️ High	🟡 Medium	🔵 Low	Total	Unique
1	39	32	1	73	33

🔷 Trivy Scanner (73 findings, 33 unique)

CVE	Severity	Package	Version	Fixed
CVE-2025-68121	🚨 CRITICAL	stdlib	v1.24.11	1.24.13, 1.25.7, 1.26.0-rc.3
CVE-2026-32280	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.9, 1.26.2
CVE-2026-32281	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.9, 1.26.2
CVE-2026-32283	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.9, 1.26.2
CVE-2026-33810	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.26.2
CVE-2026-33811	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-33814	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-39820	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-39836	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-42499	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2025-61726	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.24.11	1.24.12, 1.25.6
CVE-2025-61728	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.24.11	1.24.12, 1.25.6
CVE-2026-25679	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.24.11	1.25.8, 1.26.1
CVE-2026-32280	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.24.11	1.25.9, 1.26.2
CVE-2026-32281	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.24.11	1.25.9, 1.26.2
CVE-2026-32283	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.24.11	1.25.9, 1.26.2
CVE-2026-33811	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.24.11	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-33814	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.24.11	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-39820	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.24.11	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-39836	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.24.11	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-42499	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.24.11	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-34040	⚠️ HIGH	github.com/docker/docker	v28.5.2+incompatible	29.3.1
CVE-2026-45022	⚠️ HIGH	github.com/go-git/go-git/v5	v5.18.0	5.19.0
CVE-2026-33811	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.2	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-33814	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.2	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-39820	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.2	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-39836	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.2	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-42499	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.2	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-45022	⚠️ HIGH	github.com/go-git/go-git/v5	v5.18.0	5.19.0
CVE-2026-33811	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.2	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-33814	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.2	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-39820	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.2	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-39836	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.2	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-42499	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.2	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-45022	⚠️ HIGH	github.com/go-git/go-git/v5	v5.17.2	5.19.0
CVE-2026-33811	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.25.9	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-33814	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.25.9	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-39820	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.25.9	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-39836	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.25.9	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-42499	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.25.9	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-3219	🟡 MEDIUM	pip	26.0.1	N/A
CVE-2026-6357	🟡 MEDIUM	pip	26.0.1	26.1
CVE-2026-32282	🟡 MEDIUM	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.9, 1.26.2
CVE-2026-32288	🟡 MEDIUM	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.9, 1.26.2
CVE-2026-32289	🟡 MEDIUM	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.9, 1.26.2
CVE-2026-39823	🟡 MEDIUM	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-39825	🟡 MEDIUM	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-39826	🟡 MEDIUM	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2025-11579	🟡 MEDIUM	github.com/nwaples/rardecode/v2	v2.1.0	2.2.0
CVE-2025-58058	🟡 MEDIUM	github.com/ulikunitz/xz	v0.5.12	0.5.15

...and 23 more

⚓ Grype Scanner (0 findings, 0 unique)

✅ No vulnerabilities detected by Grype

🟡 scanner-bandit - 2 vulnerabilities (2 unique)

Image: ghcr.io/huntridge-labs/argus/scanner-bandit:4efd24ff3b6671770b1a3085c48f1a7722c44e39

Combined (Deduplicated)

🚨 Critical	⚠️ High	🟡 Medium	🔵 Low	Total	Unique
0	0	2	0	2	2

🔷 Trivy Scanner (2 findings, 2 unique)

CVE	Severity	Package	Version	Fixed
CVE-2026-3219	🟡 MEDIUM	pip	26.0.1	N/A
CVE-2026-6357	🟡 MEDIUM	pip	26.0.1	26.1

⚓ Grype Scanner (0 findings, 0 unique)

✅ No vulnerabilities detected by Grype

⚠️

scanner-opengrep - 114 vulnerabilities (50 unique)

Image: ghcr.io/huntridge-labs/argus/scanner-opengrep:4efd24ff3b6671770b1a3085c48f1a7722c44e39

Combined (Deduplicated)

🚨 Critical	⚠️ High	🟡 Medium	🔵 Low	Total	Unique
0	7	44	63	114	50

🔷 Trivy Scanner (114 findings, 49 unique)

CVE	Severity	Package	Version	Fixed
CVE-2026-4878	⚠️ HIGH	libcap2	1:2.75-10+b8	N/A
CVE-2025-69720	⚠️ HIGH	libncursesw6	6.5+20250216-2	N/A
CVE-2026-29111	⚠️ HIGH	libsystemd0	257.9-1~deb13u1	N/A
CVE-2025-69720	⚠️ HIGH	libtinfo6	6.5+20250216-2	N/A
CVE-2026-29111	⚠️ HIGH	libudev1	257.9-1~deb13u1	N/A
CVE-2025-69720	⚠️ HIGH	ncurses-base	6.5+20250216-2	N/A
CVE-2025-69720	⚠️ HIGH	ncurses-bin	6.5+20250216-2	N/A
CVE-2026-27456	🟡 MEDIUM	bsdutils	1:2.41-5	N/A
CVE-2026-3184	🟡 MEDIUM	bsdutils	1:2.41-5	N/A
CVE-2026-27456	🟡 MEDIUM	libblkid1	2.41-5	N/A
CVE-2026-3184	🟡 MEDIUM	libblkid1	2.41-5	N/A
CVE-2026-4046	🟡 MEDIUM	libc-bin	2.41-12+deb13u2	N/A
CVE-2026-4437	🟡 MEDIUM	libc-bin	2.41-12+deb13u2	N/A
CVE-2026-4438	🟡 MEDIUM	libc-bin	2.41-12+deb13u2	N/A
CVE-2026-5435	🟡 MEDIUM	libc-bin	2.41-12+deb13u2	N/A
CVE-2026-5450	🟡 MEDIUM	libc-bin	2.41-12+deb13u2	N/A
CVE-2026-5928	🟡 MEDIUM	libc-bin	2.41-12+deb13u2	N/A
CVE-2026-6238	🟡 MEDIUM	libc-bin	2.41-12+deb13u2	N/A
CVE-2026-4046	🟡 MEDIUM	libc6	2.41-12+deb13u2	N/A
CVE-2026-4437	🟡 MEDIUM	libc6	2.41-12+deb13u2	N/A
CVE-2026-4438	🟡 MEDIUM	libc6	2.41-12+deb13u2	N/A
CVE-2026-5435	🟡 MEDIUM	libc6	2.41-12+deb13u2	N/A
CVE-2026-5450	🟡 MEDIUM	libc6	2.41-12+deb13u2	N/A
CVE-2026-5928	🟡 MEDIUM	libc6	2.41-12+deb13u2	N/A
CVE-2026-6238	🟡 MEDIUM	libc6	2.41-12+deb13u2	N/A
CVE-2026-27456	🟡 MEDIUM	liblastlog2-2	2.41-5	N/A
CVE-2026-3184	🟡 MEDIUM	liblastlog2-2	2.41-5	N/A
CVE-2026-34743	🟡 MEDIUM	liblzma5	5.8.1-1	N/A
CVE-2026-27456	🟡 MEDIUM	libmount1	2.41-5	N/A
CVE-2026-3184	🟡 MEDIUM	libmount1	2.41-5	N/A
CVE-2026-27456	🟡 MEDIUM	libsmartcols1	2.41-5	N/A
CVE-2026-3184	🟡 MEDIUM	libsmartcols1	2.41-5	N/A
CVE-2026-40225	🟡 MEDIUM	libsystemd0	257.9-1~deb13u1	N/A
CVE-2026-40226	🟡 MEDIUM	libsystemd0	257.9-1~deb13u1	N/A
CVE-2026-4105	🟡 MEDIUM	libsystemd0	257.9-1~deb13u1	N/A
CVE-2026-40225	🟡 MEDIUM	libudev1	257.9-1~deb13u1	N/A
CVE-2026-40226	🟡 MEDIUM	libudev1	257.9-1~deb13u1	N/A
CVE-2026-4105	🟡 MEDIUM	libudev1	257.9-1~deb13u1	N/A
CVE-2026-27456	🟡 MEDIUM	libuuid1	2.41-5	N/A
CVE-2026-3184	🟡 MEDIUM	libuuid1	2.41-5	N/A
CVE-2026-27456	🟡 MEDIUM	login	1:4.16.0-2+really2.41-5	N/A
CVE-2026-3184	🟡 MEDIUM	login	1:4.16.0-2+really2.41-5	N/A
CVE-2026-27456	🟡 MEDIUM	mount	2.41-5	N/A
CVE-2026-3184	🟡 MEDIUM	mount	2.41-5	N/A
CVE-2026-5958	🟡 MEDIUM	sed	4.9-2	N/A
CVE-2026-5704	🟡 MEDIUM	tar	1.35+dfsg-3.1	N/A
CVE-2026-27456	🟡 MEDIUM	util-linux	2.41-5	N/A
CVE-2026-3184	🟡 MEDIUM	util-linux	2.41-5	N/A
CVE-2026-27171	🟡 MEDIUM	zlib1g	1:1.3.dfsg+really1.3.1-1+b1	N/A
CVE-2026-3219	🟡 MEDIUM	pip	26.0.1	N/A

...and 64 more

⚓ Grype Scanner (0 findings, 0 unique)

✅ No vulnerabilities detected by Grype

⚠️

scanner-supply-chain - 17 vulnerabilities (17 unique)

Image: ghcr.io/huntridge-labs/argus/scanner-supply-chain:4efd24ff3b6671770b1a3085c48f1a7722c44e39

Combined (Deduplicated)

🚨 Critical	⚠️ High	🟡 Medium	🔵 Low	Total	Unique
0	9	8	0	17	17

🔷 Trivy Scanner (17 findings, 17 unique)

CVE	Severity	Package	Version	Fixed
CVE-2026-32280	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.9, 1.26.2
CVE-2026-32281	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.9, 1.26.2
CVE-2026-32283	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.9, 1.26.2
CVE-2026-33810	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.26.2
CVE-2026-33811	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-33814	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-39820	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-39836	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-42499	⚠️ HIGH	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-3219	🟡 MEDIUM	pip	26.0.1	N/A
CVE-2026-6357	🟡 MEDIUM	pip	26.0.1	26.1
CVE-2026-32282	🟡 MEDIUM	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.9, 1.26.2
CVE-2026-32288	🟡 MEDIUM	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.9, 1.26.2
CVE-2026-32289	🟡 MEDIUM	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.9, 1.26.2
CVE-2026-39823	🟡 MEDIUM	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-39825	🟡 MEDIUM	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.10, 1.26.3
CVE-2026-39826	🟡 MEDIUM	stdlib	v1.26.1	1.25.10, 1.26.3

⚓ Grype Scanner (0 findings, 0 unique)

✅ No vulnerabilities detected by Grype

Generated by Argus

eFAILution temporarily deployed to testpypi May 12, 2026 02:27 — with GitHub Actions Inactive

eFAILution merged commit 37e433d into feat/argus-portability May 12, 2026
22 checks passed

eFAILution deleted the fix/engine-env-passthrough-no-value branch May 12, 2026 02:50

github-actions Bot mentioned this pull request May 12, 2026

feat(sdk): portable Argus CLI — pip install, Docker execution, MCP server, CI preflight #88

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eFAILution mentioned this pull request May 12, 2026

feat(cli): --registry-password-stdin and --zap-auth-password-stdin #145

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fix(engine): pass credentials by name, not value, on docker run#144

fix(engine): pass credentials by name, not value, on docker run#144
eFAILution merged 1 commit into
feat/argus-portabilityfrom
fix/engine-env-passthrough-no-value

eFAILution commented May 12, 2026

Uh oh!

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eFAILution commented May 12, 2026

Description

Changes Made

Details

Testing

Test Results

Security Considerations

Security Details

AI Context Updates (.ai/)

Checklist

Related Issues

Screenshots/Logs (if applicable)

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codecov Bot commented May 12, 2026

Codecov Report

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github-actions Bot commented May 12, 2026

🔒 Argus Container Security Scan

📊 Combined Findings Summary

📦 Container Breakdown

🔍 Detailed Findings by Container

Combined (Deduplicated)

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