fix: escape user values in fill/type/select to prevent JS injection#141
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hobostay wants to merge 1 commit intojustrach:mainfrom
Open
fix: escape user values in fill/type/select to prevent JS injection#141hobostay wants to merge 1 commit intojustrach:mainfrom
hobostay wants to merge 1 commit intojustrach:mainfrom
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The fill, type, and select actions in cmdAction injected user-supplied
values directly into JavaScript single-quoted strings without escaping.
A value containing a single quote (e.g. "test');alert('xss") would break
out of the string literal and allow arbitrary JS execution via CDP.
Add escapeForJsString() helper that escapes single quotes, backslashes,
and newlines for safe embedding in JS string literals, and apply it to
the value parameter before interpolation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
cmdActionwhere user-supplied values forfill,type, andselectcommands are injected directly into JavaScript single-quoted strings without escapingescapeForJsString()helper that escapes',\,\n,\r,\tfor safe embedding in JS string literalsVulnerability details
Before this fix, running something like:
kuri-agent fill e1 "test'); alert('xss"Would generate JavaScript:
This breaks out of the string literal and allows arbitrary JavaScript execution through CDP.
Test plan
kuri-agent fill <ref> "it's a test"correctly handles values with single quoteskuri-agent fill <ref> "back\\slash"correctly handles backslasheskuri-agent select <ref> "option'1"no longer breaks the JS functionzig build🤖 Generated with Claude Code