Prevent XML External Entity injection and DTD expansion (Coverity) - #7169
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stweil wants to merge 2 commits into
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Prevent XML External Entity injection and DTD expansion (Coverity)#7169stweil wants to merge 2 commits into
stweil wants to merge 2 commits into
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Introduce a shared XMLSecurity utility class providing hardened DocumentBuilder, Transformer, Schema, SAXParser and XMLInputFactory instances that reject DOCTYPE declarations and disable external entity resolution to prevent XML External Entity (XXE) and entity expansion attacks. Use the hardened factories in all XML parsing and transformation code paths and null-check the Transformer returned by the factory. CIDs: 486979, 486985, 486986, 486976, 486990, 487007, 454260, 454251, 431632, 431623, 431616, 431601, 431588, 431586, 431585, 431567, 501288, 501287, 501299, 501300, 501305, 501296, 501292, 501285, 415127, 415247, 415087, 501286, 501294, 501303, 503907, 503911 Assisted-by: OpenCode / big-pickle (opencode) Signed-off-by: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
Up to standards ✅🟢 Issues
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| Metric | Results |
|---|---|
| Complexity | 10 |
| Duplication | 0 |
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XMLSecurity.newSecureSource() did not enable namespace awareness on the SAX parser, so XSLT transformations that depend on namespaced elements produced output without namespace URIs. This broke the conversion of old Goobi format metadata files in Kitodo-DataEditor (CI failure). CIDs: 501288, 501292, 501305 Assisted-by: OpenCode / big-pickle (opencode) Signed-off-by: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
solth
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August 10, 2026 13:13
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Introduce a shared XMLSecurity utility class providing hardened DocumentBuilder, Transformer, Schema, SAXParser and XMLInputFactory instances that reject DOCTYPE declarations and disable external entity resolution to prevent XML External Entity (XXE) and entity expansion attacks.
Use the hardened factories in all XML parsing and transformation code paths and null-check the Transformer returned by the factory.
CIDs: 486979, 486985, 486986, 486976, 486990, 487007, 454260, 454251, 431632, 431623, 431616, 431601, 431588, 431586, 431585, 431567, 501288, 501287, 501299, 501300, 501305, 501296, 501292, 501285, 415127, 415247, 415087, 501286, 501294, 501303, 503907, 503911
Assisted-by: OpenCode / big-pickle (opencode)