chore(deps): bump rustls-webpki from 0.103.8 to 0.103.12 in /pkg/data_cache

[dependabot]

Bumps rustls-webpki from 0.103.8 to 0.103.12.

Release notes

Sourced from rustls-webpki's releases.

0.103.12

This release fixes two bugs in name constraint enforcement:

• GHSA-965h-392x-2mh5: name constraints for URI names were ignored and therefore accepted. URI name constraints are now rejected unconditionally. Note this library does not provide an API for asserting URI names, and URI name constraints are otherwise not implemented.
• GHSA-xgp8-3hg3-c2mh: permitted subtree name constraints for DNS names were accepted for certificates asserting a wildcard name. This was incorrect because, given a name constraint of accept.example.com, *.example.com could feasibly allow a name of reject.example.com which is outside the constraint. This is very similar to CVE-2025-61727.

Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, these bugs are reachable only after signature verification and require misissuance to exploit.

What's Changed

• Prepare 0.103.12 by @​djc in rustls/webpki#470

Full Changelog: rustls/webpki@v/0.103.11...v/0.103.12

0.103.11

In response to #464, we've slightly relaxed requirements for anchor_from_trust_cert() to ignore unknown extensions even if they're marked as critical. This only affects parsing a TrustAnchor from DER, for which most extensions are ignored anyway.

What's Changed

• Backport parsing trust anchors with unknown critical extensions to 0.103 by @​djc in rustls/webpki#466

0.103.10

Correct selection of candidate CRLs by Distribution Point and Issuing Distribution Point. If a certificate had more than one distributionPoint, then only the first distributionPoint would be considered against each CRL's IssuingDistributionPoint distributionPoint, and then the certificate's subsequent distributionPoints would be ignored.

The impact was that correctly provided CRLs would not be consulted to check revocation. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Deny (the default) this would lead to incorrect but safe Error::UnknownRevocationStatus. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Allow this would lead to inappropriate acceptance of revoked certificates.

This vulnerability is thought to be of limited impact. This is because both the certificate and CRL are signed -- an attacker would need to compromise a trusted issuing authority to trigger this bug. An attacker with such capabilities could likely bypass revocation checking through other more impactful means (such as publishing a valid, empty CRL.)

More likely, this bug would be latent in normal use, and an attacker could leverage faulty revocation checking to continue using a revoked credential.

This vulnerability is identified by GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4. Thank you to @​1seal for the report.

What's Changed

• Freshen up rel-0.103 by @​ctz in rustls/webpki#455
• Prepare 0.103.10 by @​ctz in rustls/webpki#458

Full Changelog: rustls/webpki@v/0.103.9...v/0.103.10

0.103.9

What's Changed

• [backport] ci: avoid denying warnings on nightly toolchains by @​alex in rustls/webpki#437
• Backport lifetime change and bump version for release by @​alex in rustls/webpki#436

Commits

• 27131d4 Bump version to 0.103.12
• 6ecb876 Clean up stuttery enum variant names
• 318b3e6 Ignore wildcard labels when matching name constraints
• 1219622 Rewrite constraint matching to avoid permissive catch-all branch
• 57bc62c Bump version to 0.103.11
• d0fa01e Allow parsing trust anchors with unknown criticial extensions
• 348ce01 Prepare 0.103.10
• dbde592 crl: fix authoritative_for() support for multiple URIs
• 9c4838e avoid std::prelude imports
• 009ef66 fix rust 1.94 ambiguous panic macro warnings
• Additional commits viewable in compare view

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[coveralls]

Coverage Report for CI Build 24700506124

Coverage remained the same at 58.057%

Details

• Coverage remained the same as the base build.
• Patch coverage: No coverable lines changed in this PR.
• No coverage regressions found.

Uncovered Changes

No uncovered changes found.

Coverage Regressions

No coverage regressions found.

---

Coverage Stats

Relevant Lines:	3500
Covered Lines:	2032
Line Coverage:	58.06%
Coverage Strength:	0.67 hits per line

---

💛 - Coveralls

[tenzen-y]

/lgtm
/approve

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