add zntport.sys - #404
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Fix an issue where the generated script failed to output the correct PDB path.
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Vulnerability Details
The driver utilizes
IoCreateDeviceto create a device object named\Device\zntportand exposes a corresponding symbolic link at\\.\zntport. This device interface exposes an insecure control code (IOCTL 0xF10024CC) that allows arbitrary physical memory mapping and reading.Upon receiving
IOCTL 0xF10024CC, the driver extracts a 32-bit physical address supplied directly within the user-controlledSystemBufferwithout conducting any bounds or permission validation. It then invokesMmMapIoSpaceto map0x32bytes of physical memory from the provided address into system space usingMmNonCachedattributes.The driver subsequently uses
strcpyto copy the data from the newly mapped physical memory address back into theSystemBuffer. This transfers the raw physical memory contents directly back to user space before the mapping is released viaMmUnmapIoSpace.Impact & Exploitation
An unprivileged user-mode application can open a handle to the
\\.\zntportdevice interface created viaIoCreateDevice. By issuingIOCTL 0xF10024CCwith arbitrary physical addresses, a local attacker can leak sensitive kernel structures, credentials, or other critical memory assets, entirely bypassing core operating system security controls.