W3CSaw

Chainsaw-style DFIR hunting for IIS W3C logs.

W3CSaw is a DFIR-focused command-line tool for hunting suspicious activity in IIS W3C logs. It is inspired by the offline hunting workflow of tools like Chainsaw, but instead of scanning Windows EVTX, it parses IIS web access logs and applies web-focused detection rules.

Inputs can be native W3C .log files or .csv exports (e.g. from Log Parser, Excel, or a SIEM). CSV files need a header row; common column-name variants like cs_uri_stem, client_ip, or User-Agent are recognized automatically.

Looking to hunt Windows event logs? W3CSaw is for IIS web access logs, not EVTX. If you need to hunt Windows Event Logs, check out Chainsaw — the two are complementary: run Chainsaw on the EVTX and W3CSaw on the IIS logs from the same server, then correlate the timelines.

w3csaw scan -i "C:\inetpub\logs\LogFiles\W3SVC1\*.log" -o findings.jsonl --summary

Why W3CSaw exists

When a Windows web server is suspected of compromise, the IIS access logs are often the first — and sometimes the only — artifact available. Grepping gigabytes of W3C logs by hand is slow and error-prone, and generic log tools don't understand the #Fields: header, changing field layouts, URL-encoded payloads, or what a web shell interaction actually looks like.

W3CSaw gives incident responders the same workflow Chainsaw gives for event logs: point it at a folder of logs and a folder of rules, get back ranked, evidence-rich findings in minutes.

Installation

Requires Python 3.9+.

git clone https://github.com/mzalzahrani/w3csaw.git
cd w3csaw
pip install .

The only runtime dependency is PyYAML. For development:

pip install -e ".[dev]"
pytest

Usage

Interactive mode (easiest way to start)

Just run w3csaw with no arguments in a terminal. It shows the banner and then prompts you for the log path, grouping, and severity — no flags to remember. The bundled rule pack is loaded automatically:

w3csaw

You can also launch it explicitly:

w3csaw interactive

It defaults the input to examples/sample_iis.log (if present), auto-loads the built-in rules, re-asks on a bad path, runs the scan in terminal mode, and offers to run another. Press Ctrl-C to quit. Everything below is the equivalent flag-driven usage for scripting and automation.

scan — hunt with detection rules

w3csaw scan -i "C:\inetpub\logs\LogFiles\W3SVC1\*.log" -o findings.jsonl --format jsonl
w3csaw scan -i logs/ -o report.md --format md --min-level medium --summary

Option	Meaning
-i, --input	Log file (.log W3C or .csv export), directory (recursive *.log/*.csv), or glob
-r, --rules	Rules directory or single rule file (default: the bundled W3CSaw rule pack)
-o, --output	Output file (default: stdout)
--format	jsonl, csv, or md (default: jsonl)
--min-level	low, medium, high, critical
--include-raw	Include the raw log line in JSONL/CSV findings
--timezone	Timezone of log timestamps, e.g. UTC or +03:00 (IIS logs UTC by default)
--fail-open	Skip malformed lines instead of stopping
--summary	Print a console summary after the scan

Exit codes: 0 no findings, 1 error, 2 findings reported — handy for automation.

Terminal output mode

By default scan writes machine output (JSONL/CSV/Markdown). Add --cli for an analyst-friendly terminal review: an ASCII banner, rule/log loading status, a hunting progress bar, a scan summary panel, and findings grouped into severity-aware tables. It is purely presentational — the JSONL, CSV, timeline, and Markdown formats are unchanged.

# Terminal review (findings grouped by category)
w3csaw scan -i examples/sample_iis.log --cli

# Show full, untruncated field values
w3csaw scan -i examples/sample_iis.log --cli --full

# Machine output to a file AND a terminal review at the same time
w3csaw scan -i logs/ --format jsonl -o findings.jsonl --cli

# Group the terminal findings by severity instead of category
w3csaw scan -i examples/sample_iis.log --cli --group-by level

Example (colors shown here as plain text):

██╗    ██╗██████╗  ██████╗███████╗ █████╗ ██╗    ██╗
██║    ██║╚════██╗██╔════╝██╔════╝██╔══██╗██║    ██║
██║ █╗ ██║ █████╔╝██║     ███████╗███████║██║ █╗ ██║
██║███╗██║ ╚═══██╗██║     ╚════██║██╔══██║██║███╗██║
╚███╔███╔╝██████╔╝╚██████╗███████║██║  ██║╚███╔███╔╝
 ╚══╝╚══╝ ╚═════╝  ╚═════╝╚══════╝╚═╝  ╚═╝ ╚══╝╚══╝
W3CSaw — Chainsaw-style DFIR hunting for IIS W3C logs
By TruePositive / Mohammed Alzahrani (@mzalzahrani)

[+] Loading detection rules from: w3csaw/rules
[+] Loaded 72 detection rules
[+] Loading IIS W3C logs from: examples/sample_iis.log
[+] Parsed 342 log records from 1 file(s)
╭─────── W3CSaw v0.1.0 scan summary ────────╮
│            Input  examples/sample_iis.log │
│            Rules  w3csaw/rules (72 loaded)│
│     Files parsed  1                       │
│     Lines parsed  342                     │
│         Findings  162                     │
│ Highest severity  critical                │
╰───────────────────────────────────────────╯
[+] Findings: 162 matches across 17 rules
[+] Group: Webshell  (5)
╭───────────┬────────┬──────────────────────────────────────┬───────────────┬────────┬───────────────────────┬────────┬────────────╮
│ timestamp │ level  │ rule                                 │ src_ip        │ method │ uri_path              │ status │ user_agent │
├───────────┼────────┼──────────────────────────────────────┼───────────────┼────────┼───────────────────────┼────────┼────────────┤
│ 2026-07-… │ high   │ iis_webshell_command_execution_query │ 198.51.100.23 │ GET    │ /uploads/profile.ashx │    200 │ curl/8.4.0 │
╰───────────┴────────┴──────────────────────────────────────┴───────────────┴────────┴───────────────────────┴────────┴────────────╯

Terminal-mode options for scan:

Option	Meaning
--cli	Show human-friendly grouped findings in the terminal
--full	Show full field values instead of truncating long ones
--group-by	Group findings by category (default), level, rule, src_ip, or host
--max-table-width N	Truncate long field values to N characters (default: 40)
--no-color	Disable ANSI colors
--no-banner	Suppress the ASCII banner only
--quiet	Suppress banner, progress, and status lines (findings/output still work)

Notes:

• Severity colors: critical = bold red, high = red, medium = yellow, low = blue.
• --cli keeps findings (not raw logs) in memory for rendering; log parsing stays streaming, so memory use tracks the number of findings, not log size.
• When --cli is used with -o, machine output goes to the file and the tables go to the terminal. When --cli is used without -o, the raw machine dump to stdout is suppressed so it doesn't mix with the tables.
• Colors are emitted only on a real terminal; redirected/piped output is always plain text.

timeline — chronological CSV of all requests

w3csaw timeline -i logs/ -o timeline.csv

top — quick frequency analysis

w3csaw top -i logs/ --by src_ip --limit 20

Supported fields: src_ip, uri_path, user_agent, status, method, extension, host.

validate-rules / rule-info

w3csaw validate-rules
w3csaw rule-info

Help and exit codes

Every command has detailed --help with examples:

w3csaw --help
w3csaw scan --help
w3csaw timeline --help
w3csaw top --help
w3csaw validate-rules --help
w3csaw rule-info --help

• --cli is for interactive, analyst-friendly terminal review.
• JSONL / CSV / Markdown remain the right choice for automation, ingestion, and reporting — they are stable and machine-parseable.
• --full disables field truncation when you need the complete value.
• --quiet suppresses banner/progress/status (useful for CI and SOAR while still writing output files).

Exit codes:

Code	Meaning
0	Completed successfully, no findings
1	Runtime or validation error
2	Completed successfully and findings were detected

Exit code 2 is not a crash or failure. It means the scan finished cleanly and matched one or more detections. This is intentional so CI/CD, SOAR playbooks, and shell scripts can branch on "were there findings?" without parsing output. For example:

w3csaw scan -i logs/ -o findings.jsonl
case $? in
  0) echo "clean" ;;
  2) echo "findings detected — escalate" ;;
  *) echo "scan error" ;;
esac

Rule format

Rules are Sigma-inspired YAML tailored to normalized IIS W3C fields:

id: iis_webshell_command_execution_query
title: IIS Possible Web Shell Command Execution via Query String
status: experimental
description: Detects command-execution keywords in query strings targeting dynamic IIS script endpoints.
level: high
tags:
  - attack.t1505.003
  - attack.t1059
logsource:
  product: iis
  service: w3c
detection:
  selection:
    status:
      gte: 200
      lt: 300
    uri_path|endswith_any:
      - ".aspx"
      - ".ashx"
    uri_query_decoded|contains_any:
      - "cmd="
      - "whoami"
      - "powershell"
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Internal diagnostics
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/

Fields available to rules

Normalized: timestamp, date, time, site_name, server_ip, method, uri_path, uri_query, src_ip, username, user_agent, referer, status, substatus, win32_status, bytes_sent, bytes_received, time_taken, host — plus any raw W3C field present in the log.

Derived helpers: url_original, url_decoded, uri_path_decoded, uri_query_decoded (recursively URL-decoded, so double encoding is transparent), is_success_status, is_error_status, extension.

Operators

Operator	Example
exact equals	method: POST (a list means any-of)
contains / contains_any	uri_query_decoded|contains_any: ["cmd=", "whoami"]
startswith / startswith_any	uri_path|startswith: "/owa"
endswith / endswith_any	uri_path|endswith_any: [".aspx", ".ashx"]
re	uri_query|re: "(?:url|target)=https?://"
in	extension|in: [".aspx", ".svc"]
exists / not_exists	referer|not_exists: true
numeric gte gt lte lt	status: {gte: 200, lt: 300}

String matching is case-insensitive. Conditions supported: selection, a and b, a or b, selection and not filter.

Aggregation rules

For behaviors that only emerge across many requests, set type: aggregation:

id: iis_high_404_single_source
title: IIS High 404 Volume From Single Source
level: medium
type: aggregation
aggregation:
  group_by:
    - src_ip
  filter:
    status: 404
  count_gte: 100
  window_minutes: 60

Three variants:

• Threshold (count_gte): fires when a group exceeds a count within a sliding time window.
• Sequence (count_gte + followed_by): counts precondition events, fires when the follow-up event arrives — e.g. 401/403 brute force followed by a 200.
• Rarity (count_lte): evaluated at end of scan; fires for groups seen at most N times — e.g. a dynamic script that succeeded only once.

Bundled rule pack

72 rules ship in the package under w3csaw/rules/ (loaded automatically), covering web shell interaction, known shell filenames, suspicious POSTs, path traversal, double encoding, SQLi/XSS/LDAP injection, SSTI, Log4Shell, Struts OGNL, Jolokia, OFBiz, Tomcat/JSP uploads, Exchange/OWA exploitation, SharePoint uploads, MinIO SSRF, scanner user agents, 404 floods, brute-force-then-success, and rare successful dynamic extensions.

Output example

{
  "rule_id": "iis_webshell_command_execution_query",
  "rule_title": "IIS Possible Web Shell Command Execution via Query String",
  "level": "high",
  "timestamp": "2026-07-03T12:15:41Z",
  "src_ip": "198.51.100.23",
  "method": "GET",
  "uri_path": "/uploads/profile.ashx",
  "uri_query": "cmd=whoami",
  "status_code": 200,
  "user_agent": "curl/8.4.0",
  "tags": ["attack.t1505.003", "attack.t1059"],
  "matched_fields": ["status", "uri_path", "uri_query_decoded"],
  "log_file": "examples/sample_iis.log",
  "line_number": 320
}

Try it yourself: examples/sample_iis.log contains benign traffic plus six attack scenarios, and examples/sample_report.md is the Markdown report W3CSaw produced from it.

DFIR workflow

1. Collect C:\inetpub\logs\LogFiles\W3SVC*\*.log from the suspect server.
2. w3csaw scan -i logs/ -o findings.jsonl --summary
3. Triage by severity, then pivot: w3csaw top -i logs/ --by src_ip and w3csaw timeline -i logs/ -o timeline.csv around finding timestamps.
4. Correlate every hit with host telemetry before calling it execution:
   • Security.evtx (logons 4624/4625/4672 around the timestamps)
   • System.evtx / Application.evtx (service installs, IIS worker events)
   • Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational.evtx (script blocks, 4104)
   • Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational.evtx (process/network events)
   • w3wp.exe child processes in EDR process trees (cmd/powershell spawned by the IIS worker is a strong web shell signal)
   • Web root file changes (new .aspx/.ashx files, $MFT/USN timestamps)
   • IIS configuration changes, new services, scheduled tasks, local users, and outbound connections from the web server

Limitations

• IIS logs do not show process execution. W3CSaw detects suspicious HTTP activity; it cannot confirm code execution on its own.
• POST body content is not present in default IIS logs — a web shell controlled entirely via POST bodies may only surface as anomalous POST patterns, sizes, or rare endpoints.
• W3C fields are configurable per server. Missing fields are handled gracefully (rules touching them simply don't match), so review which fields your logs actually contain.
• Timestamps depend on the server's IIS logging configuration (UTC by default; use --timezone for local-time logs).
• Signature rules inherit signature blind spots: encrypted, novel, or heavily obfuscated payloads may not match. Use timeline, top, and the rarity aggregation to hunt beyond signatures.

Roadmap

• Sigma web/proxy rule importer (sigma convert compatible subset)
• More aggregation primitives (distinct-count, ratio, first-seen)
• Additional log formats (IIS ODBC, NCSA, ARR proxy logs)
• Findings deduplication and clustering
• JSON output for top and machine-readable scan stats

License

MIT — see LICENSE.