fix: path traversal in fs commands + tighten HTTP/CSP/asset permissions#94
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zuiyi001 wants to merge 1 commit intonashsu:mainfrom
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fix: path traversal in fs commands + tighten HTTP/CSP/asset permissions#94zuiyi001 wants to merge 1 commit intonashsu:mainfrom
zuiyi001 wants to merge 1 commit intonashsu:mainfrom
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Security audit identified 4 vulnerabilities: 1. Critical: Path traversal - fs commands accepted arbitrary paths without validation, allowing ../../ traversal to access files outside the workspace. Added validate_path() guard to all file-system command entry points. 2. Critical: Overly permissive HTTP capabilities - wildcard http://* / https://* allowed webview requests to any server. Replaced with explicit whitelist. 3. High: Loose CSP connect-src allowed any https/http endpoint. Restricted to app-specific domains. 4. High: assetProtocol scope granted access to all local files. Restricted to project-relevant directories.
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Summary
Security audit identified and fixes 4 vulnerabilities.
Changes
1. 🔴 Critical: Path Traversal in
fs.rsProblem:
read_file,write_file,delete_file,copy_file,copy_directory,list_directory,create_directory,read_file_as_base64,file_existsaccepted arbitrary paths without validation, allowing../../traversal to read/write/delete files outside the intended workspace.Fix: Added
validate_path()that rejects paths containing..or absolute paths. Applied to all 10 file-system command entry points.2. 🔴 Critical: Overly Permissive HTTP Capabilities
Problem:
capabilities/default.jsonused wildcardhttp://*/https://*allowing the webview to make requests to any external server.Fix: Replaced with explicit whitelist:
https://api.tavily.com/*andhttps://api.anthropic.com/*3. 🟡 High: Loose CSP
connect-srcProblem: CSP allowed
connect-src 'self' https: http:— any HTTPS/HTTP endpoint.Fix: Restricted to
'self' https://api.tavily.com https://api.anthropic.com. Also removed'unsafe-inline'fromstyle-src.4. 🟡 High:
assetProtocolScope["**"]Problem: Asset protocol granted access to all local files.
Fix: Restricted to
[".", "./wiki", "./raw", "./.llm-wiki", "./.cache"]Files Changed
src-tauri/src/commands/fs.rs— path validation (+31 lines, -13 lines)src-tauri/capabilities/default.json— HTTP permission whitelistsrc-tauri/tauri.conf.json— CSP + assetProtocol scopeNotes
*on 127.0.0.1 left as-is (local-only service)