chore: bump rustls-webpki from 0.102.8 to 0.103.13 in /benchmarks/synth-bm

[dependabot]

Bumps rustls-webpki from 0.102.8 to 0.103.13.

Release notes

Sourced from rustls-webpki's releases.

0.103.13

• Fix reachable panic in parsing a CRL. This was reported to us as GHSA-82j2-j2ch-gfr8. Users who don't use CRLs are not affected.
• For name constraints on URI names, we incorrectly processed excluded subtrees in a way which inverted the desired meaning. See rustls/webpki#471. This was a case missing in the fix for GHSA-965h-392x-2mh5.

What's Changed

• Actually fail closed for URI matching against excluded subtrees by @​djc in rustls/webpki#473
• Prepare 0.103.13 by @​ctz in rustls/webpki#474

Full Changelog: rustls/webpki@v/0.103.12...v/0.103.13

0.103.12

This release fixes two bugs in name constraint enforcement:

• GHSA-965h-392x-2mh5: name constraints for URI names were ignored and therefore accepted. URI name constraints are now rejected unconditionally. Note this library does not provide an API for asserting URI names, and URI name constraints are otherwise not implemented.
• GHSA-xgp8-3hg3-c2mh: permitted subtree name constraints for DNS names were accepted for certificates asserting a wildcard name. This was incorrect because, given a name constraint of accept.example.com, *.example.com could feasibly allow a name of reject.example.com which is outside the constraint. This is very similar to CVE-2025-61727.

Since name constraints are restrictions on otherwise properly-issued certificates, these bugs are reachable only after signature verification and require misissuance to exploit.

What's Changed

• Prepare 0.103.12 by @​djc in rustls/webpki#470

Full Changelog: rustls/webpki@v/0.103.11...v/0.103.12

0.103.11

In response to #464, we've slightly relaxed requirements for anchor_from_trust_cert() to ignore unknown extensions even if they're marked as critical. This only affects parsing a TrustAnchor from DER, for which most extensions are ignored anyway.

What's Changed

• Backport parsing trust anchors with unknown critical extensions to 0.103 by @​djc in rustls/webpki#466

0.103.10

Correct selection of candidate CRLs by Distribution Point and Issuing Distribution Point. If a certificate had more than one distributionPoint, then only the first distributionPoint would be considered against each CRL's IssuingDistributionPoint distributionPoint, and then the certificate's subsequent distributionPoints would be ignored.

The impact was that correctly provided CRLs would not be consulted to check revocation. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Deny (the default) this would lead to incorrect but safe Error::UnknownRevocationStatus. With UnknownStatusPolicy::Allow this would lead to inappropriate acceptance of revoked certificates.

This vulnerability is thought to be of limited impact. This is because both the certificate and CRL are signed -- an attacker would need to compromise a trusted issuing authority to trigger this bug. An attacker with such capabilities could likely bypass revocation checking through other more impactful means (such as publishing a valid, empty CRL.)

More likely, this bug would be latent in normal use, and an attacker could leverage faulty revocation checking to continue using a revoked credential.

This vulnerability is identified by GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4. Thank you to @​1seal for the report.

What's Changed

• Freshen up rel-0.103 by @​ctz in rustls/webpki#455
• Prepare 0.103.10 by @​ctz in rustls/webpki#458

Full Changelog: rustls/webpki@v/0.103.9...v/0.103.10

... (truncated)

Commits

• 2879b2c Prepare 0.103.13
• 2c49773 Improve tests for padding of BitStringFlags
• 4e3c0b3 Correct validation of BIT STRING constraints
• 39c91d2 Actually fail closed for URI matching against excluded subtrees
• 27131d4 Bump version to 0.103.12
• 6ecb876 Clean up stuttery enum variant names
• 318b3e6 Ignore wildcard labels when matching name constraints
• 1219622 Rewrite constraint matching to avoid permissive catch-all branch
• 57bc62c Bump version to 0.103.11
• d0fa01e Allow parsing trust anchors with unknown criticial extensions
• Additional commits viewable in compare view

[codecov]

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
✅ Project coverage is 69.43%. Comparing base (02cfad7) to head (47b21f6).

Additional details and impacted files

@@           Coverage Diff           @@
##           master   #15636   +/-   ##
=======================================
  Coverage   69.43%   69.43%           
=======================================
  Files         938      938           
  Lines      213330   213330           
  Branches   213330   213330           
=======================================
+ Hits       148117   148129   +12     
+ Misses      59330    59315   -15     
- Partials     5883     5886    +3     

Flag	Coverage Δ
pytests-nightly	1.14% <ø> (ø)
unittests	68.85% <ø> (+<0.01%)	⬆️
unittests-nightly	68.99% <ø> (+0.01%)	⬆️

Flags with carried forward coverage won't be shown. Click here to find out more.

☔ View full report in Codecov by Sentry.
📢 Have feedback on the report? Share it here.

🚀 New features to boost your workflow:

• ❄️ Test Analytics: Detect flaky tests, report on failures, and find test suite problems.
• 📦 JS Bundle Analysis: Save yourself from yourself by tracking and limiting bundle sizes in JS merges.