docs: selective internal access behind an exit node - #953
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Documents the two-routing-peer architecture for combining an exit node with access to specific internal resources only: a resource peer inside the data center scoped by policies, and an exit node placed on a segment with internet-only egress. Names the two shortcuts that do not achieve this (Block LAN access only covers directly attached subnets; host forward-chain firewall rules are superseded by NetBird's own allow rules) and adds verification steps, including the netbird down requirement when enabling Block LAN access over the CLI on a connected peer. Cross-links from the routing peer concepts and from How Routing Peers Work.
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe documentation adds guidance for combining an exit node with selective access to internal resources. It explains split routing roles, network placement enforcement, safeguards, verification steps, and links from related routing documentation. ChangesSelective exit-node access
Estimated code review effort: 2 (Simple) | ~10 minutes Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to The documentation adds a selective-access design, but two verification and guarantee statements could mislead operators about acceptable blocked-connection results and the scope of the isolation guarantee. The PR is otherwise mergeable with explicit owner awareness and follow-up on these minor wording corrections. Poem
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation No functions found in the changed files to evaluate docstring coverage. Skipping docstring coverage check. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 0 functions across 0 files. (2 skipped: 2 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Inline comments:
In `@src/pages/use-cases/remote-access/exit-nodes.mdx`:
- Line 294: Update the restriction statement near the exit-node guarantee to
limit its scope to traffic routed through the exit node. Clarify that dashboard,
policy, or client changes cannot widen access through that path, while avoiding
an absolute claim that administrators cannot expose the network through other
routing configuration.
- Line 289: Update the exit-node behavior statement near the forbidden-network
example to require that connections to 10.90.0.0/20 must not succeed, while
treating timeout, unreachable-route, ICMP-unreachable, and rejected-connection
results as acceptable outcomes.
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src/pages/manage/networks/how-routing-peers-work.mdxsrc/pages/use-cases/remote-access/exit-nodes.mdx
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2 participants
What this adds
A new use-case section on the exit nodes page, Selective Internal Access Behind an Exit Node, for the recurring customer scenario: users need specific internal resources plus a full tunnel, but must not reach other internal networks that the site's routers can see.
The section documents the two-routing-peer architecture:
0.0.0.0/0route has nothing internal to expose.It names the two shortcuts that do not achieve this and why:
Verification steps lead with the property the design rests on (probe the forbidden range from the exit node's own host), and include the
netbird downrequirement when enabling Block LAN access over the CLI on an already-connected peer, which otherwise reportsAlready connectedand does not apply the flag.Also adds two cross-links: from the Routing Peer concepts bullets on the same page, and from the exit-node paragraph in How Routing Peers Work.
All behavior described was verified against NetBird 0.77.1 (cloud management, Linux routing peers on both the iptables and nftables backends).
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