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The Nx self-hosted HTTP remote cache extracts downloaded cache artifacts without constraining where files are written. A malicious — or on-path (MITM) — remote cache server can return a crafted tar archive whose entries escape the cache directory and write to arbitrary locations on the machine running Nx. This arbitrary file write can be escalated to remote code execution. The directly exploitable issue is the self-hosted HTTP remote cache.
Severity
High — CVSS v4.0 8.7 (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N)
Affected Packages
Important
Nx's default local cache and Nx Cloud are NOT affected. The default local cache and Nx Cloud use separate cache retrieval and extraction mechanisms that does not have this vulnerability. Only workspaces that use a self-hosted remote cache (NX_SELF_HOSTED_REMOTE_CACHE_SERVER, @nx/s3-cache, etc.) are affected.
Two self-hosted cache surfaces are affected:
The built-in HTTP remote cache (NX_SELF_HOSTED_REMOTE_CACHE_SERVER, in nx) — fixed in the patched release.
The self-hosted cache packages — @nx/s3-cache, @nx/gcs-cache, @nx/azure-cache, @nx/shared-fs-cache (and their @nx/powerpack-* predecessors) — the same flaw in their own extractor. Deprecated (CVE-2025-36852) and not patched; migrate off (see Remediation).
The shared step that copies cached outputs into the workspace was also part of the exposure and is hardened in the patched nx release.
Remediation
Upgrade to Nx 22.7.7 or 23.0.2 (or later). The patched extractor is a drop-in — no configuration change is required.
If you use the S3, GCS, Azure, or shared-filesystem cache packages
@nx/s3-cache, @nx/gcs-cache, @nx/azure-cache, and @nx/shared-fs-cache (and their @nx/powerpack-* predecessors) are separately versioned packages and are already deprecated (see CVE-2025-36852). Upgrading nx hardens the shared restore step, but it does not fully secure these packages. The remediation for them is to migrate off — to Nx Cloud or the self-hosted OpenAPI/HTTP remote cache — per the deprecation guidance: https://nx.dev/docs/reference/deprecated/self-hosted-cache-packages
Details
When Nx retrieves an artifact from the self-hosted HTTP remote cache, it downloads a gzipped tar archive and extracts it. The extractor joined each untrusted tar entry name directly onto the output directory and unpacked it with tar's unguardedEntry::unpack(), which performs no containment check:
// vulnerablelet path_on_disk = output_dir.join(entry_path);// entry_path is attacker-controlled
fs::create_dir_all(path_on_disk.parent()…)?;
entry.unpack(&path_on_disk)?;
In addition, restore now copies only the declared task outputs (never the whole cache directory), confined to the workspace root; parent directories are realized as real directories so a write can never traverse a symlink; declared outputs that resolve outside the workspace are rejected; and the malformed-input cases return errors instead of panicking.
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Learn more on MITRE.
The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource.
Learn more on MITRE.
Summary
The Nx self-hosted HTTP remote cache extracts downloaded cache artifacts without constraining where files are written. A malicious — or on-path (MITM) — remote cache server can return a crafted tar archive whose entries escape the cache directory and write to arbitrary locations on the machine running Nx. This arbitrary file write can be escalated to remote code execution. The directly exploitable issue is the self-hosted HTTP remote cache.
Severity
High — CVSS v4.0 8.7 (
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N)Affected Packages
Important
Nx's default local cache and Nx Cloud are NOT affected. The default local cache and Nx Cloud use separate cache retrieval and extraction mechanisms that does not have this vulnerability. Only workspaces that use a self-hosted remote cache (
NX_SELF_HOSTED_REMOTE_CACHE_SERVER,@nx/s3-cache, etc.) are affected.Two self-hosted cache surfaces are affected:
NX_SELF_HOSTED_REMOTE_CACHE_SERVER, innx) — fixed in the patched release.@nx/s3-cache,@nx/gcs-cache,@nx/azure-cache,@nx/shared-fs-cache(and their@nx/powerpack-*predecessors) — the same flaw in their own extractor. Deprecated (CVE-2025-36852) and not patched; migrate off (see Remediation).The shared step that copies cached outputs into the workspace was also part of the exposure and is hardened in the patched
nxrelease.Remediation
Upgrade to Nx
22.7.7or23.0.2(or later). The patched extractor is a drop-in — no configuration change is required.If you use the S3, GCS, Azure, or shared-filesystem cache packages
@nx/s3-cache,@nx/gcs-cache,@nx/azure-cache, and@nx/shared-fs-cache(and their@nx/powerpack-*predecessors) are separately versioned packages and are already deprecated (see CVE-2025-36852). Upgradingnxhardens the shared restore step, but it does not fully secure these packages. The remediation for them is to migrate off — to Nx Cloud or the self-hosted OpenAPI/HTTP remote cache — per the deprecation guidance: https://nx.dev/docs/reference/deprecated/self-hosted-cache-packagesDetails
When Nx retrieves an artifact from the self-hosted HTTP remote cache, it downloads a gzipped tar archive and extracts it. The extractor joined each untrusted tar entry name directly onto the output directory and unpacked it with
tar's unguardedEntry::unpack(), which performs no containment check:In addition, restore now copies only the declared task outputs (never the whole cache directory), confined to the workspace root; parent directories are realized as real directories so a write can never traverse a symlink; declared outputs that resolve outside the workspace are rejected; and the malformed-input cases return errors instead of panicking.
References
Credits