This is a self-hosted integration service with network-facing HTTP endpoints and local filesystem effects. Main risks are unauthorized API use, unsafe path behavior, credential leakage, and supply-chain drift.
- API token auth for
/api/packand/api/parse - explicit config-driven client credentials
- narrow HTTP surface
- CodeQL in CI
- Go vulnerability scanning expected in local verification
Verified on 2026-03-14 with govulncheck ./...:
github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2@v2.2.1is flagged byGO-2025-3900github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2@v2.2.1is flagged byGO-2025-3787
Both traces reach config loading through koanf.Unmarshal in internal/config/config.go.
- path construction before hardlink creation
- logging of sensitive config or tokens
- webhook contract drift causing unexpected processing
- external API dependencies and release-parser assumptions
- never log API tokens, passwords, or raw secrets
- treat filesystem target-path derivation as security-sensitive
- document any new outbound network dependency in
docs/references/ - add verification notes when auth, pathing, or external request logic changes
There is no dedicated secret-redaction test suite and no doc linter ensuring security docs stay synced with behavior.