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Token encryption cannot replace TLS. See #64 #127

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Token encryption cannot replace TLS. See #64 #127

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13 changes: 5 additions & 8 deletions draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1.md
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Expand Up @@ -2419,14 +2419,11 @@ clear, as any information in them is at risk of disclosure.
See "HTTP State Management Mechanism" {{RFC6265}} for security
considerations about cookies.

In some deployments, including those utilizing load balancers, the
TLS connection to the resource server terminates prior to the actual
server that provides the resource. This could leave the token
unprotected between the front-end server where the TLS connection
terminates and the back-end server that provides the resource. In
such deployments, sufficient measures MUST be employed to ensure
confidentiality of the access token between the front-end and back-end
servers; encryption of the token is one such possible measure.
When an OAuth server sits behind a reverse proxy
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I agree that token encryption is not a replacement for TLS. Encryption should be used to prevent any party along the way from AS to RS to inspect the data in the token, including the client.
Similar, signatures protect the integrity and authenticity of self-contained tokens along the way, especially at the client.
Lack of TLS protection from datacenter edge to RS could cause only problems with sender constrained access tokens bound to a TLS certificate. I think the suitable solution would be to use DPoP instead of Client TLS authentication in such cases.

that terminates TLS connections from clients,
tokens can be spoofed or tampered.
Mitigating measures includes using TLS along all the infrastructural
components and implementing similar requirements at message level.


### Summary of Recommendations
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