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require support for same device flow for redirect-based OpenID4VP #293
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Co-authored-by: Kristina <[email protected]>
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I still think there needs to be consideration for in-person cross device flows, e.g. age assurance at a retail store. Being unable to use digital IDs in the real world or having poor user experience will be a hindrance to adoption of digital IDs, especially in jurisdictions where showing the digital ID on your device is forbidden to be accepted by the retail staff under trust framework rules. |
Co-authored-by: Joseph Heenan <[email protected]>
paulbastian
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lgtm now
Co-authored-by: Oliver Terbu <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Paul Bastian <[email protected]>
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suggestion projecting inner @tlodderstedt :
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Discussed on today's WG call, consensus that: There are some scenarios where cross-device flows have other mechanisms in place that mean phishing resistance is not required (e.g. in-person). Add a "MUST support Same-Device". "unless the Verifier does not require phishing resistance," should be reframed as "for scenarios where phishing resistance can be achieved in alternative ways". Paul to update the PR and we'll hopefully merge on Thursday's WG call before starting public review. |
| * Signed Authorization Requests MUST be used by utilizing JWT-Secured Authorization Request (JAR) [@!RFC9101] with the `request_uri` parameter. | ||
| * Response encryption MUST be used by utilizing response mode `direct_post.jwt`, as defined in Section 8.3 of [@!OIDF.OID4VP]. Security Considerations in Section 14.3 of [@!OIDF.OID4VP] MUST be applied. | ||
| * Response encryption MUST be used by utilizing response mode `direct_post.jwt`, as defined in Section 8.3 of [@!OIDF.OID4VP]. Security considerations in Section 14.3 of [@!OIDF.OID4VP] MUST be applied. | ||
| * The Verifier MUST reject flows that are non "Same-Device". It MUST do this by including `redirect_uri` in the HTTP response to the Wallet's HTTP POST to the `response_uri`, as defined in Section 8.2 of [@!OIDF.OID4VP]. Wallets MUST follow the redirect to `redirect_uri`. Verifiers MUST reject presentations if Wallets do not follow the redirect back or the redirect back arrives in a different user session to the one the request was initiated in. Implementation considerations can be found in Section 13.3 of [@!OIDF.OID4VP] and security considerations in Section 14.2 of [@!OIDF.OID4VP]. |
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| * The Verifier MUST reject flows that are non "Same-Device". It MUST do this by including `redirect_uri` in the HTTP response to the Wallet's HTTP POST to the `response_uri`, as defined in Section 8.2 of [@!OIDF.OID4VP]. Wallets MUST follow the redirect to `redirect_uri`. Verifiers MUST reject presentations if Wallets do not follow the redirect back or the redirect back arrives in a different user session to the one the request was initiated in. Implementation considerations can be found in Section 13.3 of [@!OIDF.OID4VP] and security considerations in Section 14.2 of [@!OIDF.OID4VP]. | |
| * The Wallet and the Verifier MUST support "Same-Device" flow: | |
| * Verifiers MUST include `redirect_uri` in the HTTP response to the Wallet's HTTP POST to the `response_uri`, as defined in Section 8.2 of [@!OIDF.OID4VP]. | |
| * Wallets MUST follow the redirect to `redirect_uri`. | |
| * Verifiers MUST reject presentations if Wallets do not follow the redirect back or the redirect back arrives in a different user session to the one the request was initiated in. | |
| * Implementation considerations can be found in Section 13.3 of [@!OIDF.OID4VP] and security considerations in Section 14.2 of [@!OIDF.OID4VP]. | |
| * Non "Same-Device" flows can be acceptable in the scenarios where phishing resistance can be achieved in alternative ways. e.g. it is an in-person presentation using OpenID4VP via redirects. When doing so, ecosystems and implementations are advised to make this decision based on a risk analysis. |
Co-authored-by: Torsten Lodderstedt <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Torsten Lodderstedt <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Oliver Terbu <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Valentine Mazurov <[email protected]>
Closes #98