feat(#3309): pivot Kagenti auth to OAuth2 Client Credentials

workspaces/boost/openspec/changes/platform-operations-deployment/specs/runtime-config/spec.md

@@ -101,15 +101,16 @@ The following new features MUST have runtime configuration fields as specified b
   |---|---|---|
   | `boost.skillsMarketplace.endpoint` | yaml-only | Skills catalog backend URL |
 
-#### Scenario: Token exchange configuration
+#### Scenario: Keycloak service-account auth configuration
 
-- **WHEN** the admin configures per-user Kagenti auth
+- **WHEN** the admin configures Kagenti authentication
 - **THEN** the following fields are available:
   | Field | Scope | Description |
   |---|---|---|
-  | `boost.kagenti.auth.tokenExchange.enabled` | yaml-only | Enable RFC 8693 token exchange |
-  | `boost.kagenti.auth.tokenExchange.audience` | yaml-only | Target audience for exchanged token |
-  | `boost.kagenti.auth.tokenExchange.userTokenHeader` | yaml-only | Header containing user OIDC token |
+  | `boost.kagenti.auth.tokenEndpoint` | yaml-only | Keycloak token endpoint URL |
+  | `boost.kagenti.auth.clientId` | yaml-only | OAuth2 client ID for service-account |
+  | `boost.kagenti.auth.clientSecret` | yaml-only | OAuth2 client secret (visibility: secret) |
+  | `boost.kagenti.auth.tokenExpiryBufferSeconds` | yaml-only | Seconds before expiry to refresh token (default: 60) |
 
 #### Scenario: Credential encryption
 

workspaces/boost/openspec/changes/platform-operations-deployment/tasks.md

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 - [ ] 2.2 Generate `config.d.ts` types from Zod schemas
 - [ ] 2.3 Validate all config writes (YAML and DB) via Zod `.parse()` — no hand-written validators
 - [ ] 2.4 Annotate each field with `configScope`: `yaml-only`, `db-overridable`, or `db-only`
-- [ ] 2.5 Add Zod schemas for new config fields: agentApproval, skillsMarketplace, tokenExchange, DevSpaces credentials
+- [ ] 2.5 Add Zod schemas for new config fields: agentApproval, skillsMarketplace, Keycloak service-account auth, DevSpaces credentials
 - [ ] 2.6 Admin UI shows only DB-overridable and DB-only fields
 - [ ] 2.7 Implement credential encryption for sensitive DB-stored values (DevSpaces tokens)
 - [ ] 2.8 Implement schema version tracking: store schema version alongside DB values, re-validate on startup

workspaces/boost/openspec/changes/pluggable-ai-platform-architecture/design.md

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Boost implements the provider abstraction as modular RHDH dynamic plugins from t
 - Modifying chat interaction behavior or message rendering
 - Rewriting the ADK orchestration library
 - Creating catalog entities for models/agents (covered in agent-creation-discovery change)
-- Per-user token exchange (covered in security-safety-governance change)
+- Per-user token exchange (deferred — service-account auth adopted instead; see security-safety-governance change)
 
 ## Decisions
 

workspaces/boost/openspec/changes/security-safety-governance/design.md

@@ -4,13 +4,13 @@
 
 Boost builds the security and governance layer with Backstage fine-grained permissions as the sole authorization mechanism from day one. The Augment reference prototype's governance system grew into a parallel authorization layer where authorization decisions bypassed `permissions.authorize()`. Boost avoids this entirely.
 
-Boost also implements RFC 8693 token exchange for per-user identity delegation to Kagenti from the start, enabling per-user audit trails.
+Boost also implements service-account Keycloak authentication for Kagenti via OAuth2 Client Credentials Grant, with user identity propagated via headers for audit trails.
 
 ## Goals
 
 - Implement 16 fine-grained Backstage permissions as the sole authorization mechanism
 - Add conditional permission rules for ownership (IS_OWNER), separation of duties (IS_NOT_CREATOR), and lifecycle stage gating (HAS_LIFECYCLE_STAGE)
-- Implement RFC 8693 token exchange for per-user Kagenti identity
+- Implement service-account Keycloak auth for Kagenti via OAuth2 Client Credentials Grant
 - Use `development-only-no-auth` as the only dev security mode name (no legacy aliases)
 - Add CSRF protection and credential encryption
 - Export all permissions from `boost-common`
@@ -40,20 +40,20 @@ These rules are evaluated against loaded resources via `createConditionalDecisio
 
 The `IS_NOT_CREATOR` permission rule is the primary enforcement mechanism. A route-level guard remains as defense-in-depth (belt and suspenders). Both layers are active in `security.mode === 'full'`.
 
-### Decision 4: Per-user token exchange is backend-only with graceful fallback
+### Decision 4: Service-account auth with token caching and streaming support
 
-`TokenExchangeManager` reads the user's OIDC token from a configurable request header (injected by auth proxy), exchanges it via RFC 8693, caches per-user, and deduplicates concurrent exchanges. All failures fall back silently to the shared service-account token — no request is ever blocked by token exchange issues. This is deliberately conservative: token exchange enhances audit trails and per-user authorization but must never degrade availability.
+`KeycloakTokenManager` obtains service-account tokens via OAuth2 Client Credentials Grant against Keycloak's token endpoint. Tokens are cached with a configurable expiry buffer (default 60s), concurrent requests share a single in-flight Keycloak call, and `getTokenForStreaming(minLifetimeMs)` ensures minimum validity for SSE connections. On 401 errors, the cached token is cleared and a fresh token is fetched before retrying (at most once — a second 401 is propagated to the caller). User identity is propagated via `X-Backstage-User` header for audit purposes (informational, not for authentication).
 
 ### Decision 5: Separation of authorization concerns
 
 Three non-overlapping authorization layers:
 
 - **Backstage** governs: UI visibility, agent lifecycle governance, ownership, approval workflows, admin operations
-- **Kagenti** governs: agent specs, tools, runtime operations — via per-user exchanged token when enabled
+- **Kagenti** governs: agent specs, tools, runtime operations — via service-account token; user identity propagated via header for audit
 - **Kubernetes** governs: pod/deployment operations, namespace scoping, SPIRE mTLS
 
 ## Risks
 
 - **RBAC policy complexity:** 16 permissions with conditions is more complex than 2. Mitigated by sensible defaults — `boost.access` as top-level gate and `boost.admin` available for coarse control.
-- **Token exchange reliability:** Keycloak availability becomes a dependency. Mitigated by graceful fallback to service-account token on any failure.
+- **Keycloak availability:** Keycloak availability becomes a dependency for Kagenti auth. Mitigated by token caching with expiry buffer (requests continue with cached token even during brief Keycloak outages) and clear error reporting on token fetch failures.
 - **SonataFlow trust boundary:** Callbacks bypass self-approval prevention via header. Callback identity verification should be implemented to close this gap.

workspaces/boost/openspec/changes/security-safety-governance/proposal.md

@@ -21,8 +21,9 @@ Enterprise AI platforms must treat security, safety, and governance as foundatio
 ### Identity & Authentication
 
 - RBAC via Keycloak OIDC + Backstage permissions (`boost.access`, `boost.admin` as top-level gates)
-- RFC 8693 token exchange for per-user Kagenti identity delegation
-- Graceful fallback to service-account token on any exchange failure
+- Service-account Keycloak auth for Kagenti via OAuth2 Client Credentials Grant
+- Token caching with expiry buffer, streaming support, and 401 retry with cache invalidation
+- User identity propagation via `X-Backstage-User` header for audit trails
 - MCP 4-level auth chain
 - Kagenti SPIRE integration for infrastructure mTLS
 
@@ -45,4 +46,4 @@ Enterprise AI platforms must treat security, safety, and governance as foundatio
 - `plugins/boost-common/src/permissions.ts` — 16 permission definitions with resource types
 - `plugins/boost-backend/src/middleware/security.ts` — `authorizeLifecycleAction` middleware
 - `plugins/boost-frontend/src/components/SecurityGate.tsx` — granular permission checks
-- `plugins/boost-backend/src/services/TokenExchangeManager.ts` — RFC 8693 implementation
+- `plugins/boost-backend-module-kagenti/src/client/KeycloakTokenManager.ts` — OAuth2 Client Credentials service-account auth

workspaces/boost/openspec/changes/security-safety-governance/specs/access-control/spec.md

@@ -81,41 +81,63 @@ Inference responses are not stored on the server when ZDR is enabled.
 
 ## ADDED Requirements
 
-### Requirement: Per-User Kagenti Identity via Token Exchange
+### Requirement: Service-Account Kagenti Authentication via Keycloak
 
-User identity MUST be delegated to Kagenti via RFC 8693 OAuth2 Token Exchange so agent operations are authorized per-user.
+Kagenti requests MUST be authenticated using a dedicated service-account via OAuth2 Client Credentials Grant. User identity MUST be propagated via headers for audit purposes.
 
-#### Scenario: Token exchange enabled
+#### Scenario: Service-account token acquisition
 
-- **WHEN** `boost.kagenti.auth.tokenExchange.enabled` is `true`
-- **AND** a user's OIDC token is available via the configured header (default: `X-Forwarded-Access-Token`)
-- **THEN** `TokenExchangeManager` exchanges the user's token for a Kagenti-scoped token via RFC 8693
-- **AND** the exchanged token is cached per-user with TTL from token expiry
-- **AND** concurrent exchanges for the same user are deduplicated
-- **AND** the per-user token is used for all Kagenti API calls on behalf of that user
+- **WHEN** `boost.kagenti.auth.tokenEndpoint` is configured
+- **AND** `boost.kagenti.auth.clientId` and `boost.kagenti.auth.clientSecret` are provided
+- **THEN** `KeycloakTokenManager` obtains a service-account token via OAuth2 Client Credentials Grant
+- **AND** the token is cached with a configurable expiry buffer (default: 60 seconds)
+- **AND** concurrent token requests share a single in-flight Keycloak call
+- **AND** the `Authorization: Bearer <token>` header is added to all Kagenti API calls
 
-#### Scenario: Token exchange graceful fallback
+#### Scenario: Kagenti REST API endpoints
 
-- **WHEN** token exchange fails (missing header, Keycloak error, exchange failure, disabled config)
-- **THEN** the system silently falls back to the shared service-account token
-- **AND** no request is blocked due to token exchange failure
-- **AND** the fallback is logged for debugging
+- **WHEN** the entity provider or `KagentiApiClient` calls the Kagenti API
+- **THEN** it uses the `/api/v1/` REST API prefix — **not** `/a2a/` (which is the A2A protocol path, not the management API)
+- **AND** agent discovery calls `GET /api/v1/agents?namespace={ns}` returning `{ items: AgentCard[] }`
+- **AND** tool discovery calls `GET /api/v1/tools?namespace={ns}` returning `{ items: KagentiTool[] }`
+- **AND** the `Authorization: Bearer <token>` header is included on every request
 
-#### Scenario: Token exchange configuration
+#### Scenario: Streaming token lifecycle
 
-- **WHEN** token exchange is configured
+- **WHEN** a streaming (SSE) request is initiated
+- **THEN** `getTokenForStreaming(minLifetimeMs)` ensures the token has sufficient remaining validity
+- **AND** if the token would expire during the stream, a fresh token is obtained before the request starts
+
+#### Scenario: Token refresh on authentication failure
+
+- **WHEN** a Kagenti API call returns HTTP 401
+- **THEN** the cached token is immediately invalidated
+- **AND** a fresh token is obtained from Keycloak
+- **AND** the original request is retried with the new token
+- **AND** the retry is attempted at most once — if the retried request also returns 401, the error is propagated to the caller
+
+#### Scenario: User identity propagation
+
+- **WHEN** a Kagenti API call is made on behalf of a user
+- **THEN** the `X-Backstage-User` header carries the Backstage user entity ref (e.g., `user:default/jsmith`)
+- **AND** this header is informational only — authentication is via the service-account token
+
+#### Scenario: Service-account auth configuration
+
+- **WHEN** Kagenti authentication is configured
 - **THEN** the following config is used:
   | Key | Default | Description |
   |---|---|---|
-  | `boost.kagenti.auth.tokenExchange.enabled` | `false` | Enable per-user token exchange |
-  | `boost.kagenti.auth.tokenExchange.audience` | — | Target audience for exchanged token |
-  | `boost.kagenti.auth.tokenExchange.userTokenHeader` | `X-Forwarded-Access-Token` | Header containing user's OIDC token |
+  | `boost.kagenti.auth.tokenEndpoint` | — | Keycloak token endpoint URL |
+  | `boost.kagenti.auth.clientId` | — | OAuth2 client ID for service-account |
+  | `boost.kagenti.auth.clientSecret` | — | OAuth2 client secret |
+  | `boost.kagenti.auth.tokenExpiryBufferSeconds` | `60` | Seconds before expiry to refresh token |
 
 #### Scenario: LlamaStack provider unaffected
 
-- **WHEN** token exchange is configured
-- **THEN** `ResponsesApiProvider` is not modified — `setUserContext` is optional and not implemented
-- **AND** token exchange is Kagenti-specific
+- **WHEN** Kagenti service-account auth is configured
+- **THEN** `ResponsesApiProvider` is not modified — it uses a separate authentication path
+- **AND** Keycloak service-account auth is Kagenti-specific
 
 ### Requirement: CSRF Protection
 

workspaces/boost/openspec/changes/security-safety-governance/tasks.md

@@ -43,15 +43,15 @@
 - [ ] 6.4 Gate MCP panel with `boost.mcp.manage`
 - [ ] 6.5 Gate config panel with `boost.config.manage`
 
-## 7. Token Exchange (P1)
+## 7. Keycloak Service-Account Authentication (P1)
 
-- [ ] 7.1 Create `TokenExchangeManager` implementing RFC 8693 exchange
-- [ ] 7.2 Add per-user token caching with TTL from token expiry
-- [ ] 7.3 Add concurrent exchange deduplication
-- [ ] 7.4 Add graceful fallback to service-account token on all failures
-- [ ] 7.5 Add config schema: `boost.kagenti.auth.tokenExchange.{enabled, audience, userTokenHeader}`
-- [ ] 7.6 Integrate into `KagentiApiClient.requestCore()` — inject per-user token when available
-- [ ] 7.7 Extract user OIDC token from configurable request header in route handlers
+- [ ] 7.1 Create `KeycloakTokenManager` implementing OAuth2 Client Credentials Grant
+- [ ] 7.2 Add token caching with configurable expiry buffer (default 60s)
+- [ ] 7.3 Add concurrent token request deduplication (single in-flight Keycloak call)
+- [ ] 7.4 Add `getTokenForStreaming(minLifetimeMs)` for SSE connection support
+- [ ] 7.5 Add single 401 retry with cache invalidation and fresh token fetch
+- [ ] 7.6 Add config schema: `boost.kagenti.auth.{tokenEndpoint, clientId, clientSecret, tokenExpiryBufferSeconds}`
+- [ ] 7.7 Integrate into `KagentiApiClient.requestCore()` — add `Authorization: Bearer` and `X-Backstage-User` headers
 
 ## 8. CSRF and Credential Security (P2)
 
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@
 - [ ] 10.2 Verify IS_OWNER blocks non-owner promote/delete/withdraw
 - [ ] 10.3 Verify IS_NOT_CREATOR blocks self-approval
 - [ ] 10.4 Verify `boost.admin` works as coarse-grained alternative to fine-grained permissions
-- [ ] 10.5 Verify token exchange fallback: disabled config → service-account token
-- [ ] 10.6 Verify token exchange fallback: Keycloak error → service-account token
-- [ ] 10.7 Verify token exchange fallback: missing header → service-account token
+- [ ] 10.5 Verify service-account token acquisition and caching with expiry buffer
+- [ ] 10.6 Verify 401 retry: cache invalidation → fresh token → successful retry
+- [ ] 10.7 Verify streaming token lifecycle: `getTokenForStreaming` returns token with sufficient validity
 - [ ] 10.8 Verify `none` is rejected with a clear error pointing to `development-only-no-auth`

workspaces/boost/plugins/boost-backend/config.d.ts

@@ -97,26 +97,29 @@ export interface Config {
 
     /** Kagenti provider configuration. */
     kagenti?: {
-      /** Authentication configuration. */
+      /** Authentication configuration (OAuth2 Client Credentials Grant). */
       auth?: {
-        /** RFC 8693 token exchange. */
-        tokenExchange?: {
-          /**
-           * Enable RFC 8693 token exchange for Kagenti.
-           * @configScope yaml-only
-           */
-          enabled?: boolean;
-          /**
-           * Target audience for exchanged token.
-           * @configScope yaml-only
-           */
-          audience?: string;
-          /**
-           * Header containing user OIDC token.
-           * @configScope yaml-only
-           */
-          userTokenHeader?: string;
-        };
+        /**
+         * Keycloak token endpoint URL.
+         * @configScope yaml-only
+         */
+        tokenEndpoint?: string;
+        /**
+         * OAuth2 client ID for service-account authentication.
+         * @configScope yaml-only
+         */
+        clientId?: string;
+        /**
+         * OAuth2 client secret for service-account authentication.
+         * @visibility secret
+         * @configScope yaml-only
+         */
+        clientSecret?: string;
+        /**
+         * Seconds before token expiry to trigger a refresh (default: 60).
+         * @configScope yaml-only
+         */
+        tokenExpiryBufferSeconds?: number;
       };
     };
 

workspaces/boost/plugins/boost-backend/report.api.md

@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ export interface BackendApprovalStoreOptions {
 }
 
 // @public
-export const BOOST_CONFIG_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1;
+export const BOOST_CONFIG_SCHEMA_VERSION = 2;
 
 // @public
 export const boostAiProviderServiceFactory: ServiceFactory<
@@ -170,19 +170,25 @@ export const boostConfigFields: {
     readonly configScope: ConfigScope;
     readonly description: string;
   };
-  readonly 'boost.kagenti.auth.tokenExchange.enabled': {
-    readonly schema: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodBoolean>;
+  readonly 'boost.kagenti.auth.tokenEndpoint': {
+    readonly schema: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
     readonly configScope: ConfigScope;
     readonly description: string;
   };
-  readonly 'boost.kagenti.auth.tokenExchange.audience': {
+  readonly 'boost.kagenti.auth.clientId': {
     readonly schema: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
     readonly configScope: ConfigScope;
     readonly description: string;
   };
-  readonly 'boost.kagenti.auth.tokenExchange.userTokenHeader': {
+  readonly 'boost.kagenti.auth.clientSecret': {
     readonly schema: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
     readonly configScope: ConfigScope;
+    readonly sensitive: true;
+    readonly description: string;
+  };
+  readonly 'boost.kagenti.auth.tokenExpiryBufferSeconds': {
+    readonly schema: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodNumber>;
+    readonly configScope: ConfigScope;
     readonly description: string;
   };
   readonly 'boost.encryptionSecret': {