Harden artifact verification and signer trust across the pipeline#70
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Harden artifact verification and signer trust across the pipeline#70
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Looks good to me. Please resolve the conflicts. |
jkaczman
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@arrdalan I have resolved them. |
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[1] We were pulling the Raspberry Pi OS base image and libcamera .deb files and using them immediately without any integrity check. Now both get SHA256-verified.
[2] Builder images are now pinned by digest instead of mutable tags.
[3] I swapped the libcamera mirror over to archive.raspberrypi.com. The previous mirror no longer holds the necessary artifact we're using, which is what necessitated this change.
[4] The updater now requires an exact OpenPGP fingerprint match instead of blindly trusting whatever key a GitHub profile is currently publishing. Key rotations must be pushed to main and re-signed by both of our release keys.
[5] There's also now an integrity check step in the reproducibility README before unzipping the release ZIP.